Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and of intimidation of a witness. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial judge committed reversible errors and also raised several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the murder conviction.View "Commonwealth v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Secretary filed an administrative complaint alleging that three hedge funds offered by Bulldog Investors violated section 301 of G.L.c. 110A by offering unregistered securities to a Massachusetts resident through a publicly available website and an e-mail message. The Secretary adopted the hearing officer's finding of a violation and ordered Bulldog Investors to cease and desist from committing any further violations and to take all necessary actions to ensure that future offers and sales of securities complied with section 301. The court held that the challenged provisions of the Massachusetts law were part of a constitutionally permissible disclosure scheme and, to the extent that they restricted speech, they were tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state interest in promoting the integrity of capital markets by ensuring a fully informed investing public. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bulldog Investors, et al. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs commenced an action in the Superior Court, alleging fraud, violation of G.L.c. 93A, and other claims arising from their purchase of a house which, they alleged, contained numerous undisclosed latent defects that rendered the house uninhabitable. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a "Notice of Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct," alleging that the judge was in violation of the Code in several respects. Plaintiffs requested that the single justice remove the judge from the case and the single justice denied relief on the ground that plaintiffs had adequate alternative remedies. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion by denying extraordinary general superintendence relief and affirmed the judgment. View "Culley, et al. v. Cato, et al." on Justia Law

Ralph C. Sullivan was stopped and issued a citation assessing a one hundred dollar penalty for a moving violation, failure to stay within a marked lane, in violation of G.L.c. 89, section 4A. On appeal, defendant claimed that the twenty-five and fifty dollar filing fees, he was required to pay in order to have his case heard, violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Defendant also argued that, because the statue providing for payment of the twenty-five dollar filing fee was enacted after he had requested a clerk-magistrate's hearing, the imposition of the filing fee was an ex post facto application of that statute. The court held that the filing fees did not violate Sullivan's equal protection rights and that the application of the statute requiring the twenty-five dollar filing fee did not violate the ex post facto clause. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Sullivan's motion seeking the return of these filing fees. View "Police Dept. of Salem v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, armed assault with intent to murder, and possession of an unlicensed firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that he should be granted a new trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel; that the judge erred in limiting the jury's use of exculpatory evidence of third-party culprits, in admitting evidence of defendant's participation in drug dealing, and in failing to give an alibi instruction; and that defendant was entitled to reversal of the guilty verdict on the indictment charging armed assault with intent to murder. The court affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion for new trial. After a complete review of the record, the court also concluded that there was no basis to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce his murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Walker" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder on both charges, and of burning of a dwelling house, armed robbery while masked, and assault and battery. Defendant subsequently raised numerous issues of error on appeal related to the denial of his motion for a new trial, denial of his motions to suppress, and admission of DNA evidence. The court affirmed defendant's convictions and declined to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial pursuant to its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Cavitt" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial on the Commonwealth's petition for commitment under G.L.c. 123A, sections 12-16, a judge in the Superior Court concluded that as applied to defendant, whose victims both historically and predictably were limited to adult women to whom he would expose himself, sometimes while masturbating, the statute could not be construed constitutionally to support a determination that would result in defendant's commitment as a sexually dangerous person. The Commonwealth appealed, and sought a stay of defendant's release pending appeal. The court held that the finding made as to the manner in which defendant had behaved historically, and the findings as to his predicted criminal sexual behavior, did not support a finding that he was a "menace" within the meaning of section 123A. Consequently, the court need not decide the constitutional question and defendant was entitled to a judgment that he was not a sexually dangerous person. View "Commonwealth v. Suave" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a class C substance, clonazepam, and a class E substance, trazodone; possession with intent to distribute a class D substance, marijuana; and a drug violation near a school or park. Defendant contended, among other things, that the admission of drug certificates without the testimony of the analyst violated his constitutional rights. The court held that because the erroneous admission of the drug certificates was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. Because the Commonwealth could choose to retry defendant, the court considered other issues raised by his claims of error that could be material to a retrial. View "Commonwealth v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of January 12, 1991, six men were shot execution-style in the basement of an illegal gambling parlor in the Chinatown section of Boston. After the shootings, arrest warrants were issued for the defendants and in 1999, one defendant, Siny Van Tran, was arrested in China. Another defendant, Nam The Tham, was arrested the following year in China. Both defendants were extradited from Hong Kong to the United States and subsequently convicted of five charges of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendants asserted several claims of error related to the denial of motions for severance, the admissibility of airline records, improper prosecutorial vouching, and the admission of inculpatory statements. After the court reviewed the briefs, the entire record, all the issues, and the arguments, the court saw no reason to reduce the degree of guilt on the murder convictions or to order a new trial. Accordingly, the judgments were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Tran (and 13 companion cases)" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was under fourteen-years-old at the time of the alleged offense, was subsequently indicted when defendant was twenty-three-years-old on six charges of rape of a child with force and two charges of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. At issue was whether a person who committed an offense at an age under 14, but who was not apprehended until after he or she had passed the age of 18, could be prosecuted. The court held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to try the person for that offense under G.L.c. 119, section 72A, after indictment, provided that a judge in the Juvenile Court had determined that there was probable cause to believe that the person committed the offense charged and that the interests of the public required that the person be tried for the offenses instead of being discharged. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Porges" on Justia Law