Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to sex-related charges and was required to register as a level three sex offender. In 2010, Defendant was arrested and charged with violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178H(a)(1). Specifically, the State alleged that eight days before Defendant was arrested, Defendant, who was registered as homeless, failed to notify police that he had begun living in an apartment with his aunt, either as his home or as his secondary residence, and that he knowingly provided false information when he registered as homeless. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and ordered entry of a judgment of not guilty, holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that Defendant changed his primary address or acquired a secondary address and, as such, could not show that he failed to inform police of a change of address. View "Commonwealth v. Arce" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction of murder in the first degree, holding (1) any error by the superior court in denying Defendant’s motions to suppress statements made to police as well as certain physical evidence gathered as a result of those statements was harmless; (2) the trial judge properly precluded Defendant from cross-examining a key Commonwealth witness as to prior false accusations she had made; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of armed robbery, the predicate offense for his conviction of murder in the first degree; and (4) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to complaints charging him with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial seeking to vacate his guilty plea to the charge of resisting arrest. In support of his motion, Defendant argued that there was no factual basis for the crime. The district court denied the motion, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s plea was not voluntary and intelligent because the record of the plea did not establish a sufficient factual basis for Defendant’s guilty plea to resisting arrest. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Hart" on Justia Law

In 2005, nine-year-old Jamison and three of his siblings became the wards of their maternal aunt and her spouse (together, “guardians”). Two years later, the guardians voluntarily terminated their guardianship of Jamison, and Jamison was placed in the permanent custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF). Jamison subsequently petitioned the juvenile court for visitation with two of his siblings. A juvenile court judge ordered supervised visitation with all three children over the guardians’ objection. The Supreme Court vacated the order allowing the motion for sibling visitation and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction over a sibling visitation petition where the petitioning child is in DCF custody and his siblings are wards subject to guardianship; (2) the presumption of validity afforded parental decisions regarding grandparent visitation recognized in Blixt v. Blixt does extend to the judgments of fit guardians in such circumstances; and (3) there was insufficient information to inform the judge’s determination whether visitation would serve the interests of all three children. View "In re Jamison" on Justia Law

Petitioners owned thirty-six acres of land in Hampden. The Division of Fisheries and Wildlife (Division), a unit of the Department of Environmental Protection, restricted Petitioners’ ability to construct a home on their land by delineating the property as a “priority habitat” for the eastern box turtle, a “species of special concern” under 321 Mass. Code Regs. 10.90. Petitioners challenged the validity of the priority habitat regulations insofar as they allowed the Division to designate priority habitat without affording landowners the procedural protections due under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act (MESA) to those owning property within significant habitats. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the Division, concluding that the regulations did not exceed the scope of the Division’s authority as granted by MESA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the priority habitat regulations were a reasonable implementation of the enabling statute. View "Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

After Defendant was indicted on murder charges, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of cell site location information (CSLI) associated with the cellular phone he was using because the CSLI was obtained without a valid search warrant based on probable cause. The superior court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant’s rights under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights were violated because, although the Commonwealth had obtained the CSLI from Defendant’s cellular servicer provider pursuant to a valid court order under the Federal Stored Communications Act (SCA), the Commonwealth’s access to the CSLI constituted a search within the meaning of article 14. The Supreme Court agreed with the motion judge, holding that although the CSLI in this case was a business record of Defendant’s cellular servicer provider, Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and, under the circumstances, the warrant requirement of article 14 applied. Remanded to allow the Commonwealth to present evidence that the affidavit in support of its application for an order under the SCA demonstrated probable cause for the CSLI records. View "Commonwealth v. Augustine " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding, inter alia, that (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his interview at a house of correction or Defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of a search of his girlfriend’s home; (2) it was error to allow the Commonwealth’s fingerprint expert to make certain statements during her testimony, but the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the absence of an instruction to the jury that they must unanimously agree on the predicate felony caused no prejudice to Defendant; and (4) the judge did not err in instructing the jury that the crimes of armed robbery and home invasion are “inherently dangerous to human life.” View "Commonwealth v. Wadlington" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of armed robbery. Defendant appealed from his conviction and from the revocation of his probation that resulted from the conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and concluded that there was no error in the revocation of Defendant’s probation, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction; (2) the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence in her closing argument; and (3) the judge who presided at Defendant’s probation revocation hearing did not violate Defendant’s due process rights by denying Defendant’s requests to present additional evidence as to whether he committed the robbery. View "Commonwealth v. Joyner" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, which held that a foreclosure by power of sale is invalid unless a foreclosing party holds the mortgage and also holds either the underlying mortgage note or acts on behalf of the note holder. In the instant case, Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage payments, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) sought to foreclose on the property. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against MERS claiming that MERS did not have standing to initiate foreclosure proceedings because it was not the holder of the promissory note or an authorized agent of any note holder. The superior court dismissed the complaint. Before Plaintiffs’ appeal was heard, the Supreme Court decided Eaton. The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim alleging a lack of authority to foreclose, holding (1) Eaton applies to cases, such as the instant case, that preserved the issue presented in Eaton and that were pending on appeal as of June 22, 2012; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs’ complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim on the grounds that MERS lacked the authority to foreclose. Remanded. View "Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of deliberately premeditated murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the murder. Defendant appealed, raising several allegations of error. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the motion judges and trial judge did not commit reversible error or abuse their discretion in their rulings and that Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; but (2) remanded the case to the superior court for resentencing, holding that, pursuant to the Court’s decision in Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, Defendant was eligible for parole in accordance with the terms of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 133A. View "Commonwealth v. Ray" on Justia Law