Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a Class B controlled substance, cocaine. During trial, a ballistics certificate and two certificates of drug analysis were admitted into evidence without testimony from the analysts who had prepared them. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the certificates were admitted without a showing of the unavailability of the analysts or a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. The appeals court affirmed the firearms conviction but reversed the drug conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, holding that the improper admission of the certificates at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Defendant conceded that he possessed both the gun and cocaine and agreed that the jury be instructed that the Commonwealth had proven all elements of both charges beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted a distribution of a class B controlled substance and committing a drug offense within a school zone. Before trial, Defendant's counsel orally stipulated that the substance at issue was cocaine. Both Defendant and the Commonwealth treated this as a fact during trial, but the jury did not become aware of the stipulation until the judge spoke of it during his final charge to the jury. On appeal, Defendant argued, inter alia, that because the stipulation was never presented to the jury, the Commonwealth failed to prove the substance was cocaine. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's distribution of a controlled substance conviction, holding (1) even if there were error in the manner the stipulation was handled in this case, no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice occurred; (2) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the stipulation was not memorialized in a writing or made the subject of a specific colloquy between the judge and Defendant; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the jury that Defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine. View "Commonwealth v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

On ten separate indictments, Defendant was convicted of rape of a child, indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, and indecent assault and battery on a child over the age of fourteen. Defendant's sentences included concurrent periods of incarceration and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Later, the superior court judge allowed Defendant's motion to correct his sentences by vacating the illegally imposed requirement of CPSL. So as to effectuate the intent of the original sentencing judge, the judge then vacated and restructured the entire sentencing scheme, converting two of the concurrent sentences of incarceration into probationary terms. Defendant appealed his resentencing, arguing that it violated double jeopardy protections. The Supreme Court held (1) although the lawful components of Defendant's sentences were in a sense final, the judge's decision to modify the interdependent sentences did not violate Defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy; and (2) because an increase in the aggregate punishment would subject Defendant to double jeopardy, the case must be remanded for resentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Cumming" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally prescribing controlled substances in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(a) and 32B(a), among other crimes. Defendant appealed, raising the issue of whether a physician "dispenses" rather than "distributes" a controlled substance pursuant to chapter 94C, 32A(a) and 32B(a) when the substance is delivered pursuant to an alleged prescription to a person who does not lawfully possess it. At Defendant's trial, the Commonwealth proceeded only on the theory that Defendant dispensed controlled substances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury effectively convicted Defendant of distribution even though they were told they were being instructed on dispensing. After Defendant's habeas corpus petition was denied, Defendant filed a motion for release from unlawful restraint challenging the Court's decision in Brown I. The motion was denied without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) there was no merit to Defendant's argument that the distribution conviction violated his right against double jeopardy; (2) the Court did not deny Defendant the right to appeal from the distribution conviction; and (3) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for the shooting death of Brittany Perez. Eight bullets were fired at an apartment's front room window where Perez was standing, and four of the bullets struck and killed Perez. The window was covered by venetian blinds and dark curtains. Defendant was seen fleeing the scene of the shooting. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, holding that the trial judge erred in deciding not to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, where the jury reasonably could have found that Defendant did not know the room was occupied when he fired the rifle at the window. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Horne" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) assessed a penalty against Plaintiff for improper handling and disposal of roof shingles that contained asbestos. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, pursuant to the Administrative Penalties Act, it was entitled to a notice of noncompliance and the opportunity to cure any violations before the imposition of a penalty. The commissioner of the DEP affirmed the penalty after accepting the recommendation of a hearing officer, finding that Plaintiff's failure to comply fell within one of the exceptions to the notice requirement because it was "willful and not the result of error." The hearing officer interpreted this language, otherwise called the "willfulness exception," as requiring only a showing of the "intent to do an act that violates the law if done." The Supreme Court affirmed the agency's disposition but on different grounds, holding (1) the DEP's decision was based on an error of law because its interpretation of the willfulness exception did not comport with the clear meaning of the relevant statute; but (2) Plaintiff's conduct was willful and not the result of error within the meaning of the Act because Plaintiff knew or should have known of the likely presence of asbestos in the shingles. View "Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

A Boston police officer witnessed Sylvain engaging in a sexual act with a prostitute. As the officer approached, Sylvain removed plastic baggies from his coat pocket and placed them in his mouth. Believing that the baggies contained "crack" cocaine and fearing overdose, the officer attempted to intercede. Although Sylvain ingested the drugs, a search of his jacket revealed an additional baggie of crack cocaine. The incident took place within 1,000 feet of a child care center. Sylvain, a noncitizen lawfully residing in the U.S., pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, subjecting him to automatic deportation. After the conviction the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) regarding a criminal defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to accurate advice about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, was not a "new" rule and applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Sylvain sought to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that his attorney erroneously advised him that there would be no deportation consequences. The motion was denied. While Sylvain's appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States (2013), holding that Padilla did announce a "new" rule and does not apply retroactively to collateral challenges. The Massachusetts Supreme Court remanded, holding that, as a matter of Massachusetts law, the right enunciated in Padilla was not new and, consequently, defendants whose state law convictions were final after April 1, 1997, may attack their convictions collaterally on Padilla grounds. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvain" on Justia Law

In 2006, while visiting relatives in Andover, 29-year-old Aleo attempted to use an inflatable swimming pool slide that had been imported and sold by Toys R Us. She slid down head first; when she reached the bottom of the slide, it collapsed, and her head struck the concrete deck of the swimming pool through the fabric of the slide. Robin's upper two cervical vertebrae fractured, resulting in quadriplegia. She died the following day, after her family, in accordance with her wishes, withdrew life support. Her estate sued, alleging negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, wrongful death, and violation of G.L. c. 93A. A jury found Toys R Us liable for negligence, breach of warranty, and wrongful death, awarding compensatory damages of $2,640,000 and punitive damages of $18 million. Under G.L. c. 229, punitive damages available for gross negligence in wrongful death action. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Toys R Us exhibited a “substantial degree of reprehensibility.” The court rejected challenges to pretrial rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of the $18 million award of punitive damages. View "Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Funds, closed-end investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a- 5(a)(1)(2), are organized as Massachusetts business trusts under G.L. c. 182. Plaintiffs are beneficial owners of preferred shares of each of the Funds. The Funds’ declarations of trust state that meetings shall be held “so long as Common Shares are listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange, on at least an annual basis." After plaintiffs delivered written notice stating an intention to nominate one of their partners for election as a preferred shares trustee of each fund at the 2011 annual meeting, the Funds issued a press release stating that their annual meeting was being rescheduled to July 2012, the last day of the Funds' 2012 fiscal year. Plaintiffs claimed that the bylaws require that an annual shareholders’ meeting be held within 12 months of the last annual shareholder meeting. The Funds argued that the bylaws require only that one meeting be held each fiscal year. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that "on at least an annual basis" means that a shareholders' meeting for each Fund must be held no later than one year and 30 days after the last annual meeting. View "Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund, Ltd. v. PIMCO, Income Strategy Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's 11-year-old stepdaughter told the Sexual Assault Investigation Network (SAIN) that the plaintiff had engaged in sexual conduct with her since she was four years old. Before trial on the resulting charges, the plaintiff sexually assaulted a 16-year-old. He pleaded guilty to indecent assault and battery on a person over 14, G.L. c. 265, 13H. The Sex Offender Registry Board notified the plaintiff of his duty to register and of its preliminary classification of him as a level three sex offender. The plaintiff requested administrative review and moved to continue the hearing until the case regarding his stepdaughter's allegations was resolved. The board denied the motion and considered a summary of the stepdaughter's SAIN interview. Plaintiff’s attorney told the hearing examiner that criminal trial counsel was guarding the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment rights and that the plaintiff, therefore, would not testify or present evidence. The hearing examiner found that the plaintiff presented high risk to re-offend and a high degree of dangerousness, and ordered registration as a level three sex offender. Plaintiff was later found not guilty with respect to his stepdaughter, except the charge of open and gross lewdness. The plaintiff sought review of his final classification, G.L. c. 6, 178M. A trial judge affirmed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, acknowledging that a convicted offender, awaiting trial on separate sexual offense charges, has a difficult dilemma where a classification hearing is held before the criminal trial. The board acted within its discretion in weighing the public safety interest in obtaining prompt final classification against the offender's interest in not potentially compromising his criminal trial strategy. The board now has discretion to reconsider the classification, but the acquittal is insufficient alone to show that the allegations were false. View "Soe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law