Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in October, 2011
by
The issue raised by this appeal concerned the threshold administrative remedy or remedies available under the Zoning Act, G.L.c. 40A, to one who was aggrieved by the issuance of a building permit to another person. The court held that where an aggrieved party had adequate notice of the building permit's issuance, he or she was required to appeal the appropriate zoning board of appeals within thirty days of the permit's issue date. In such circumstances, a later appeal to the board from a denial of a request for enforcement was not an available alternative remedy. Accordingly, the court agreed with the Land Court judge that because plaintiffs, who had adequate notice that the challenged building permits had issued to their neighbor, did not file an appeal with the zoning board of appeals within 30 days of issuance, the board, and thereafter the Land Court, lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Connors, Jr. v. Annino" on Justia Law

by
Defendant was convicted by a jury of unarmed robbery of a person sixty years of age or older and was sentenced to life in prison after the trial judge found him guilty of being a habitual offender. At issue was whether the prosecutor's mathematical analysis in his closing argument of the probability that the lone eyewitness's identification of defendant was accurate created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where the analysis was not a reasonable doubt with a statistical probability. The court held that where, as here, the prosecution's case rested solely on an uncertain eyewitness identification and defendant's association with an admitted perpetrator of the crime, it did. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the court must determine whether a plaintiff had standing to maintain a try title action under G.L.c. 240, section 1-5, where he was in physical possession of real property but his chain of title rested on a foreclosure sale conducted by someone other than "the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or assigns." On his own motion, a Land Court judge determined that plaintiff held no title to the property at issue and thus lacked standing to bring a try title action. The judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the Land Court judge properly raised the question whether plaintiff had record title to the property such that he had standing to bring a try title action. Plaintiff had identified no basis on which it might be concluded that he had record title to the property such that a try title action could be sustained. As a result, the Land Court was without jurisdiction to hear the try title action. Dismissal of the petition was therefore proper but the dismissal should have been without prejudice. View "Bevilacqua, III v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

by
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, and also of armed assault with intent to kill. Defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Defendant argued that he was entitled to reversal of the convictions and a new trial because the courtroom was improperly closed during individual voir dire of prospective jurors; the judge, outside the presence of defendant, improperly questioned jurors and discussed questions from the jury; defendant was improperly denied a post trial evidentiary hearing on the possible bias of two deliberating jurors; the trial judge committed evidentiary errors; the judge's instructions on malice, voluntary manslaughter, and self-defense were in error; and his trial counsel was ineffective in many respects. The court thoroughly examined the record and affirmed defendant's convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, declining to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33 E. View "Commonwealth v. Dyer" on Justia Law

by
Petitioners (the witnesses) appealed from the denial by a single justice of their petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3. In their petition, the witnesses sought relief from a Superior Court order granting them immunity pursuant to G.L.c. 233, section 20C-20E, and ordering them to testify in the criminal trial of David Forlizzi and Fred Battista. The court held that the witnesses have not shown that they could not obtain adequate relief from the challenged orders in the normal process of appellate review. Therefore, the denial of their petition was proper. Insofar as the single justice considered the merits of the witnesses' claims, the court also concluded that he correctly determined that the scope of immunity provided to the witnesses pursuant to G.L.c. 233, section 20G, adequately protected their constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the single justice. View "Vaccari & another, petitioners" on Justia Law

by
This case was before the court pursuant to an order entered by the United States Supreme Court granting defendant's petition for certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the court for further consideration in light of McDonald v. Chicago. At issue was whether McDonald required the court to dismiss the three indictments charging defendant under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), with possession of a firearm and ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for (and was denied) a FID card to possess a firearm and ammunition, defendant could not challenge his convictions under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), as unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Accordingly, there was no reason to alter the court's judgment. View "Commonwealth v. Loadholt" on Justia Law

by
Following the death of plaintiff's wife, plaintiff amended the complaint for medical malpractice in a pending action against defendants, to include a claim for wrongful death. The wrongful death claim in the amended complaint was subsequently dismissed as time barred pursuant to G.L.c. 260, section 4 (statute of repose), and plaintiff appealed. The court held that a wrongful death claim could be substituted for a personal injury claim only where the trial had not commenced; the original complaint alleging malpractice was filed within the statutes of limitation and repose; and the allegations of liability supporting the personal injury claim were the same as those supporting the wrongful death claim. Accordingly, the court held that the wrongful death claim in this case should not have been dismissed where plaintiff could, after the period of time set forth in the statue of repose had expired, amend a complaint alleging medical malpractice resulting in injury including expected premature death. View "Sisson, Jr., et al. v. Lhowe, et al." on Justia Law