Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Demoulas Super Markets (DSM) was a closely held Massachusetts corporation. In this case, several minority Class A stockholders (Sellers), whose offer to sell their shares to DSM was rejected, brought an action seeking a declaration that, consistent with DSM's articles of organization (articles), Sellers could dispose of their shares in any manner they saw fit. DSM counterclaimed, claiming that Sellers could not sell their shares to any buyer who would imperil DSM's status as a Subchapter S Corporation and that Sellers were obligated to reoffer their shares to DSM before selling them to a third party on more favorable terms. A superior court judge declared (1) Sellers were not bound by the articles from freely transferring their stock, and (2) Sellers were not obligated to reoffer their shares to DSM before offering them to a third party on more favorable terms than those arrived at by arbitrators designated in accordance with the articles. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Sellers were not bound by fiduciary duty and could sell their shares regardless of whether the buyer's ownership would terminate DSM's S corporation status; and (2) DSM's articles did not create a preemptive right of first offer held by DSM. View "Merriam v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. The appeals court affirmed, concluding that any delay in bringing Defendant to trial did not violate Mass. R. Crim. P. 36. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the appeals court that Defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been allowed under the speedy trial provisions of the state or federal Constitutions. The motion was denied, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where (1) the speedy trial clock starts when a Massachusetts criminal complaint issues; (2) the speedy trial clock "resumes" when the Commonwealth reinstates charges following dismissal; and (3) although the delay from the attachment of the right to a speedy trial in September 1991 to Defendant's trial in May 2003 was lengthy, the factors set forth in Baker v. Wingo did not establish that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. View "Commonwealth v. Butler " on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of multiple criminal offenses in 2005. In 2010, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial and an amended motion for a new trial. Neither motion was acted on. Defendant also represented that he filed two additional motions requesting action on his new trial motions but that those motions likewise were unresolved. Defendant filed a petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, requesting that a single justice of the Supreme Court grant him a new trial for the reasons stated in the motions he filed in the trial court. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, as Petitioner did not (1) demonstrate he had availed himself of all measures available to him in the trial court to obtain a ruling on his motion, (2) provide copies of the motions he stated he filed in the trial court seeking action on his new trial motions, or (3) provide the single justice with a record adequate to support the specific relief he sought. View "Sellers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Fall River zoning board of appeals (Board) granted the C.B.L. Realty Trust (Trust) a variance for certain real property owned by it. The Fall River building inspector subsequently issued a notice of violation, ordering the trust to cease and desist from violating a Fall River zoning ordinance that concerned execution of the ordinance. The Board reversed the building inspector's order. Plaintiff, E & J Properties, LLC, commenced this action in the Land Court challenging the Board's decision. The Land Court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly considered whether the city ordinance had been violated, as alleged in the notice of violation, on account of the Trust's failure to comply with the Board's variance decision within some specified "reasonable time"; and (2) the Board's decision that the variance did not require demolition within a particular time period was both legally tenable and reasonable. View "E & J Props., LLC v. Medas" on Justia Law

Petitioner commenced actions in the probate and family court seeking to have herself appointed guardian and conservator for her elderly father. A judge appointed a temporary guardian and a temporary conservator in 2011. In 2012, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, seeking to remove the temporary guardian and the temporary conservator and arguing that Respondents engaged in unethical, unprofessional, and unlawful conduct resulting in irreparable harm to her father. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, as adequate alternative remedies existed for Petitioner to pursue relief, and Petitioner's concerns did not necessarily create the type of "exceptional circumstances" that would compel the exercise of the Court's supervisory powers pursuant to chapter 211, section 3. View "Belanger v. Cuffe" on Justia Law

In the underlying case, a superior court jury convicted Keith Winfield of forcible rape of a child under the age of sixteen, indecent assault and battery of a child under the age of fourteen, and assault and battery of a child causing serious bodily injury. The appeals court affirmed. Steve Audette, a film producer, was making a documentary film about Winfield's prosecution and convictions. After Audette purchased an official transcript of the trial, Audette filed a motion to access an audiotape room recording of the trial made by a court reporter. The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where the court reporter's room recording is not the official record of the trial and is not filed with the court or referenced in the court file, Audette was not entitled to a copy under the public's right of access to criminal proceedings guaranteed by the First Amendment or under the State's common-law right of access to judicial records; and (2) the judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to give Audette access to the recording. View "Commonwealth v. Winfield" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of murder in the first degree and two counts of armed robbery. Defendant did not appeal. Nearly forty-five years later, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, collaterally attacking his conviction. A judge denied Defendant's amended motion and granted Defendant leave to renew that motion subject to the outcome of his co-defendant's appeal from the denial of a similar motion for new trial. Rather than awaiting the outcome of that case, Defendant appealed the denial of his motion. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the denial of the co-defendant's motion for a new trial and concluded that the Court's decision in that case was controlling in the present appeal. The Court affirmed the judge's denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the judge's denial of Defendant's motion for new trial was not manifestly unjust, nor was the trial infected with prejudicial constitutional error. View "Commonwealth v. Robideau" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant and his co-defendant were convicted of felony-murder in the first degree and armed robbery. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant's conviction of felony-murder in the first degree, holding, among other things, that (i) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, (ii) the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a prior bad act of the co-defendant, but the error was harmless, (iii) the judge did not err in its instructions to the jury, and (iv) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial where the Court concluded that the co-defendant was entitled to a new trial due to errors at trial; and (2) vacated the armed robbery conviction, as it was duplicative of the murder conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Benitez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant later filed a second motion for a new trial, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain alleged errors at trial and on direct appeal. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial, holding (1) trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to two courtroom closures; (2) the trial judge improperly limited the scope of Defendant's cross-examination of a witness for the prosecution, but the error was harmless; (3) Defendant's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to cite federal law to support Defendant's claims of error on direct appeal; (4) the trial judge did not err in declining to give a Bowden instruction; and (5) the trial judge properly instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Defendant purchased an "own occupation" disability insurance policy from an affiliate of Plaintiff, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife). After Defendant was diagnosed with cancer, Defendant's employment was terminated. Defendant filed a clam for disability benefits and began receiving disability payments. Defendant later began working at a lower stress job. MetLife concluded that Defendant was no longer eligible to receive disability benefits. Metlife reached this conclusion by interpreting a clause in Defendant's policy requiring Defendant to receive care by a physician that "is appropriate for the condition causing the disability" to mean that Defendant was required to pursue treatment aimed at returning him to his prior occupation. MetLife filed an action seeking a judgment declaring it had no continuing obligation to pay benefits to Defendant and reimbursement of benefits it had paid. The superior court declared MetLife was not required to continue paying Defendant benefits but that MetLife was not entitled to restitution of any benefits paid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to benefits under the policy since he was not receiving care designed to enable him to return to him prior occupation; and (2) MetLife was not entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid to Defendant. View "Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter" on Justia Law