Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Boston Edison Company ("Boston Edison") brought an action under G.L. c. 79, 12 to recover damages caused by four eminent domain takings by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") on property known as the Fore River Station ("site") in the town of Weymouth and city of Quincy. The parties raised issues related to the reasonable probability of residential development on the north parcel of land; limiting damages on the south parcel of land to those caused by the actual taking or the public project for which the taking was made; and the calculation of interest. The court held that a rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Boston Edison, reasonably could have found that it was reasonably probable that the north parcel could be rezoned for residential use and developed even though it was in a designated port area. The court also held that damages arising from a planned taking were not compensable and therefore, the jury must distinguish between damages arising from the actual taking and those arising from the planned, but unrealized, taking. The court further held that there was no error in the calculation of prejudgment or postjudgment interest where the court failed to see what basis remained for claiming the preamendment rate of interest when Boston waived any constitutional challenge to the statutory rate of interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the rulings and remanded for further action consistent with the opinion and the judge's allowance of the motion for remittur.

Defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute when he was stopped for speeding and then arrested for operating a motor vehicle without a license in violation of G.L. c. 90, 10. During the subsequent inventory search of defendant's vehicle, police recovered drugs, cash, and other items. At issue was whether the search was unlawful because defendant did not need a Massachusetts driver's license and possessed a valid Canadian driver's license at the time of the stop and therefore, the evidence recovered from the inventory search was fruits of an illegal search. The court affirmed the order allowing defendant's motion to suppress the evidence at issue where the arresting officer did not, in connection with defendant's arrest, take into account the statutory factors enumerated in G.L. c. 90, 3 1/2, for determining Massachusetts residency and therefore, lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for operating without a Massachusetts driver's license.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a general contractor at a residential construction site, alleging claims of negligence, cross negligence and/or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct which resulted in the deaths of two employees hired by the subcontractor that was hired by defendant. At issue was whether, pursuant to G.L. c. 152, 23, a general contractor that paid workers' compensation benefits to an employee of an uninsured subcontractor, was immune from liability for common law claims the employee could have against that general contractor. The court held that the plain language of section 23 did not release a general contractor that paid workers' compensation benefits to its uninsured subcontractor's employee and that G.L. c. 152, 18 made clear that suits were not barred against general contractors that were obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits to the uninsured subcontractor's employees. Accordingly, the immunity provided under section 23 did not apply to defendant and therefore, the court vacated summary judgment in favor of defendant and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and doing so in a school zone, moved successfully to suppress drugs that were seized from his person. At issue was whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant and search his boot where they found 28 packaged bags of "crack" cocaine. The court held that the series of events seen by the experienced surveillance officer were more than sufficient for reasonable suspicion. However, the quantum of facts known to the police justified a stop of defendant for questioning but without more, those facts did not justify the search of defendant's boot, which required probable cause.

A juvenile was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on the grounds of a school in violation of G.L. c. 269, 10(j) when a knife, a recent birthday gift from his father, dropped out of his pocket during shop class and had been seen by the instructor who reported the juvenile to the dean. At issue was whether a knife that was not a per se dangerous weapon enumerated in G.L. c. 269, 10(b), could constitute a "dangerous weapon" as that term was used in section 10(j), when that knife was not being used in a dangerous manner. The court held that the phrase "dangerous weapon," as used in section 10(j), must be interpreted as incorporating the common law definition of that phrase. The definition included knives that were "designed and constructed to produce death, or great bodily harm" but that were not necessarily stilletos, daggers, dirk knives, or the other objects listed in section 10(j). Such knives were dangerous per se under the common law and thus prohibited from schools under section 10(j). The court also held that, although it appeared unlikely that the two-inch folding knife carried by the juvenile constituted a dangerous weapon within the common law definition, the court remanded to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings to determine the design, purpose, and construction of the knife.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, violation of G.L. c. 93A, 11, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with contractual and business relations and defendants filed counterclaims. At issue, among others, was whether actions taken by an employer against a former employee could violate G.L. c. 151B, 4(4), and (4A), sections of the antidiscrimination law that respectively prohibited retaliation and interference with a protected right. The court held that an employer or other person could be liable to a former employee under these sections for retaliatory or interfering conduct that occurred after the employment relationship had terminated. The court also affirmed in part and reversed in part the remaining issues in case.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, 3, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, 148 and 150, when plaintiff filed an action in superior court against his former employers and their officers. At issue was whether the justice erred by denying plaintiff's second petition of relief from an order granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration as to some of plaintiff's claims and staying his remaining claims pending arbitration. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion by denying relief where plaintiff offered several arguments that the justice's order was wrong on the merits and each of his arguments could be addressed in an appeal from a final judgment and where plaintiff had an alternative interlocutory remedy, namely, a petition for relief under G.L.c. 231, 118.

The subject of the present appeal was an order issued by a judge in the Probate and Family Court, authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication (substituted judgment treatment order) to a mentally ill women under guardianship. The order was issued on February 2009 and has since expired, therefore, the appeal was moot. However, the court addressed the issue concerning notice requirements applicable to motions seeking substituted judgment treatment orders because that issue was likely to recur. The court held that a party filing a motion for entry of a substituted judgment treatment order must provide all other parties with at least seven days notice through service of a copy of the motion on them, and must give the same notice, through service, of every affidavit that will be filed in support of the motion.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty when she ran over her husband several times and was convicted of an assault and battery on him by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant raised issues on appeal related to evidence of her mental impairment, the ineffective assistance of counsel, error in the judge's limiting instruction, and the reduction of her sentence. The court held that the jury was not properly instructed that they could consider evidence of mental impairment on the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty, but that the conviction of murder in the second degree could stand unless the Commonwealth elected to move for a new trial. Therefore, the court declined to decide the remaining issues and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater and sentenced to a one-year term of probation and ninety-day loss of license. The principal issue in this case was whether an annual certification, and accompanying diagnostic records, attesting to the proper functioning of the breathalyzer machine used to test defendant's blood alcohol content were admissible in a criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The court held that the certification and supporting records were created as part of a regulatory program providing standardized mechanisms for the routine maintenance of all breathalyzer machines throughout the Commonwealth and therefore, they were admissible evidence as business records pursuant to G.L.c. 233, 78, and were not testimonial statements within the scope of protection afforded by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, their admission in this case was not error and the conviction affirmed.