Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Real Estate Bar Association of Massachusettes ("REBA") claimed that certain activities undertaken by the National Real Estate Information Services ("NREIS") constituted an unauthorized practice of law. At issue was whether NREIS's activities, either in whole or in part, based on the record and as described in the parties' filings, constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, section 46 et seq. Also at issue was whether NREIS's activities, in contracting with Massachusetts attorneys to attend real estate closings, violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, section 46 et seq. The court held that certain of the real estate settlement activities undertaken by NREIS did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law but the court could not determine based on the record whether the other described settlement activities did. The court also held that the closing or settlement of the types of real estate transactions described in the record required not only the presence but the substantive participation of an attorney on behalf of the mortgage lender and that certain services connected with real property conveyances constituted the practice of law.

Plaintiff served as an elementary school nurse during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years but did not acquire professional teacher status under G.L. c. 71, sections 41 and 42. Defendant sent plaintiff a notice that she would not be employed for the following 2009-2010 school year because she did not have the proper professional standards. Plaintiff sued defendant asserting that she was entitled to reemployment where defendant failed to comply with the requirements under G.L. c. 71, section 42. At issue was whether the nonrenewal of plaintiff's employment should be treated as a "dismissal" within the meaning of section 42 and subject to the protections therein. The court held that the decision not to rehire a teacher on the experience of his or her term of employment cannot be equated to dismissal of a teacher during his or her term of employment. Therefore, plaintiff was not dismissed from her position and was not entitled to safeguards under section 42.

Defendant appealed a conviction of murder in the first degree where the predicate felony for felony-murder was an armed home invasion. Defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court reversed the conviction on the indictment charging armed home invasion where the indictment failed to specify the offense for which the defense was charged but affirmed defendant's conviction of felony-murder and illegal possession of a firearm. The court also held that, in light of the circumstances, the admission of the threat at issue did not unfairly prejudice the defendant and there was no error in admitting it. The court further held that self-defense was inapplicable to a charge of felony-murder so any error in the self-defense and excessive force instructions would have had no impact on felony-murder deliberations; that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; and that the judge did not err in deciding his motion for a new trial without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and resisting arrest. At issue was whether the court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress and properly convicted him. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion and held that there was no error in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence where the firearm was recovered as a result of a lawful seizure of his person; there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions of resisting arrest to and unlawful possession of a firearm where he charged at officers and used physical force against one officer; and there was no merit to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel failed to suppress his statement in response to an officer where there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have could have inferred that he knew that the two men following him were police officers and that the police wished to stop him. The court also held that defendant's right to bear arms and to self-defense under the Second Amendment and his equal protection guarantees under Federal and State Constitutions were not violated.

The mother of a child who was the subject of care and protection in a proceeding in Juvenile Court appealed from a judgment denying her petition for relief from an order placing the child in temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families ("department"). At issue was whether the denial of extraordinary relief was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the judge's findings clearly supported her determination where the department made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child by placing the mother in two successive foster homes to help her learn better parenting skills and there was no reason to believe that a third placement would have been more successful. The court also held that the judge did not err in holding that the child was suffering from serious abuse or neglect in the mother's custody.