Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery of his girlfriend (victim). On appeal, defendant contended that the admission into evidence of a tape of the 911 telephone call the victim made violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that the victim's 911 call was an excited utterance and was not testimonial because the court could infer from the victim's statements during the call that the victim had just been assaulted, that the victim was still in the same apartment building as the assailant, and that the victim was in danger until the police came or defendant fled. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Commonwealth v. Beatrice" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder with armed assault with the intent to rob as the predicate felony. Defendant was also convicted of armed assault in a dwelling, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. Defendant claimed error regarding the denial of his motion to suppress; claimed that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts and in limiting defendant's use of third-party culprit evidence; claimed that trial counsel should have requested a jury instruction concerning the effects of marijuana intoxication on defendant's ability to form the specific intent for murder with deliberate premeditation and the underlying felony for felony-murder; and requested that, pursuant to G.L.c. 278, section 33E, the court reduce the verdict on the murder charge or order a new trial. The court found no reversible error and therefore, affirmed the judgments of conviction and discerned to basis to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Morgan" on Justia Law

PCG Trading filed a complaint for legal malpractice and related claims against Seyfarth Shaw and four individual attorneys associated or formerly associated with the firm. At issue was whether a motion filed by PCG Trading for admission of an attorney pro hac vice was properly denied by a judge in the Superior Court. The court held that the order denying the motion to admit Robert L. Garner pro hac vice was reversed, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. View "PCG Trading, LLC v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of distributing cocaine, second offense, in violation of G.L.c. 94C, section 32A(d), and sentenced to a five-year mandatory term of imprisonment. At issue was whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the admissibility of the drug certificate in her direct appeal and for further failing to seek a stay of the appeal while Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz was pending in the Supreme Court. The court held that the rule announced in Melendez-Diaz was a new rule not applicable to convictions, such as defendant's, that had become final prior to its issuance. Consequently, there was no error in the admission of the drug certificate at defendant's trial based on the law in effect at the time. Because the court also held that defendant's attempt to obtain relief under the rubric of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed, the court affirmed the denial of her motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Boria" on Justia Law

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court concluded that a certificate of chemical analysis, sworn to by a state laboratory analyst and reporting the weight and chemical makeup of a seized substance, came within the class of testimonial statements subject to the protections of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Consequently, the certificate was inadmissible as evidence in a criminal trial in the absence of testimony from the analyst who performed the underlying forensic analysis. At issue was whether the rule announced in Melendez-Diaz applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The court held that the rule announced in Melendez-Diaz, as it related to the applicability of the confrontation clause to certificates of chemical analysis (drug certificates), was a "new" rule within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, and as such, was not available to defendant in this appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Liberty Mutual, both personally and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated individuals, alleging that the company's failure to disburse "medical payments" coverage (MedPay) benefits to her constituted a breach of contract, a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of G.L.c. 93A, 2. At issue was whether a claimant could seek medical expense benefits under the MedPay of a standard Massachusetts automobile insurance policy where she had already recovered for those expenses under a separate policy of health insurance. The court held that plaintiff's complaint and the extrinsic materials submitted by Liberty Mutual contained alleged facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." The court also held that Liberty Mutual had not demonstrated as a matter of law that plaintiff could not receive MedPay benefits when she already had received medical expense benefits under her policy of health insurance. Accordingly, the order allowing Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss was reversed and the matter remanded. View "Golchin v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of malicious burning of personal property, damage to property for the purpose of intimidation, and a civil rights violation where the convictions stemmed from defendant setting his homosexual neighbor's boat on fire. At issue was whether the statements that defendant made "off the record" during his interview with a state trooper were voluntary. The court held that the fact that the trooper's simple acquiescence to defendant's request that certain of his comments be "off the record" was not so manipulative or coercive that it deprived defendant of his ability to make a free and rational choice about whether to make such comments in the first instance. The court also held that this fact, taken together with all of the other circumstances surrounding the interview, which the court had already determined did not suggest coerciveness, supported the conclusion that defendant's statements were not involuntary. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's motion to suppress these statements were properly denied. View "Commonwealth v. Tremblay" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to a life term in State prison. On appeal, defendant contended that the judge erred by failing effectively to instruct the jury that only an intent to kill can support a conviction of premeditated murder in the first degree; allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony from cooperating witnesses that they were testifying "truthfully" pursuant to their cooperation agreement; allowing a cooperating witness to testify that members of the Latin Kings gang killed cooperating witnesses in prison; and in refusing to discharge a juror who reported being followed by a member of defendant's family. Defendant also raised other issues on appeal. The court concluded that the conviction in the first degree was supported by ample evidence and found no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that he should be granted a new trial because the trial judge erred by asking the members of the jury venire to make "mental note[s]" rather than raise their hands in response to any affirmative answer to the questions asked by the judge during jury selection; by allowing a witness to testify to defendant's silence after she accused him of the killing; by preventing defendant from admitting into evidence that the Commonwealth's key percipient witness had told another witness that he had not seen anything; in instructing the jury regarding transferred intent; and in refusing to ask the jury for clarification of their finding as to murder in the first degree, where they did not separately indicate that they based their verdict on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The court concluded as to each of these grounds that the judge either did not err or that his error did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and also concluded that there was no basis to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce defendant's murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial.

This case was brought pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, section 14, and G.L.c. 231A, where the court was asked to decide whether the the imposition of $275 in filing fees to obtain judicial review of a final decision of a municipal parking clerk regarding a parking citation offended the Massachusetts Constitution. Plaintiffs each appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court that the statutory scheme that imposed such fees for review of a municipal parking clerk's adjudication of the citation, following an in-person administrative hearings, was consonant with the principles of due process, equal protection, and separation of powers. The court held that the statutory scheme did not violate substantive or procedural due process; did not violate the equal protection clause; and afforded the opportunity for judicial review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.