Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joseph Doktor and Dorothy Doktor were divorced by a judgment nisi entered in January 1992. The judgment incorporated a separation agreement that obligated Joseph to pay alimony to Dorothy until the death or remarriage of Dorothy. The alimony provision merged with the judgment. In 2013, Joseph filed a complaint for modification seeking termination of the alimony obligation under the retirement provision of the Alimony Reform Act, which provides that “general term alimony orders shall terminate upon the payor attaining the full retirement age.” A probate and family court judge dismissed the complaint for modification, concluding that the retirement provision applies prospectively, and therefore, Joseph was required to establish that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting modification and that Joseph had not met this burden. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the retirement provision of the Act was not applicable to modification of the alimony judgment in this case; and (2) the judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that the parties’ circumstances did not warrant modification of the alimony judgment. View "Doktor v. Doktor" on Justia Law

George Rodman and Roberta Rodman were divorced in 2008. The parties entered into a separation agreement that was incorporated into and merged with a judgment of divorce nisi. The separation agreement obligated George to pay Roberta alimony in the amount of $1,539 per week until the death of either party or Roberta’s remarriage. In 2013, George filed a complaint for modification seeking to terminate his obligations to pay alimony to Roberta on the ground that he had reached “full retirement age” as defined by the Alimony Reform Act, which became effective March 1, 2012. A probate and family court judge denied the motion, concluding that the Act was not to be applied retroactively to judgments entered before March 1, 2012. George appealed, arguing that, because his agreement merged with the judgment, it was always subject to modification based on his having reached the age of retirement, and therefore, his complaint for modification did not conflict with the proscription against retroactive application set forth in the Act. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the retirement provision of the Act does not apply retroactively to alimony orders in divorce judgments that entered before March 1, 2012. View "Rodman v. Rodman" on Justia Law

Chester Chin and Edith Merriot were divorced in 2011. Pursuant to a merged provision of the parties’ separation agreement, Chin was obligated to pay alimony until the death of either party or Edith’s remarriage. In 2013, Chin filed a complaint for modification seeking to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that, as changed circumstances, he had reached full retirement age and Merriot had been cohabiting with another person. A probate and family court judge dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) neither the retirement or cohabitation provision of the Alimony Reform Act applied retrospectively to divorce judgments ordering general term alimony that were in existence prior to the effective date of the Act on March 1, 2012; and (2) under the change of circumstances standard in effect before March 1, 2012, Chin was not entitled to modification of the alimony order. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) with respect to the alimony obligation, the retirement and cohabitation provisions of the Act apply prospectively and therefore afford no basis upon which to terminate the alimony order; and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge’s findings that there were no changed circumstances that would require an adjustment to the amount of alimony Chin had been ordered to pay. View "Chin v. Merriot" on Justia Law

The town of Yarmouth entered into a transportation contract with the Bay Colony Railroad Corporation whereby Bay Colony was to transport solid waste from the town’s waste transfer station to a facility in Rochester. The town later notified Bay Colony that it would terminate Bay Colony’s lease of certain rail lines, which meant that Bay Colony would no longer be able to transport the town’s waste by rail. A provision in the contract provided that, in the event the lease of the rail line was terminated, the town would permit Bay Colony to continue to transport the waste by “other modes of transportation.” Bay Colony notified the town that it would continue to transport waste by truck rather than rail. The town, however, began transporting its waste with the railroad operating company that was awarded the rail lease. A jury found that the town had committed a breach of the contract. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the town’s affirmative defense that it was barred by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 160, 70A from allowing Bay Colony to transport its waste by truck failed as a matter of law; (2) a permit issued to the town by the Department of Environmental Protection did not render Bay Colony legally unable to perform the contract after it lost its rail lease; and (3) the contract remained in effect at the time of the town’s breach. View "Bay Colony R.R. Corp. v. Town of Yarmouth" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the financial institution excise tax (FIET) liability of GATE Holdings, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of The First Marblehead Corporation (FMC). The Appellate Tax Board concluded (1) Gate qualified as a “financial institution” within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, 1 and was entitled to apportion its income pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, 2A; but (2) in applying the apportionment rules of section 2A, all of Gate’s taxable property, which consisted of securitized student loans, was properly assigned to Massachusetts, rather than States outside the Commonwealth, which resulted in a greater FIET liability than anticipated by Gate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly concluded that section 2A(e)(vi)(B) creates a rebuttable presumption that where a taxpayer seeks to assign loans to a location that is not a regular place of that taxpayer’s business, the loans should be assigned to its commercial domicile; (2) all of the student loans were properly located at Gate’s commercial domicile in Massachusetts; and (3) the Board’s decisions did not violate the due process or commerce clause. View "First Marblehead Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

A Newspaper sought postverdict access to the list containing the names and addresses of the jurors who served at the criminal trial of a defendant on charges of murder in the first degree and assault and battery. The trial judge ruled that he would ask jury members if they were amenable to speaking to the press and would permit disclosure only as to those jurors who responded affirmatively. The Newspaper filed a petition for relief from the judge’s ruling. The Supreme Judicial Court set aside the trial judge’s order in part and instructed that a list identifying the names of the jurors, without addresses, be disclosed, holding (1) the public’s long-term interest in maintaining an open judicial process requires that a list identifying the names of jurors who have been empanelled and rendered a verdict in a criminal case be retained in the court file of the case and be made available to the public; and (2) only on a judicial finding of good cause may such a list be withheld. View "Commonwealth v. Fujita" on Justia Law

Defendant was acquitted on eighteen counts of statutory rape but convicted on seven counts of the lesser-included offense of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial judge’s instruction on reasonable doubt was constitutionally inadequate, and even if it was constitutionally sound, the charge on reasonable doubt established more than 150 years ago in Commonwealth v. Webster should be required in all criminal trials. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) pursuant to the Court’s general superintendence power, a modernized version of the Webster charge must be given in criminal trials on a prospective basis; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a special retroactive application of this new rule, and the judge’s instruction on reasonable doubt in this case passed constitutional muster. View "Commonwealth v. Russell" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of murder, armed assault with intent to murder, accessory after the fact to murder, and unlawful possession of firearms. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of accessory after the fact and unlawful possession of firearms. Because the jury could not reach a verdict on the indictments charging murder and armed assault with intent to murder, the judge declared a mistrial as to those indictments. The Commonwealth subsequently requested that sentencing on the indictments on which Defendant was found guilty be postponed until he could be retried on the indictments that were mistried. Defendant moved to dismiss the mistried indictments, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by not allowing his motion for required findings of not guilty as to the mistried indictments. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Defendant and reversed the denial of the motion for required findings of not guilty as to the mistried indictments and directed entry of verdicts of not guilty as to those indictments because the Commonwealth did not satisfy its burden of proof. Remanded for sentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Simpkins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, among other crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by restricting Defendant’s attendance at a jury view; (2) the trial judge did not err by admitting a witness’s testimony that the witness saw Defendant with a gun more than one year before the shooting in question occurred; (3) the police’s failure to examine the money seized from Defendant’s residence for fingerprints of DNA before depositing the money into a bank account did not warrant dismissal of the charges against him; and (4) the trial judge’s exclusion of video and testimony of Defendant’s expert showing that surveillance footage of the shooting distorted the height of the perpetrator did not infringe on Defendant’s right to present a defense. View "Commonwealth v. Corliss" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree under theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant moved to suppress the eyewitness identifications of him as the shooter and the identifications of his jacket, which had been found in the path of flight and identified by two witnesses as the one worn by the shooter. The motions were denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the admission of the jacket identifications did not violate due process or Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 where the Commonwealth did not arrange a “jacket lineup”; (2) no reversible error arose from Defendant’s other claims; and (3) although evidence of questionable conduct by some of the investigating police officers was brought out during the course of the proceedings, there was an insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Bresilla" on Justia Law