Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
A police officer found the defendant behind the wheel of a parked rental van in a municipal lot. The key was in the ignition, the radio was on, and there was a strong odor of alcohol. The defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. The officer observed vodka bottles in the vehicle and asked the defendant to move the van slightly to clear a tree blocking the driver's door. The defendant complied, and upon exiting the vehicle, he struggled with field sobriety tests and was arrested for operating under the influence (OUI).The defendant was tried in the Falmouth Division of the District Court Department and found guilty of OUI, fifth offense. He was also found guilty of OUI with a license suspended for OUI after a bench trial. The defendant was sentenced to three and a half years in a house of correction. The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant "operated" the vehicle while under the influence. The court held that the evidence was sufficient, affirming the convictions. The court explained that "operates" under the OUI statute includes any act that sets in motion the vehicle's motive power, such as turning the key in the ignition. The court concluded that the defendant's actions of turning the key and being intoxicated while in the driver's seat met the statutory definition of "operates," even though the vehicle was not moving. View "Commonwealth v. Wurtzberger" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Tody's Service, Inc. (Tody's), a towing company, billed Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) a six-figure storage fee after towing and storing a vehicle involved in a fatal crash at the direction of the police. The vehicle, insured by Liberty, was held as evidence for nearly three years. After obtaining the vehicle's title, Liberty refused to pay the accrued storage charges, leading Tody's to sue Liberty to recover those fees.In the Superior Court, a judge granted summary judgment in favor of Liberty on all of Tody's claims, which included unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and failure to pay storage fees under G. L. c. 159B, § 6B. The judge found no evidence of unjust enrichment, ruled that § 6B does not provide a private right of action, and concluded that Tody's failed to demonstrate any actionable promise or reasonable reliance to support promissory estoppel.The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held that Liberty was not unjustly enriched as a matter of law, as there was no measurable benefit conferred on Liberty by Tody's storage of the vehicle. The court also found no evidence of reliance sufficient to support promissory estoppel, as Tody's stored the vehicle in response to a police directive, not in reliance on any promise by Liberty. Additionally, the court held that § 6B does not create a private right of action against a vehicle owner. Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in Liberty's favor. View "Tody's Service, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

by
Michael Cannata served as a firefighter for the town of Mashpee for over a decade before leaving in 2004 as a "deferred retiree." During his employment, he was enrolled in the town's group health insurance plan, but his enrollment ended upon his departure. In 2021, after turning fifty-five and beginning to collect retirement benefits, Cannata sought to re-enroll in the town's health insurance plan as a retiree. The town denied his request, citing various reasons, including his lack of "time in-service" and the town's practice of denying coverage to retirees not enrolled in the plan at the time of retirement.Cannata filed an action in the Superior Court, seeking a judgment declaring that the town's denial of benefits violated G. L. c. 32B, § 9. The Superior Court judge granted the town's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that Cannata was required to apply for continued coverage and pay the full premium cost during his deferral period in order to later enroll in the town's group health insurance plan upon retirement. Cannata appealed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that G. L. c. 32B, § 9, neither requires nor prohibits a municipality from enrolling individuals like Cannata in its group health insurance plan upon retirement. The court concluded that the third paragraph of the statute, which the lower court relied on, did not govern Cannata's case. The court determined that municipalities may, but are not obligated to, allow such individuals to enroll in group health insurance upon retirement. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal on the alternative ground that Cannata's complaint failed to plausibly allege entitlement to relief beyond a speculative level. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, allowing Cannata an opportunity to amend his request for declaratory relief. View "Cannata v. Town of Mashpee" on Justia Law

by
In 2020, a police officer applied for a criminal complaint in the District Court, alleging that the defendant possessed a loaded firearm while intoxicated. A clerk-magistrate denied the application, finding no probable cause that the defendant had a firearm under his control inside a motor vehicle. No review of this decision was sought. Over two years later, the same officer filed a new application for the same offense with the same facts, and a different clerk-magistrate found probable cause and issued the complaint.The defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the issuance of the complaint was barred by collateral estoppel and that the delay violated his due process rights. A single justice of the county court reserved and reported the petition to the full court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the principles of collateral estoppel did not bar the issuance of the complaint because the initial denial was not a final judgment. The court noted that a District Court determination of no probable cause is not conclusive and does not bar a subsequent indictment for the same offense. The court also found no due process violation, as the defendant did not have a constitutionally protected interest in the finality of a show cause determination, and the delay did not cause severe prejudice to the defendant's ability to mount a defense. The court remanded the case to the county court for entry of a judgment denying the defendant's petition for extraordinary relief. View "Cabrera v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

by
Elena Gaston was indicted on charges of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, conspiracy, deriving support from prostitution, and money laundering. The Commonwealth alleged that she ran an escort service where her employees provided sexual services for money. On the day of her trial, a plea agreement was proposed, but during the plea colloquy, Gaston denied key elements of the charges, leading the judge to proceed to trial. During the trial, defense counsel made improper opening statements, conceding Gaston's guilt and inviting the jury to consider irrelevant factors, which led the Commonwealth to move for a mistrial.The trial judge initially opted for a curative instruction instead of a mistrial but later declared a mistrial after concluding that defense counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge noted that defense counsel's failure to consult with Gaston on his opening statement and the detrimental impact of his strategy on her defense warranted a mistrial. Gaston, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial judge denied.Gaston then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petition was denied by a single justice, and she appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. The court found that the trial judge carefully considered alternatives and provided both parties with opportunities to be heard before declaring a mistrial. The court concluded that defense counsel's conduct was manifestly unreasonable and deprived Gaston of a substantial ground of defense, justifying the mistrial. View "Gaston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

by
Susan Miele was hired by Foundation Medicine, Inc. (FMI) in 2017 and signed a restrictive covenant agreement that included a nonsolicitation provision. In 2020, Miele and FMI executed a transition agreement upon her separation, which incorporated the restrictive covenant agreement and included a forfeiture clause. FMI paid Miele approximately $1.2 million in transition benefits. After joining Ginkgo Bioworks in 2021, Miele allegedly solicited FMI employees to join Ginkgo, leading FMI to cease further payments and demand repayment of benefits.Miele sued FMI in late 2021 for breach of the transition agreement, and FMI counterclaimed for breach of contract. Miele moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the provisions FMI relied on were unenforceable under the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act. A Superior Court judge granted Miele's motion in part, ruling that FMI could not enforce the forfeiture provision but allowed FMI to assert Miele's breach as a defense and seek damages. The judge concluded that the transition agreement qualified as a "forfeiture for competition agreement" under the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act does not apply to a nonsolicitation agreement, even if it includes a forfeiture provision. The court reasoned that the act explicitly excludes nonsolicitation agreements from its scope, and a forfeiture clause does not change this exclusion. The court reversed the Superior Court's order partially granting Miele's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The case involves the execution of an anticipatory search warrant that led to the seizure of cocaine and U.S. currency from Victor Manuel Mercedes' apartment. The warrant was contingent on a future triggering event, which did not occur. The issue is whether the police could still search the apartment based on other information in the warrant affidavit that independently established probable cause.In the Superior Court, a grand jury indicted the defendant on drug trafficking charges. A codefendant's motion to suppress evidence from a related search was granted, and the defendant joined this motion. The judge allowed the motion, ruling that the anticipatory warrant was void because the triggering event did not occur. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the search was valid based on probable cause from other information in the affidavit.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, police cannot execute an anticipatory search warrant without the occurrence of the specified triggering event or its equivalent. The court emphasized that the triggering event must be clear and narrowly defined to prevent police from exercising unfettered discretion. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence, ruling that the anticipatory warrant was void without the triggering event, and no valid exception to the warrant requirement was established. The defendant's cross-appeal was dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Mercedes" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
In 2023, Boima Collins was convicted by a jury of carrying a firearm without a license and other charges. The Commonwealth introduced evidence of Collins' 1998 felony conviction to prove he did not have a license to carry a firearm, as a prior felony conviction bars one from obtaining such a license. The trial judge admitted the redacted court record over Collins' objection and instructed the jury to consider this evidence only for determining whether Collins had a license.Collins appealed, arguing that the trial judge abused her discretion by admitting the prior conviction evidence, claiming it was more prejudicial than probative and that the Commonwealth had less prejudicial means to prove lack of licensure. He also contended that the jury should have been instructed to consider the prior conviction evidence only if the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person named in the record. Additionally, Collins argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he lacked a license because the Commonwealth did not prove he was the same person named in the record.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and found no prejudicial error in admitting the evidence of Collins' prior conviction. The court held that the trial judge correctly weighed the evidence's probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice, provided robust limiting instructions to the jury, and noted that the prior conviction was for a dissimilar offense, reducing the risk of improper propensity reasoning. The court also concluded that the judge's instructions to the jury were not erroneous and that the evidence was sufficient to prove Collins lacked a firearms license. Consequently, the court affirmed Collins' convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Collins" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon after stabbing his father at a family barbecue. The incident occurred when the victim became upset and yelled at the defendant's wife, leading to a confrontation between the defendant and the victim. The victim pushed the defendant first, and the defendant responded by stabbing the victim in the chest. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense and sought to introduce evidence of the victim's subsequent violent act to support his claim.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court, where the defendant was convicted. The judge denied the defendant's motion to introduce evidence of the victim's subsequent violent act, concluding that such evidence was not admissible under Commonwealth v. Adjutant. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the judge erred in believing that Adjutant evidence is not applicable to subsequent acts of violence. However, the court affirmed the conviction, stating that the evidence was correctly excluded because the identity of the first aggressor was not in dispute, and the defendant was the first to use deadly force. The court also held that the judge did not err in failing to instruct the jury on defense of another, as the defendant did not rely on this theory at trial, and no evidence suggested that the defendant reasonably believed he had to use deadly force to protect his wife. The judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Andrade" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The case involves the admissibility of location data obtained from a GPS device imposed on the defendant as a condition of pretrial release. The defendant was involved in a domestic violence incident on December 26, 2019, where he threatened his ex-wife, C.P., and discharged a firearm. He was later apprehended in July 2020 and released on bail with conditions, including GPS monitoring. In August 2020, following a shooting incident, police retrieved the defendant's GPS data to determine his proximity to the crime scene.The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the GPS evidence, and he entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.The Supreme Judicial Court addressed two main issues: whether the initial imposition of GPS monitoring was an unreasonable search under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and whether the subsequent retrieval and review of the defendant's GPS data constituted an unreasonable search.The court held that the initial imposition of GPS monitoring was a search but was reasonable under Article 14 due to the legitimate governmental interests in protecting the alleged victims and ensuring compliance with the conditions of pretrial release. The court found that the defendant's privacy expectations were outweighed by these interests.Regarding the retrieval and review of the GPS data, the court concluded that it did not constitute a search under Article 14. The defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the specific location data retrieved, as it was limited in scope and duration, and the defendant was aware that his movements could be monitored for compliance with pretrial conditions.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's order denying the motion to suppress. View "Commonwealth v. Govan" on Justia Law