Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant and his girlfriend entered the home of an elderly couple, Thomas Harty and Joanna Fisher, where they stabbed and suffocated the victims, stole their valuables, and fled in the victims’ car. Harty died immediately. Fisher, a nonambulatory, seventy-seven-year-old woman who used a wheelchair, survived initially but later died from complications due to multiple stab wounds. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for both victims and, as to Fisher, also of attempted murder.Previously, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed and affirmed the convictions, but noted that the jury instruction for attempted murder incorrectly included the failure to complete murder as an element. The court allowed the defendant to raise the issue of legally inconsistent verdicts in a postconviction motion. The Superior Court, after considering whether the acts supporting the attempted murder and murder convictions were sufficiently separate and whether the defendant had notice of alternate theories, found both questions answered in the affirmative and denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the convictions.On further appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the verdicts were not legally inconsistent. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant’s act of attempting to smother Fisher with pillows was separate from the subsequent fatal stabbing, and each act could support distinct convictions. The court also found that the defendant received adequate notice of the theories underlying each charge. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the convictions, holding that no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice resulted from the erroneous jury instruction. View "Commonwealth v. Hart" on Justia Law

Kelsey Fitzsimmons, a North Andover police officer, was indicted in Essex County on one count of assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The Commonwealth alleged that during the service of an abuse prevention order, Fitzsimmons deceived officers regarding firearms in her home, drew a firearm, pointed it at an officer, and pulled the trigger, though the gun did not discharge. She then allegedly attempted to chamber a round before being shot by an officer. The Commonwealth presented further evidence of Fitzsimmons’s prior alcohol-related violence, mental health struggles, and a 2019 misdemeanor conviction for intoxicated and disruptive behavior. Fitzsimmons relied on medical and psychological evidence suggesting she was suitable for outpatient care and posed no credible risk of harm.Initially, the District Court ordered Fitzsimmons held on dangerousness grounds. A Superior Court judge subsequently found her dangerous but released her subject to strict conditions, including house arrest, GPS monitoring, and alcohol abstinence monitored by SCRAM testing. When Fitzsimmons claimed she could not physically comply with SCRAM testing due to injuries, the judge vacated the release order and detained her pretrial. Fitzsimmons moved for reconsideration, proposing urine testing as an alternative, but the judge denied the motion, finding that urine testing would interfere with house arrest requirements.Fitzsimmons then petitioned a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, arguing the judge erred in refusing less restrictive alternatives and in her conduct. The single justice denied the petition, concluding there was no error or abuse of discretion. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that neither the hearing judge nor the single justice abused their discretion in ordering detention when Fitzsimmons could not comply with the least restrictive conditions necessary for community safety. The Court also found no requirement for de novo review and rejected Fitzsimmons’s arguments under the Americans with Disabilities Act and other statutes. Judgment was affirmed. View "Fitzsimmons v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty in 2012 to multiple sex offenses involving his minor children. He was sentenced to ten years in state prison followed by ten years of probation, with mandatory global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of probation under Massachusetts law. The statute required GPS monitoring for the entirety of his probation, but at the time of sentencing, no specific exclusion zones were established. After serving his prison sentence and two years of probation with GPS monitoring, the defendant sought relief from the GPS monitoring condition, arguing that it was unreasonable and unconstitutional, particularly due to its ten-year duration.After the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Feliz, which required individualized judicial findings regarding the reasonableness of GPS monitoring as a probation condition, the defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court for such an individualized assessment. The Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had shown continued GPS monitoring was reasonable, based in part on the defendant’s classification as a level three sex offender and the victims’ statements about ongoing harm. However, the judge did not make findings regarding the reasonableness of the specific ten-year duration of GPS monitoring.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. The Court held that a judge must consider the duration of GPS monitoring in evaluating its reasonableness under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The holding clarified that a judge may only impose GPS monitoring for a duration found to be reasonable, even if that period is less than the statutory term of probation. Because the Superior Court judge did not evaluate the ten-year duration, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the defendant’s motion and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Arnold" on Justia Law

A commercial landlord leased property in downtown Boston to a restaurant operator. As part of their lease agreement, the landlord sold the restaurant a liquor license for one dollar, with the understanding that the license would be transferred back to the landlord for one dollar at the end of the lease. The lease included a provision prohibiting the restaurant from pledging the liquor license as collateral for any loan without the landlord’s written consent. Despite this, before the lease ended, the restaurant pledged the license to its principal as collateral for a loan. When the landlord discovered this, it terminated the lease and demanded the return of the license.The landlord and its related entities filed suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, unfair or deceptive business practices under General Laws c. 93A, and conversion. The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the landlord on the contract claims, finding the anti-pledge provision enforceable and the pledge a default. After a bench trial, the court found for the landlord on the c. 93A and conversion claims, awarding treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The defendants appealed these decisions.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the anti-pledge provision did not violate public policy or state law and was therefore enforceable. The court affirmed that the principal’s conduct in falsely affirming to regulatory authorities that the pledge did not violate any agreements constituted willful and knowing unfair or deceptive conduct under c. 93A. However, while the court affirmed the breach of contract claim, it reversed the conversion judgment, finding that the landlord did not have actual or immediate right to possession of the license at the relevant time. The award of attorney's fees and costs was affirmed. View "Nicosia v. Burns, LLC" on Justia Law

The case arose from a criminal prosecution in which the defendant was charged with violating an abuse prevention order issued under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 209A. The order directed the defendant to "stay away" from the victim's residence, which was a multi-unit building, but did not set a specific distance for compliance. On the day in question, the defendant was observed by police walking on a street parallel and behind the victim’s residence, eventually reaching a point approximately 200 feet away from the victim’s home but on the opposite side of the block. He was arrested at that location. There was no evidence the defendant entered the victim’s property or that the victim was at home at the time.The Cambridge Division of the District Court Department conducted a jury trial, at which the defendant was convicted of violating the abuse prevention order. The defendant’s motions for a required finding of not guilty were denied at multiple stages. On appeal, the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find a violation. The defendant sought, and was granted, further appellate review by the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the evidence under the standard of whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had positioned himself so proximate to the victim’s property that he would have been able to abuse or contact the victim if she were present. Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction, set aside the verdict, and ordered that judgment enter for the defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Carino" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted, along with a codefendant, of murder in the first degree by extreme atrocity or cruelty after a joint jury trial in 1984. The killing occurred during a fight, and both men received mandatory sentences of life without parole. More than thirty years later, the defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel ignored his repeated requests to seek a plea bargain for a lesser charge, specifically murder in the second degree, which carries the possibility of parole. The defendant claimed he did not learn until 2016 that his attorney had not pursued plea negotiations and that the prosecutor might have been open to a plea if both defendants agreed.After the original convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court under plenary review, the codefendant separately moved for a new trial, asserting ineffective assistance in plea negotiations. The Superior Court judge held evidentiary hearings on both the codefendant’s and the defendant’s motions. The judge found that neither attorney had secured or pursued a pretrial plea to murder in the second degree, and that the prosecutor would only have considered such a plea if both defendants agreed. Since this circumstance never arose before trial, the judge denied both motions, finding the arguments were speculative.On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether ineffective assistance may be found when counsel fails to pursue a reasonable plea negotiation at the defendant’s request. The court held that such a claim requires a showing that counsel’s failure was unreasonable and resulted in prejudice—specifically, a reasonable probability that the prosecutor and judge would have accepted the plea, and that the defendant suffered a more severe outcome by going to trial. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that there was no reasonable probability a stand-alone plea would have been accepted by the prosecutor. View "Commonwealth v. Mosso" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was tried on six charges involving sexual abuse of minors. At trial, the jury acquitted him on five counts relating to two minors but convicted him on one count involving a third minor. After the trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal. Subsequently, the Executive Office of the Trial Court issued a notice under the Massachusetts automatic sealing statute, informing him that records relating to the acquitted counts would be sealed unless he requested otherwise. The notice also stated that he would lose access to those records once sealed. The individual did not respond, and some records were sealed.After this, appellate counsel was appointed to represent the individual on appeal. Counsel attempted to obtain the trial records, including those pertaining to the acquitted counts, but discovered that certain documents had been sealed. Counsel then moved for access to these sealed documents, arguing that not having access would hinder effective appellate representation. The motion judge allowed only limited access—counsel could view the documents at the clerk’s office under supervision and take notes, but could not make copies. The individual submitted an affidavit authorizing counsel’s access, but the motion judge maintained the restrictions. Seeking broader access, the individual petitioned a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court under G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the automatic sealing statute does not preclude a defendant or the defendant’s appellate counsel from accessing the defendant’s own sealed criminal records. The court concluded that the statute’s text, legislative history, and related statutory framework support the view that sealing is aimed at precluding public access—not preventing the defendant and counsel from reviewing the records necessary for appeal. The court vacated the lower court’s order restricting access and remanded for entry of an order providing access to the sealed records. View "Gravito v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A student at Dearborn School in Boston was found in possession of a nine millimeter Glock pistol with six rounds of ammunition during an administrative search. The juvenile, who had previously been subject to threats and assaults while commuting to school, did not have a license to carry the firearm but did possess a valid firearm identification card. After his arrest, the juvenile was readmitted to school, graduated, and subsequently completed occupational training and part-time employment.The Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department issued a delinquency complaint charging the juvenile with unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and unlawful possession of ammunition. During plea negotiations, the juvenile recommended a continuance without a finding (CWOF) on the firearm counts, while the Commonwealth sought commitment to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday. Both parties agreed to dismiss the ammunition charge. The judge allowed the CWOF on the firearm counts and dismissed the ammunition count, rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument that a CWOF was prohibited for the firearm charge. The judge subsequently denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revise or revoke the sentence, and the Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed whether a Juvenile Court judge may impose a CWOF for a juvenile charged with carrying a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). The court held that the statutes governing juvenile proceedings permit the judge to impose a CWOF for this offense, as the prohibition against CWOFs applies only to certain enumerated sex offenses and not to firearm offenses under § 10 (a). The order denying the Commonwealth’s motion to revise or revoke the sentence was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Q." on Justia Law

The case concerns the medical treatment of a fifty-eight-year-old man who suffered a shoulder injury and subsequently died from septic shock, acute septic arthritis, metabolic acidosis, and renal failure. After his initial visit to the emergency department, he was diagnosed with rotator cuff tendinitis and cellulitis, and discharged with antibiotics. His condition worsened over several weeks, leading to multiple emergency department visits and consultations with various medical providers, including nurse practitioner Michael Collins. Collins attended to the patient on August 4-5, 2020, and discharged him after administering fluids and pain medication, advising follow-up with orthopedics. The patient returned to the hospital two days later in a deteriorated state, was diagnosed with sepsis and septic arthritis, and died shortly thereafter.The plaintiff, acting as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a medical malpractice action in the Massachusetts Superior Court against several providers, including Collins. The plaintiff submitted an offer of proof supported by medical records and expert opinion, alleging that Collins failed to meet the standard of care by not recognizing symptoms of septic arthritis, failing to order appropriate imaging and bloodwork, and not admitting the patient for further treatment. Collins and other defendants requested a medical malpractice tribunal under G. L. c. 231, § 60B. The tribunal found the plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability against Collins, leading to dismissal of the claims after the plaintiff did not post the required bond.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the tribunal’s decision. It held that the tribunal erred in finding the plaintiff’s offer of proof insufficient, as the expert opinion was factually based and rooted in the medical records, and adequately raised a legitimate question of liability and causation. The Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s claims against Collins to proceed without posting a bond. View "Bennett v. Collins" on Justia Law

Benjamin Tariri was charged with multiple counts of embezzlement and larceny, allegedly misappropriating nearly $2 million from clients while working as an attorney. He was arrested at Logan International Airport attempting to board a one-way flight to Iran, where he had recently spent six months. Tariri had longstanding ties to the United States but also significant connections to Iran. After his arraignment in the Boston Municipal Court, he was released on cash bail and required to submit to GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone restricting his movements to certain areas, primarily to mitigate his risk of flight.Following indictment and arraignment in the Superior Court, the bail and GPS conditions were maintained, with the inclusion zone expanded to cover additional areas. Tariri moved to modify or vacate the GPS condition, arguing that it hindered his ability to work and prevented him from visiting his wife and child in East Boston. The motion judge expanded the inclusion zone to address employment concerns but otherwise denied further relief. Tariri then filed a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court, which a single justice denied, finding no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s order.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the single justice’s denial for clear error of law or abuse of discretion. The court held that GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone, imposed as a condition of pretrial release, was a reasonable and constitutional search under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, given the particularized risk of flight and the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring Tariri’s appearance in court. The judgment of the single justice was affirmed. View "Tariri v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law