Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two sets of plaintiffs brought actions against the city of Worcester, alleging that the city was liable to them for nuisance, continuing nuisance, and continuing trespass arising from the discharge of effluent from the city's sewer system onto their properties. After the lower courts made a series of rulings in favor of the city, Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs' nuisance claims were not barred because they failed to satisfy the presentment requirement of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, as application of the presentment requirement in these cases would be egregiously unfair to Plaintiffs given that the law did not require presentment of nuisance claims at the time they filed their lawsuits; and (2) none of the statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity by the city was applicable in this case, and the city remained subject to suit. Remanded. View "Shapiro v. City of Worcester" on Justia Law

In 1995, Defendant was charged with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. At the time, Defendant was a minor and primarily spoke Khmai. During his plea colloquy, Defendant admitted to sufficient facts and was placed on probation. Defendant was committed to the Department of Youth Services after he violated the terms of his probation. In 2009, as an adult, Defendant sought to vacate his pleas, asserting he did not knowingly and voluntarily admit to sufficient facts where no interpreter was present during his plea colloquy and where he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The juvenile court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity of his plea proceedings and did not demonstrate he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Yardley Y." on Justia Law

Defendant had a license permitting him to carry a firearm for all lawful purposes. After driving to work one day, Defendant attempted to obtain a gun locker key for the storage of his firearm during his work shift, but all the lockers were full. Consequently, Defendant placed his gun in his vehicle's glove box and locked the vehicle. Defendant's car was later searched, and Defendant was charged with firearms violations. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of improperly carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of the carrying statute and unlawfully storing a firearm in violation of the storage statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction under the carrying statute, and Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of not guilty on that charge; and (2) because the trial judge did not properly instruct the jury regarding what qualifies as a locked container, Defendant's conviction under the storage statute was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on that charge. View "Commonwealth v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Defendant had a valid license to carry a firearm in Massachusetts. Defendant owned a semiautomatic handgun, which he kept loaded and unlocked in a bedroom drawer in his home. Defendant was charged with violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 131L(a), which makes it unlawful to store a firearm not under the immediate control of the authorized user unless the firearm is secured in a locked container or equipped with a safety device that renders the firearm inoperable by anyone other than the authorized user. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held (1) section 131L(a) is subject only to a rational basis analysis; (2) the statute is constitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago; and (3) Massachusetts may enforce section 131L(a) to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. View "Commonwealth v. McGowan" on Justia Law

This case involved a family dispute among the owners of several business entities (collectively, companies) that were established in connection with the operation of a chain of automobile dealerships. When the family patriarch died, his four sons - James Jr, Mark, Joseph, and Michael - held equal ownership interests in the companies. In 2007, the brothers sold most of the companies' assets. Plaintiffs, the wives of James and Mark, brought this action against Joseph, Michael, and the companies challenging the disposition of business assets remaining after the 2007 sale. In connection with their action, Plaintiffs sought testimony and documents from the companies' general counsel and outside counsel. The lawyers refused to comply with the subpoenas based on the attorney-client privilege. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel testimony and the production of documents. A judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's order insofar as the communications sought related specifically to the sale of life insurance policies, as the attorney-client privilege was waived as to this information. View "Clair v. Clair" on Justia Law

An LLC filed an application for a comprehensive permit with the zoning board of appeals to build five three-story buildings with 150 rental apartments. The board denied the application. On appeal, the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) vacated the board's decision and directed the board to issue a comprehensive permit. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HAC did not err in calculating the regional need for low and moderate income housing; (2) substantial evidence supported the HAC's determination that the fire safety concern outweighed the regional need for low and moderate income housing; (3) the HAC did not err in concluding that the town need not acquire a ladder fire truck if the project were built and that other claims of adverse fiscal impact arising from the project may not be considered in evaluating whether the denial of project approval is consistent with local needs; (4) substantial evidence supported the HAC's determination that the development would not adequately protect wetlands; and (5) the HAC did not err in ordering the board to refund the fee it assessed the LLC to pay for the service's of the board's legal counsel. View "Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sunderland v. Sugarbush Meadow, LLC" on Justia Law

John Marino, who died before this action, owned Corporation. Defendant sold equipment to Corporation, which failed to pay Defendant. Defendant obtained a default judgment against Corporation but was unable to enforce the judgment because Corporation had no assets. Defendant brought an action against Marino's estate, the executrix of Marino's estate, and another corporation owned by Marino, asserting claims for breach of contract, remedies under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Defendants filed a joint motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that none of the claims survived, as each claim arose from fraudulent acts or misrepresentations made by Marino. A superior court judge dismissed all claims against the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the breach of contract, UFTA, and violations of Chapter 93A claims should not have been dismissed because the claims were contractual in nature; (2) the fraud claim was properly dismissed; and (3) the unjust enrichment claim should not have been dismissed because it was premised on the allegation that the executrix was retaining funds belonging to Defendant. Remanded. View "Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff bank (Bank) claimed to be the holder of a mortgage given by Defendant. Bank filed a complaint in equity in the land court under the Massachusetts Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to determine if Defendant was entitled to foreclosure protections under the Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). Defendant conceded she was not entitled to protection under the SCRA but moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Bank lacked standing to bring a servicemember proceeding because it was not the clear holder of her note or mortgage. The land court denied Defendant's motion, determining that Bank had standing based on its right to purchase Defendant's mortgage. The court then authorized Bank to make an entry and to sell the property covered by the mortgage. The Supreme Court vacated the land court's judgment, holding (1) because Defendant was not entitled to appear or be heard at the servicemember proceeding, the land court should not have accepted or entertained Defendant's filings; (2) only mortgagees or those acting on behalf of mortgagees having standing to bring servicemember proceedings; and (3) in the present case, the judge used the incorrect standard in making the determination that Bank had standing. Remanded. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged initially by complaint with murder. After Defendant was arraigned, the judge scheduled a probable cause hearing. However, due to several continuances requested by the prosecutor, the probable cause hearing was not held before the grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with murder in the first degree. Before the indictment was returned, Defendant filed a petition seeking an order that a probable cause hearing be conducted. A single justice denied the requested relief. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal as moot, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 38 is applicable to a defendant who is initially charged by complaint with murder in the first degree and provides the defendant with the right to a probable cause hearing as soon as practicable in the circumstances; (2) the Commonwealth need not conduct the probable cause hearing within a definite time frame, but the Commonwealth must demonstrate good cause to justify any request by the Commonwealth to continue it; and (3) in the instant case, the single justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the relief sought by Defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Perkins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant and a codefendant were each convicted of assault and battery. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the court denied the motion, finding that counsel's performance did not prejudice Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the loss of exculpatory evidence; (3) instructing the jury on multiple defendants; and (4) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Marinho" on Justia Law