Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in July, 2012
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In 2000 Go-Best wired $5 million to an account entitled "Morris M. Goldings client account" at Citizens Bank, based on representations made by Morris M. Goldings, who was then a Massachusetts attorney. Goldings later admitted that the representations were false and that he had used the money to pay other debts. Go-Best filed suit against Citizens Bank, bringing claims of misrepresentation, conversion, aiding and abetting a fraud, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a conversion, and negligence. Citizens Bank had no knowledge of Goldings's scheme to defraud Go-Best but failed to notify the Board of Bar Overseers of dishonored checks issued on the client account more than six months before Go-Best wired funds into that account. The trial court dismissed, but a divided Appeals Court reversed in part, vacating dismissal of claims of negligence and of aiding and abetting. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reinstated dismissal. Without actual knowledge, the bank's duty to notify the board of dishonored checks from trust accounts arose only from its contractual duty, not from any duty in tort, so the bank could not be liable to Go-Best for any negligence in fulfilling that duty. View "Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of MA" on Justia Law

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Blonde appealed denial of his motion to stay pending appeal after a probate judge appointed a special master for the purpose of selling the parties' former marital home. The property has since been sold. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Blonde had the opportunity to appeal to a panel of the appeals court. He also could have requested that the appeals court expedite such an appeal. An exercise of the court's “extraordinary power” is not necessary because he did not attempt to pursue ordinary appellate remedies. A stay pending appeal was not required and the request for a stay of that aspect of the judgment has become moot.View "Blonde. v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

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Healey, convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving children, completed his prison sentences, but remains committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center as a sexually dangerous person. He was initially committed in 1966, under the law then in effect, and was recommitted after he reoffended sexually while on a gradual release program. He unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge under G.L. c. 123A, 9, several times. In 2005, a jury determined that he remained sexually dangerous. Healy filed a petition in the county court, G.L. c. 211, 3, alleging that his conditions of confinement are governed by the 1958 version of the sexually dangerous person law; that he is entitled to be evaluated by psychiatrists rather than psychologists; that he is entitled to hearings before the parole board; that his right to a speedy trial has been abridged; and that he is entitled to proceed jury-waived. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed denial of the petition. Healy was required to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of remedies alternative to G.L. c. 211, 3, and failed to do so. He could have appealed from dismissal of his habeas corpus petition or filed a civil action against the Commissioner of Correction to challenge the terms of his commitment. View "Healey v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

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At trial, defendant conceded his guilt of murder, but sought a verdict of murder in the second degree on the ground that his impaired mental condition affected his ability to make decisions in a normal manner or to appreciate the consequences of his actions. He was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the beating death of his housemate in 2008. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, declining to grant relief under G.L. c. 278, 33E. The court rejected an argument by new counsel that the judge erred in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on mental impairment. In explaining the elements of murder in the first degree committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, the judge directed the jurors to consider each of the Cunneen factors, and he listed them accurately. The judge subsequently instructed the jury in conformity with the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 61-62 regarding consideration of evidence of the defendant's mental impairment. The jury need not be instructed in the exact words requested by the defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Szlachta" on Justia Law

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Defendant entered the apartment of his estranged wife and their two children with a can of gasoline; poured the gasoline so that it landed on himself, his 14-month-old daughter (Diana), the babysitter, and the floor; and ignited it. Fire engulfed Diana’s body, causing permanent disfiguring injuries. Defendant was indicted for armed assault with intent to murder, G.L. c. 265, 18 (b ); aggravated assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, 15A (c ) (i); assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, 15A (b ); arson of a dwelling, G.L. c. 266, 1; and armed home invasion, G.L. c. 265, 18C. He testified that he intended to commit suicide, not to injure anyone else, nor to burn the apartment. He did not claim any mental or emotional condition that prevented him from forming requisite intent or that he was not criminally responsible for his acts because of mental or emotional impairment. He was convicted of all charges. The Massachusetts Supreme Court set aside convictions of armed assault with intent to murder Diana and the caretaker, based on admission of incriminating statements defendant made to a psychiatrist after the fire, but otherwise affirmed. The court rejected claims relating to admission of prior bad acts evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Tran" on Justia Law

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In 2003 plaintiff entered into a same-sex civil union in Vermont. His Vermont civil union has never been dissolved by any civil authority. Nevertheless, in 2005, plaintiff and defendant were married in Worcester. In 2009 plaintiff filed for divorce from defendant. In his answer, defendant stated that he was married to the plaintiff and counterclaimed for a divorce. Defendant later moved to dismiss on the ground that his Massachusetts marriage was void. Holding that plaintiff's Vermont civil union as the equivalent of marriage in the Commonwealth, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the Vermont civil union would have to be dissolved before either party to that civil union could enter into a valid marriage in Massachusetts to a third party. View "Elia-Warnken v. Elia" on Justia Law

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Defendant, charged with deriving support from prostitution, was tried before a jury that indicated that they were unable to reach a verdict. The judge declared a mistrial. Prior to retrial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments against him on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge (the same judge as at his first trial) denied that motion, finding that the prior declaration of mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that defendant may be retried. View "Ray v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Following internal upheaval in a gang, five members and a nonmember associate executed a sixth member. Two other members testified under cooperation agreements. Davenport, the nonmember who killed the victim, testified that he acted under duress. Following joint trial of four defendants, the jury found all guilty of first degree murder and of other crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting Davenport’s claim that he was entitled to an instruction on duress as a defense to murder. The court also rejected arguments by other defendants that their defenses were mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable with Davenport's duress defense, so that their trials should have been severed, and that the Commonwealth was improperly allowed to challenge a juror who failed to make complete disclosure of his criminal record (the prosecutor discovered the omission after declaring his satisfaction with the juror but before the jury were sworn). The judge properly denied a motion for recusal that was based on statements made during a plea colloquy; properly admitted a statement of another defendant; properly denied a hearing to challenge reliability and admissibility of expert opinion testimony on bloodstain pattern analysis; and properly denied a required finding of not guilty on a charge of aggravated rape. View "Commonwealth v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

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The Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, 40, requires a conservation commission to issue a decision on a requested order of conditions within 21 days after holding a public hearing on the applicant's notice of intent to perform work covered by the act. Following the owner’s request for an extension, a hearing on his application for construction of a pile-supported pier and floating dock was held on April 6; the commission voted to deny the application on April 27 and mailed notice on April 28, 22 days after the hearing. The department reversed, based on the commission’s failure to timely act. In the meantime, the commission issued an enforcement order, based on work being done on the applicant’s property. The Supreme Judicial Court held that an applicant may waive the statutory time restriction, but any waiver must be voluntary in fact, its duration defined and reasonable in length, and notice of the waiver's duration must be a matter of public record, available to all interested persons. In this case, the applicant is entitled to proceed under the order issued by the department. View "Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham" on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded guilty to rape of a child and an unrelated unarmed burglary, and was sentenced to eight to 15 years. He had been the live-in boyfriend of the victim's mother for many years. When the victim was approximately seven years old, he began fondling her chest, and when she was about 10 years old he raped her once or twice each week. The charged rapes occurred when the victim was age 12 to 14. A jury found defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, G.L. c. 123A, 1, and he was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for an indeterminate period of from one day to life. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed for a new trial, based on the court: allowing evidence of defendant’s refusal to participate in sex offender treatment programs; admitting evidence of rumors that he had sexually assaulted another inmate; and instructing the jury regarding mental abnormality and the likelihood of engaging in sexual offenses. The prosecutor's closing argument, regarding defendant's sexual frustration from time in prison, was improper. The court properly excused a prospective juror for cause who expressed his belief that no medical expert could conclusively demonstrate whether defendant is going to commit another sexual offense. View "Commonwealth v. Hunt" on Justia Law