Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with home invasion and other offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress an audio recording allegedly made by a key witness in violation of state and federal wiretap laws. The witness was receiving witness protection services from the Commonwealth. Defendant then moved for issuance of a summons to secure the witness's attendance at the suppression hearing. A superior court judge ordered that the Commonwealth file the witness's address with the court under seal so that a summons could be served in time for the suppression hearing. The Commonwealth sought relief from this order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, the judge was within his discretion to order this limited disclosure. View "Commonwealth v. Platt" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for armed assault with intent to murder and other offenses. Defendant filed a motion seeking information as to the alleged victim's status as a police informant. Defendant argued that this information was relevant to his state of mind as to the time of the incident. The judge ordered the prosecutor to inquire of the alleged victim whether he was an informant for any law enforcement agency and to report the result to defense counsel. The Commonwealth sought relief from this order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no basis for the judge to order the Commonwealth to ask the alleged victim whether he was a confidential informant, as this information, obtained by counsel after the alleged incident, logically could not demonstrate Defendant's state of mind at the time of the incident. View "Commonwealth v. Jordan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress out-of-course photographic identifications made by four witnesses even though the officers who conducted the identification procedures did not follow the protocol adopted in 2009, where the out-of-court identifications took place in 2007; (2) admitting testimony that two witnesses feared for their lives; and (3) admitting testimony that Defendant sold drugs, as the testimony could not have resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the Court held that Defendant was not entitled to relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Borgos" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in the district court with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license and various civil motor vehicle infractions. The court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant sought leave to appeal from that ruling pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied. Defendant's application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 15 has no application where a trial court judge denies a defendant's motion to dismiss in a criminal case; and (2) nor was Defendant entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws 211, ch. 3, as it was well established that, unless a single justice decides the matter on the merits or reserves and reports it to the full court, neither of which occurred here, a defendant cannot receive review under chapter 3, section 11 from the denial of his motion to dismiss. View "Azubuko v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Chukwuma Azubuko for failure to pay rent. Azubuko, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Commonwealth, two cities, and a town, asserting various constitutional, statutory, and common-law claims and contending that these governmental entities were liable for paying his rent. A district court judge dismissed the third-party claims and later dismissed the underlying complaint when Plaintiff and Azubuko failed to appear. Azubuko subsequently sought mandamus relief. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied Azubuko's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the single justice correctly denied the request for mandamus relief, as Azubuko had another remedy, namely, an appeal from the final judgment of the trial court dismissing his third-party complaint. View "Azubuko v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion in limine to admit evidence that, shortly after he had declined to take a breathalyzer test, he changed his mind and requested the test but was not given it. After the judge's denial of the motion, Defendant neither proffered such evidence nor renewed his objection to its exclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence, as the minimally probative evidence proffered could have diverted the aim of the trial, causing the jury to focus unduly on whether Defendant recanted his refusal to take the breathalyzer test rather than on whether his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by the influence of intoxicating liquor. View "Commonwealth v. Jones " on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. After the conviction was affirmed, Petitioner filed several pro se motions for a new trial and sought appointment of counsel with respect to these postconviction, postappeal claims. The Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) declined to appoint counsel, and the trial judge denied Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a motion in the county court seeking relief in the nature of mandamus, challenging CPCS's decision not to appoint counsel and the trial judge's denial of his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was no clear cut duty to appoint counsel in this situation, mandamus was not proper. View "Ardon v. Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs." on Justia Law

This case involved an employment dispute between Defendant, a home heating oil company, and Plaintiffs, two former delivery truck drivers. Plaintiffs argued that they were owed compensation based on their classification as employees, rather than as independent contractors, under the Wage Act. Defendant responded (1) Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) alternatively, a general release contained in the parties' contract termination agreements nevertheless defeated the Wage Act claims. The superior court stayed the proceedings and reported the statute of limitations and general release issues to the appeals court. The Supreme Court transferred the case on its own motion and held (1) Plaintiffs were entitled to recover for damages that occurred within the three-year period prior to filing the complaint; (2) the general releases contained in the contract carrier termination agreements that did not explicitly include the release of Wage Act claims failed to waive those claims; and (3) as a result, Plaintiffs remained entitled to recover for their damages accruing within the three-year period prior to filing the lawsuit. View "Crocker v.Townsend Oil Co." on Justia Law

Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, was indicted for murder in the second degree. The superior court judge dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to the grand jury to support an indictment of murder in the second degree. A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the order dismissing the indictment, holding (1) contrary to the superior court judge's ruling, the evidence before the grand jury supported the indictment for murder in the second degree; but (2) the grand jury should have been, but was not, instructed by the prosecutor on the elements of murder and on the legal significance of the mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Walczak" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury; (2) it was not improper for a judge other than the trial judge to provide the jury with a supplemental instruction where the trial judge was neither sick nor disabled, and where the substitute judge did not certify in writing that he had familiarized himself with the record of the trial; (3) Defendant received effective assistance of counsel, and even if counsel made the mistakes claimed on appeal, counsel's performance did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) Defendant received a fair trial, and the interests of justice did not require the reduction of the murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law