Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An electrician was killed by electrocution while attempting to repair an electrical transformer at the Logan Airport Hilton Hotel (Hilton). Plaintiff, as administratrix of the electrician's estate, filed suit against, inter alia, Hilton, the architect who designed the hotel (Cambridge Seven), the consultant Cambridge Seven retained to provide electrical engineering services (Costentini), and the construction subcontractor for electrical services (Broadway), alleging negligence, gross negligence, and breach of warranty. Hilton and Broadway filed cross claims against Cambridge Seven and Cosentini for indemnification and contribution. The superior court granted the motion for summary judgment brought by Cambridge Seven and Cosentini as to the complaint and cross claims and ordered final judgment. Hilton and Broadway appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on behalf of Cambridge Seven and Cosentini as to the cross claims brought by Hilton and Broadway for indemnification; but (2) reversed as to the cross claims for contribution. Remanded. View "LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture" on Justia Law

In 1941, Anna Child Bird executed a will with a testamentary trust that benefitted her sons, her grandsons, and their issue. At the time the will was executed, the law provided that an adopted child was excluded from the definition of "child." In 1958, the statute was amended to redefine the term "child" to include an adopted child. By its terms, however, the 1958 amendment applied only to testamentary instruments executed after 1958. In 2009, another amendment made the 1958 amendment applicable to all testamentary instruments regardless of when executed. Plaintiff was the biological great-grandchild of Anna, and Plaintiff had two adopted brothers. Plaintiff's father was a biological grandson of Anna. Plaintiff had been receiving income distribution from the testamentary trust established by Anna in her will. The Supreme Court concluded that the retroactive application of the 2009 amendment to Anna's trust, with the effect that Plaintiff's interest in the trust would be divided into three parts to cover her and her two adopted brothers, was unconstitutional. Remanded. View "Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A." on Justia Law

A superior court jury convicted Defendant William Santos of armed robbery and murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder fin the shooting death of Luis Rodriguez. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting many portions of Defendant's statement given to the police following the shooing, and the admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court err in admitting statements made by the codefendant to his sister shortly after the shooting, and the error was not harmless. View "Commonwealth v. Santos" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth and William O'Connell (collectively, Petitioners) filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from a district court judge's order releasing from impoundment a redacted version of a search warrant affidavit. The affidavit contained a recitation of allegations made against O'Connell, a prominent real estate developer, that were the subject of criminal charges of, inter alia, statutory rape. George W. Prescott Publishing Company sought access to the impounded affidavit on the grounds that the document was presumptively public. The district court judge vacated his earlier order impounding the affidavit but further ordered that the affidavit be redacted before it was made available to the public. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws 41, 97D, which bars from disclosure affidavits containing reports of rape, does not apply to search warrant affidavits; and (2) the judge did not err in vacating the order of impoundment. View "Commonwealth v. George W. Prescott Publ'g Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the death of Lourdes Hernandez. Defendant appealed, claiming that inappropriate statements made in the prosecutor's closing argument and a defective jury instruction on reasonable doubt constituted error requiring that his conviction be reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial error in his closing remarks; (2) the jury instruction was an accurate statement of the law, the instruction did not denigrate the Commonwealth's burden of proof, and Defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction; and (3) cumulative error did not warrant a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Mejia" on Justia Law

Family Court ordered that father, a retired stockbroker, pay mother, a physician, $454 in weekly child support, to equalize the parties' net incomes. The mother was required to pay specific child-related expenses. The parents were never married, but briefly lived together. They have joint legal custody and share physical custody. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated orders that the father pay child support and the mother to bear the full costs of extracurricular activities, child care, and private school. The court rejected father's argument that, to attribute income to him, the judge was required to find that his retirement was voluntary and in bad faith, or that the child's needs required consideration of his ability to earn additional income. It was within the judge's discretion to award support on finding that the child's reasonable needs could not otherwise be met. Application of the income-equalization formula was inconsistent with principles reflected in the guidelines and should not have been employed. Although the guidelines in effect at the time did not apply to shared physical custody arrangements, calculation of support was required to be consistent with principles embodied in the guidelines.View "M.C. v. T.K" on Justia Law

In 2006, defendant's wife and their nine-month-old daughter were found dead in a bed in the master bedroom of their home in Hopkinton. His wife had been shot once in the forehead; his daughter had been shot in the abdomen from close range while cradled in her mother's arms. Defendant, a British citizen, was charged with their murders and extradited from the United Kingdom, where he had traveled. He was convicted of counts of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, G.L. c. 265, sect. 1. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the motion judge (who was also the trial judge) erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless searches of his home by officers attempting to find his missing family. The court also rejected defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury because the jury pool was tainted by "saturating and inflammatory" media coverage and because the judge refused during jury selection to probe more deeply into whether prospective jurors had already concluded from the pretrial publicity that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged. View "Commonwealth v. Entwistle" on Justia Law

In 1990 McCarthy bought land at a mortgage foreclosure sale conducted by defendant, Seamen's, the mortgage holder. The advertisement described the parcel as "at the end of the paved portion of Higgins Hollow Road, Truro." McCarthy obtained a mortgage from Seamen's and retained defendant, Snow, an attorney. Before closing, Snow and issued to Seamen's a certificate of title. McCarthy received a copy. The foreclosure deed and mortgage were recorded. McCarthy purchased the property under the belief that it was in a specific location; it is actually another parcel. Following a land court action concerning a boundary dispute with a neighbor, McCarthy sued those involved in her purchase. During discovery, defendants sought, from the land court action, time sheets, correspondence between or among McCarthy and her attorneys, land surveyors, title abstractors, and title examiners; and all documents concerning the parcels. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the defendants did not establish entitlement to discovery of communications protected by attorney-client privilege under a theory of at issue waiver, but may discover the other information that qualifies as "fact" work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), because they have shown substantial need for the material and cannot without undue hardship obtain it from another source. View "McCarthy v. Slade Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

A district attorney filed a complaint with the Commission on Judicial Conduct alleging that a judge had exhibited "disregard for the law, lack of impartiality, and bias against the Commonwealth," S.J.C. Rule 3:09. The complaint enumerated 24 categories of decisions in which the judge allegedly exercised bias. For each category, the complaint provided one or more examples. The commission appointed special counsel to investigate. Months later, the Boston Globe published an article and an editorial reporting on the complaint and criticizing the judge's conduct in 10 cases. Four of these cases were not included in the complaint. The special counsel stated his intention to inquire about the additional cases and requested a broad set of documents. These requests were incorporated into a subpoena. The judge sought a protective order to quash or modify, arguing that the requests were overbroad and encroached on confidential, deliberative communications. Special counsel reduced the number of new cases to 23, identified into which area of inquiry each case fell, and removed one category of requested documents. The judge objected to the revised subpoena. The Massachusetts Supreme Court directed issuance of a revised subpoena, recognizing a judicial deliberative privilege as necessary to the finality, integrity, and quality of judicial decisions. View "In the Matter of Enforcement of a Subpoena" on Justia Law

The Bridgewater State University Foundation owns three buildings and three undeveloped parcels. One building is occupied by foundation offices and the university's alumni office; another houses the university's political science department; and the third is used by the university and the foundation for receptions and fundraising. The undeveloped parcels are used by students for recreation. None of the properties is used exclusively by the foundation. The foundation permits the university to use all the properties free of charge. The Appellate Tax Board decided that the foundation was entitled to the charitable exemption from local property taxes, G.L. c. 59, Sect. 5; the Appeals Court reversed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the foundation is entitled to the exemption. The foundation is a public charitable trust, and it is "organized and operate[s] exclusively for the benefit of" Bridgewater State University under G.L. c. 15A, sect. 37. The foundation has qualified as a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The university is an institution of public higher education and certifies that the foundation is operating "in a manner consistent with" the university's goals and policies and uses its money and assets solely for the benefit of the university. View "Bridgewater State Univ. Found. v. Bd. of Assessors of Bridgewater" on Justia Law