Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A child was removed from her mother's care by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) shortly after birth due to neglect. The child spent most of her life in foster care. In February 2019, a Juvenile Court judge awarded custody to the child's father, a New Hampshire resident, despite the absence of an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) report. The child went missing after moving to New Hampshire with her father and is presumed dead. The father was later convicted of her murder.The journalist sought access to audio recordings of the February 2019 hearings where custody was awarded to the father. The Juvenile Court judge denied the request, applying the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (URIP). The journalist filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and determined that the good cause standard under Rule 7(b) of the URIP was the appropriate test for evaluating the journalist's request. The court found that the privacy interests of the parties involved were minimal, given the extensive public disclosure of the case details. The court also recognized the significant public interest in understanding the child welfare system and the circumstances leading to the child's death.The court concluded that the journalist demonstrated good cause for the release of the February 2019 hearing recordings for use in a documentary, subject to specific redactions and conditions. The order denying the motion for access was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for the release of the recordings with the specified limitations. View "Care and Protection of Adele" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of deliberately premeditated murder in the first degree for the shooting death of Jesus Flores at the entrance of a Springfield nightclub. The primary issue at trial was the identification of the defendant as the shooter, which the Commonwealth supported with surveillance video footage. The defendant argued that the poor quality of the footage made it impossible to prove identification beyond a reasonable doubt.A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. However, the trial judge later reduced the verdict to murder in the second degree, citing insufficient evidence of deliberate premeditation and lethal intent. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, the compilation video was improperly admitted, and a police officer's testimony about a hearsay statement from the victim was wrongly allowed. The Commonwealth also appealed the reduction of the verdict.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction of murder in the first degree. The court found that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to identify the defendant as the shooter and that the compilation video was properly admitted. The court also ruled that the victim's statement was admissible to rebut the defendant's challenge to the adequacy of the police investigation. Finally, the court reversed the trial judge's reduction of the verdict, reinstating the jury's original verdict of murder in the first degree, and remanded the case for resentencing. The court held that the weight of the evidence supported the jury's finding of deliberate premeditation and intent to kill. View "Commonwealth v. Gomez" on Justia Law

The defendant, Clough, Harbour & Associates LLP (CHA), agreed to design a new athletic field for the plaintiff, Trustees of Boston University (university). The contract included an express indemnification provision, which required CHA to indemnify the university for any expenses resulting from CHA's negligent design. A defect in CHA's design caused the university to incur expenses to fix the field. The university demanded indemnification from CHA, which CHA refused. More than six years after the field opened, the university sued CHA for breach of the indemnification provision.The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of CHA, relying on the tort statute of repose, which bars tort actions for damages arising from design defects in real property improvements six years after the improvement's opening. The judge concluded that the university's claim was barred by this statute. The university appealed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the tort statute of repose does not apply to the university's contract claim for indemnification. The court emphasized that the claim was based on an express contractual provision, not a tort duty imposed by law. The court distinguished between claims for breach of an implied warranty, which are barred by the statute of repose, and claims for breach of an express warranty or indemnification provision, which are not. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trustees of Boston University v. Clough, Harbour & Associates LLP" on Justia Law

Jeff Stacy, a lineman for Unitil Corporation, continued working during the COVID-19 pandemic as his job was classified as an essential service. Despite the Governor's orders to shut down nonessential businesses, Stacy worked closely with colleagues, which led to his exposure to the virus. In February 2021, after working overtime during snowstorms, Stacy contracted COVID-19 from a coworker, resulting in severe illness and total disability. He applied for workers' compensation benefits, which were initially denied by his employer's insurer, Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut.An administrative judge from the Department of Industrial Accidents held an evidentiary hearing and ruled in favor of Stacy, finding that the risk of contracting COVID-19 was inherent in his employment during the pandemic. The judge noted that Stacy's job required close physical proximity to coworkers, increasing his risk of infection. The Industrial Accident Reviewing Board affirmed the judge's decision, adopting the factual findings and concluding that the decision was supported by adequate evidence and reasoned decision-making.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the board's decision. The court held that the board's determination that the risk of contracting COVID-19 was inherent in Stacy's employment was not arbitrary or capricious. The court emphasized that Stacy's role as an essential worker, who continued to work closely with others during a time when most businesses were closed and social distancing was mandated, justified the finding that his employment posed a unique risk of infection. Thus, Stacy's claim for workers' compensation benefits was upheld. View "Stacy's Case" on Justia Law

A juvenile was found delinquent on firearm charges and guilty on a youthful offender indictment for one of the offenses. At the trial, the juvenile was nineteen years old, and the Commonwealth called his mother to testify about events that occurred when he was seventeen. The juvenile argued that the parent-child witness disqualification statute, which prohibits testimony by a parent against their minor child, should have precluded his mother's testimony even though he was no longer a minor at the time of trial. He also claimed that the trial judge made several errors in admitting other evidence and that his sentence was unlawful and unconstitutional.The juvenile was charged in a delinquency complaint with possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device, and improper storage of a firearm. He was subsequently indicted as a youthful offender for the large capacity feeding device charge. The juvenile filed a motion to prevent the Commonwealth from calling his mother as a witness, invoking the parent-child witness disqualification statute. The motion judge denied the motion, reasoning that the statute applied only to testimony against a minor child, and the juvenile was no longer a minor.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and agreed with the trial judge's interpretation that the statutory prohibition of testimony by a parent against their minor child does not apply once the child has reached the age of eighteen. The court found no prejudicial error in the admission of other evidence, although it concluded that the judge should not have admitted a detective's testimony that a firearm depicted in still images was "identical" to the firearm admitted in evidence, nor two hearsay statements. Regarding the juvenile's sentence, the court agreed that the judge erred in not issuing written findings explaining the sentence but concluded that this error did not prejudice the juvenile. The court affirmed the juvenile's delinquency and youthful offender adjudications and declined to vacate his sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Rajiv R." on Justia Law

The defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, improper disposal of a body, and willfully misleading a police officer. The case involves the killing of a long-time friend, whose body was discovered by a passerby in a wooded area. The victim was identified through fingerprint records, and his cause of death was determined to be acute cyanide toxicity. The investigation revealed that the defendant and the victim had met on the day of the victim's death, and the defendant had given inconsistent and false statements to the police about their meeting.In the Superior Court, the defendant's pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained from searches and his statements to the police were denied. The trial proceeded with the Commonwealth presenting evidence of the defendant's financial troubles and his purchase of cyanide. The defense argued that the defendant's confessions were not voluntary due to his medical and emotional state following a suicide attempt. The jury found the defendant guilty on all charges, and he was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction, with concurrent sentences for the other charges.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the evidence obtained from the searches should have been suppressed due to lack of probable cause and that his statements to the police were involuntary. The court found no error in the denial of the motions to suppress, concluding that the affidavits provided sufficient probable cause and that the defendant's waivers of his Miranda rights and his statements were voluntary. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions and declined to order a new trial or reduce the conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Camuti" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of multiple charges following an altercation involving a woman and three men, including the defendant and the victim. The defendant was found guilty of assault with intent to maim, mayhem, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (knife) causing serious bodily injury, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot), two counts of assault and battery, and misleading a police officer. The incident occurred after the defendant drove the intoxicated woman to her home, where a violent confrontation ensued with the victim.In the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted by a jury on the aforementioned charges. The defendant appealed, raising three issues: the exclusion of Adjutant evidence, the sufficiency of evidence for the conviction of misleading a police officer, and the duplicative nature of certain convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the Adjutant evidence related to the defendant's self-defense claim and declined to extend the Adjutant rule to defense of another. The court found insufficient evidence to support the conviction of misleading a police officer, as the defendant's simple denial did not demonstrate specific intent. The court also determined that the convictions for assault with intent to maim and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury were duplicative of the mayhem conviction, and one of the assault and battery convictions was duplicative of the assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon conviction. Consequently, the court vacated the convictions for misleading a police officer, assault with intent to maim, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, and one count of assault and battery, while affirming the remaining convictions and remanding the case for resentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Rateree" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of animal cruelty after witnesses observed him repeatedly punching his dog in a public park. The defendant claimed he was trying to save a groundhog his dog was attacking and that he minimized the force of his punches. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in excluding his expert witness's testimony about the dog's pain response and prey drive, and in refusing to instruct the jury on bona fide discipline and defense of another animal.The case was initially tried in the Newburyport Division of the District Court Department, where the jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial was denied, and he filed a timely notice of appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the expert testimony, as it was cumulative and would not have significantly aided the jury. The court also found that the jury instructions provided were sufficient to allow the jury to consider the defendant's arguments regarding bona fide discipline and defense of another animal. The court affirmed the conviction, concluding that there was no reversible error in the trial proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Adams" on Justia Law

The case involves BAK Realty, LLC, and Crossing Over, Inc., which operate a sober house in a three-family dwelling in Fitchburg, Massachusetts. The sober house, located in a residential B (RB) district, houses thirteen unrelated individuals recovering from addiction. The City of Fitchburg's zoning ordinances classify the sober house as a boarding house, a use not permitted in the RB district. The plaintiffs argue that the city's zoning ordinances violate the anti-disability discrimination provision of the Zoning Act, G. L. c. 40A, § 3, fourth par., which they interpret as requiring the city to treat the sober house residents as a "family" under local zoning laws.The Superior Court judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, annulling the decision of the Fitchburg Zoning Board of Appeals (board). The judge concluded that G. L. c. 40A, § 3, required the city to treat the sober house residents the same as a family or any similar-sized group of unrelated persons, whichever is more favorable. The judge ruled that the city's zoning ordinances could not be enforced against the sober house residents.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and disagreed with the Superior Court's interpretation. The court held that G. L. c. 40A, § 3, fourth par., does not preempt municipalities from defining "family" for zoning purposes. The statute requires that disabled persons in congregate living arrangements be treated the same as either families or similar-sized groups of unrelated persons, but not necessarily both. The court found that the residents of the sober house did not meet the local definition of "family" and were treated the same as any similar group of thirteen unrelated people living together. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the board's decision that the sober house was operating as a boarding house, a use not permitted in the RB district. View "BAK Realty, LLC v. City of Fitchburg" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Lorraine Bellmar, as the personal representative of her deceased husband Harry Bellmar's estate, filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death action against Dr. Robert Moore and his medical practice. Harry Bellmar had been Dr. Moore's patient for approximately ten years, suffering from morbid obesity, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, and high cholesterol. In December 2006, an abnormal EKG was performed, but Dr. Moore did not order any follow-up cardiac testing over the next ten years. Harry Bellmar died in June 2016 from cardiac arrhythmia.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the seven-year statute of repose under G. L. c. 260, § 4, because the claim was based on the 2006 EKG, which occurred more than seven years before the filing of the lawsuit in December 2017. The Appeals Court affirmed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the statute of repose does not shield later negligent acts if the medical malpractice claim is not predicated on acts or omissions that took place more than seven years before the filing of the claim. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Dr. Moore's treatment of the decedent within the seven-year period was negligent, independent of the 2006 EKG. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. View "Bellmar v. Moore" on Justia Law