Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the conviction must be overturned because (1) closure of the court room during jury selection violated his constitutional right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment; (2) defendant improperly was precluded from presenting evidence of potential third-party culprits; (3) one of the Commonwealth's DNA experts offered improper testimony; (4) the Commonwealth failed to make timely disclosure of expert materials; (5) the prosecutor's closing argument was improper; and (6) trial counsel was ineffective. Defendant further argued that the motion judge erred in ruling on his motions for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court affirmed the conviction, the orders denying defendant's motion for a new trial and his supplemental motion for a new trial, and declined to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Buckman" on Justia Law

After his conviction in 2005 of murder in the first degree and carrying a firearm without a license, and while his appeal to the court was pending, defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for postconviction discovery relating to evidence not disclosed by the Commonwealth. The court remanded the motions to the Superior Court. After separate hearings on the motions, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a new trial. The commonwealth appealed. The court affirmed the trial judge's order granting defendant a new trial and concluded that the judge did not abuse her discretion or commit any other error of law in granting defendant's motion. View "Commonwealth v. Murray" on Justia Law

Defendant filed an application in the county court under G.L.c. 278, section 33E for leave to appeal from the denial of his second motion for a new trial. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court on the question of whether a so-called Acevedo error in the jury instructions on the burden of proof on provocation presented a "new and substantial" question under the statute, and if it did, whether the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that defendant's claims were not new and substantial within the meaning of G.L.c. 278, section 33E. The court continued to adhere to the principle that single justices, whose decisions under section 33E were final and unreviewable, faced with gatekeeper applications under section 33E, would allow cases to proceed to the full court in all meaningful matters. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court where an order shall be entered denying defendant's application for leave of appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher with professional teacher status, was dismissed by the superintendent of the school district for multiple instances of conduct unbecoming a teacher. On appeal, plaintiff argued that G.L.c. 71, section 42, which compelled arbitration of a wrongful dismissal claim made by a public school teacher with professional teacher status, violated art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because it impermissibly delegated to a private individual (an arbitrator) a judicial function and denied meaningful judicial review. The court concluded that this statute's provision authorizing arbitration of a principal or superintendent's dismissal decision did not interfere with core judicial functions and that the scope of judicial review set forth in the statute did provide for meaning judicial review such that there was no art. 30 violation. Plaintiff also contended that, pursuant to G.L.c. 150C, section 11, the arbitration award should be vacated because the arbitrator acted in excess of her authority, engaged in misconduct, and exhibited bias against him. The court concluded that the judge properly concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority or act in manifest disregard for the law. The court also rejected plaintiff's claims that the arbitrator engaged in misconduct and exhibited bias. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Atwater v. Commissioner of Education" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for operating while under the influence of intoxication liquor (OUI), operating with a license suspended for a prior OUI, and operating with a revoked license, following an encounter with an off-duty Summerville police officer in the city of Woburn. At issue was the suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the Woburn encounter, on the ground that the off-duty officer performed an illegal extraterritorial arrest. Because the court concluded that the Summerville officer did not "arrest" defendant for the purposes of triggering the common-law rule against performing a citizen's arrest for a misdemeanor, and that his actions were reasonable preventive measures to ensure public safety, the court agreed with the motion judge that there was no need to exclude the evidence. The court also held that its conclusion was buttressed by the lack of any official misconduct on these facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order denying defendant's motion to suppress and affirmed the convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Limone" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from a judgment of a single justice of the court denying his petition pursuant to G.L.c. 211, section 3. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictments against him in the Superior Court, arguing that they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The case was now before the court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21. The rule required petitioner to demonstrate "why review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." Petitioner has failed to do so where a statute of limitations defense could adequately be addressed in the ordinary course of pretrial motions, trial, and appeal. Although petitioner claimed that he had a right not to be tried on the indictment because of the passage of time, a statute of limitations defense protected only the right to have charges brought in a timely fashion. Petitioner's remaining claims similarly could be raised and decided during the ordinary course of trial and appeal. View "Garden v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of a single justice of the court denying, without hearing, his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3. The case before the court on defendant's memorandum pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, which required him to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or other available means." In his memorandum, which primarily focused on the merits of the judge's decision to revoke his sentence, defendant briefly asserted that he had no remedy in the ordinary appellate process. The court disagreed, if defendant was resentenced to a longer term, he could raise the revocation issue on appeal from that decision. View "Sarantakis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of felony-murder, deliberate premeditation, and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant was also convicted of armed robbery as the predicate felony and three charges of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of armed robbery to support his conviction of felony-murder, that there were numerous errors in the judge's instruction to the jury, and that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The court held that because it concluded that no claim of error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, and discerned no reason to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, defendant's convictions were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Fitchburg appealed from a ruling of the department requiring it to reimburse its customers over $4.6 million in gas supply costs incurred during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 purchasing seasons. The court concluded that the department's determination that Fitchburg's purchasing plans required preapproval was erroneous, as the plans incorporated only traditional risk management techniques that had previously never been subject to the department's preapproval. Penalizing Fitchburg for failing to seek preapproval, when such preapproval was never required, exceeded the department's authority and amounted to an error of law. With respect to the allegedly imprudent purchases, the court agreed with the department that one of the purchases at issue was unreasonable and imprudent, but held that the department's findings of imprudence with regard to the balance of the purchases in 2007 and 2008 were not supported by substantial evidence. View "Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities" on Justia Law