Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A United States District Court judge for the District of Massachusetts ruled in this case that defendant misclassified as independent contractors those plaintiffs who were Massachusetts residents. The judge certified to this court questions related to calculation of damages for one such plaintiff. The certified questions related to whether, under Massachusetts law, an employer could use a system of customer accounts receivable financing to pay its employee at the time the customer paid the employer for the employee's work rather than when the work was performed; and whether, under the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, section 148, 150, an employer and an employee could agree that the employee would pay the cost of workers' compensation and other work-related insurance coverage. The court held that the accounts receivable financing system at issue improperly deferred payment of the employee's earned wages, and that an employer could not deduct the insurance costs from an employee's earned wages. In response to the judge's invitation to provide additional guidance, the court also addressed the question whether defendant could deduct "franchise fees" from such wages, and concluded that the Wage Act forbade the deductions. View "Awuah & others v. Coverall North America, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer, claiming that his failure to pay her a referral fee was a breach of contract and violated the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, sections 148, 150. At issue was whether a 2008 amendment to the enforcement section of the Wage Act, providing for a mandatory award of treble damages to a prevailing employee, should be applied in an action brought by an employee against her employer for violation of the Wage Act before the amendment's effective date. The court held that the amendment should be read to apply only prospectively, to claims arising on or after the amendment's effective date of July 12, 2008. Therefore, because the Superior Court judge applied the amendment retrospectively, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rosnov v. Molloy" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree of Elizabeth Lochtefeld based on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed from his convictions and the denial of his amended motion for a new trial. The court held that flaws in the jury selection process required the reversal of his conviction. The court also noted that on remand, the Commonwealth should exercise care to avoid using defendant's exercise of his Miranda rights against him by suggesting that his invocations of or deliberations on these rights demonstrated his criminal responsibility. The court further noted that, at retrial, the judge should consider the application of Commonwealth v. Berry to the case in light of the particular evidence introduced and instruct the jury accordingly. Therefore, defendant's convictions were reversed, the verdicts set aside, and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Toolan" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested following the recovery of a weapon in the glove box of a motor vehicle after it was searched by police. Defendant subsequently sought sanctions from the Commonwealth's violation of discovery orders aimed at preserving firearm evidence and securing the presence of defendant's expert at ballistics testing of the weapon. The court held that because the record was not sufficiently developed either as to the likely exculpatory nature of the unobserved first test firing or the level of culpability that might warrant the shifting of the burden to the Commonwealth, and thus provided inadequate support for the judge's findings, the order for sanctions was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court also held that the judge could consider affidavits submitted by the parties or conduct an evidentiary hearing if requested to do so. View "Commonwealth v. Sanford" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in the death of his former landlady on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On his direct appeal, defendant asserted that an error in the jury instructions and improperly admitted findings from the autopsy victim created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice and required reversal. The court agreed and held that the jury instructions regarding the interaction of the voluntary consumption of drugs and mental illness were flawed and incomplete and created a substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial on that basis. View "Commonwealth v. DiPadova" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant contended that the judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty as to murder in the first degree because the evidence was insufficient. Defendant also urged the court to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the verdict to murder in the second degree. The court held that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support defendant's conviction. After review of the record, the court also held that there was no basis to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce his murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, possession of a firearm without a license, as a subsequent offender, and as an armed career criminal, and various other firearm offenses. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that the judge did not erroneously instruct the jury on the elements of joint venture; a witness's out-of-court statement was made during the court of an ongoing emergency and was therefore, nontestimonial; the statement was also admissible under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule; any impeachment value of the inconsistent statement at issue would have been diminished by the testimony of the police officers and the undisputed evidence, thereby corroborating the witness's spontaneous utterance; the exclusion of cumulative evidence did not constitute prejudicial error; and nothing in the prosecutor's closing statement created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the proposed redevelopement of private property within the Middlesex Fells Reservation. Plaintiffs commenced an action against Fellsway Development LLC; Langwood Commons LLC; the Secretary of the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (Secretary); and the Commissioner of the Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from alleged violations of the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), G.L.c. 30, section 61-62H, and regulations promulgated thereunder, 301 Code Mass. Regs. 11.00. Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing Counts I, II, and III of plaintiffs' complaint, brought under section 7A and G.L.c. 231A, against the Secretary for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As against the developers and the DCR, the court reversed only the judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under section 7A, and alleging a violation of MEPA's antisegmentation regulation promulgated at 301 Code Mass. Regs. 11.01(2)(c). Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ten Persons of the Commonwealth & another v. Fellsway Development LLC & others" on Justia Law

This case arose when Robert Morrison, Jr. pleaded guilty to, among other things, four counts of assault and battery on a public employee (the arresting police officer) and the officer consequently brought a civil suit against Morrison for his injuries. Morrison and Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan) subsequently applied for direct appellate review on the issue of whether Metropolitan had a duty to defend and indemnify Morrisson in the civil suit. The court held that an exclusion in a liability policy for "intentional and criminal acts" applied where the insured intended to commit the conduct that caused injury and where the conduct was criminal. The court also held that a guilty plea did not negate an insurer's duty to defend, even where the duty to defend would be negated by a criminal conviction after trial, because a guilty plea was not given preclusive effect and was simply evidence that the insured's acts were intentional and criminal. The court further held that one of the consequences of such a breach of its duty to an insured by failing to provide a defense was that, in determining whether the insurer owed a duty to indemnify the insured for the default judgment, the insurer was bound by the factual allegations in the complaint as to liability. The court finally held that, because the judge based her conclusion that Metropolitan had no duty to indemnify in large part on Morrison's guilty pleas and because the judge determined that Metropolitan had no duty to indemnify without first determining whether it owed a duty to defend at the time of the default judgment, the court vacated the declaratory judgment and set aside the allowance of Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment as well as the denial of Morrison's motion for partial summary judgment. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Morrison, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a level three sex offender with Asperger's disorder currently residing in a rest home. At issue was whether G.L.c. 178K(2)(e), which prohibited level three sex offenders to move to a rest home or other regulated long-term care facility, was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. The court held that the statute infringed on plaintiff's protected liberty and property interests and violated his right to due process; because the statute failed to provide for an individualized determination that the public safety benefits of requiring him to leave the rest home outweighed the risks to plaintiff of such a removal, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. View "John Doe vs. Police Commissioner of Boston & others" on Justia Law