Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose when defendant, a sex offender, was notified by the Sex Offender Registry Board (Board) on July 3, 2008, that he had been recommended for reclassification as a level three sex offender where defendant had been classified as a level two sex offender since 2004. At issue was whether the board had the authority to promulgate a regulation declaring that a sex offender waived the right to a classification hearing by failing to appear at that hearing without good cause. The court held that because the Legislature specified only that the classification hearing was waived where the sex offender did not timely request a hearing, the board lacked the authority to declare the hearing waived where a sex offender requested a hearing and the sex offender's attorney was present at that hearing. View "John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 941 vs. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff, Bank of New York (BNY), asserted that it acquired title to the home of defendant pursuant to foreclosure proceedings. At issue was whether the Housing Court had jurisdiction to decide the validity of a challenge to a title, raised by a former homeowner as a defense to a summary process eviction action by a party acquiring the property pursuant to a foreclosure sale. The court vacated the allowance of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings because the court concluded that the Housing Court had jurisdiction to consider the validity of plaintiff's title as a defense to a summary process action after a foreclosure sale pursuant to G.L.c. 239, section 1. View "Bank of New York v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. At issue was whether defendant's motion for new trial was properly granted where defendant challenged the instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty and the instruction on reasonable provocation as it related to both murder and manslaughter. The court held that it was error to conclude that the instruction on extreme atrocity or cruelty created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and that the court did not adequately consider the issue of erroneous instruction on plenary review. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to the instruction on provocation and voluntary manslaughter where the evidence of "cooling off" was objective and sufficient to remove provocation as a mitigating factor on the question of malice. Therefore, the court held that the judge abused her discretion in granting defendant a new trial and the order was vacated. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony-murder in the first degree based on the predicate felony of attempted armed robbery, and related crimes. At issue was whether the jury should have been instructed that an alternative underlying felony for the felony-murder charge was armed home invasion committed with a firearm, a crime that at the relevant time did not carry a life sentence and therefore could have served as a predicate felony-murder in the second degree. The court held that, where the felony later advanced by defendant as the predicate for an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree was not itself the subject of a separate indictment, no error occurred if the trial judge did not charge the jury on it even though there could be sufficient evidence supporting such a charge, at least where, as here, no party requested such an instruction or even brought the issue to the judge's attention at trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. The court also held that defendant's argument that his separate conviction of armed home invasion merged with his felony-murder conviction must be vacated because it was not properly before the court. View "Commonwealth v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, armed home invasion, arson, and two charges of violation of an abuse prevention order. Defendant appealed both from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the absence of an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree with arson as the predicate felony required a reversal of defendant's conviction of felony-murder in the first degree. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction of that crime, set aside the verdict, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, at the Commonwealth's option, a verdict of guilty of felony-murder in the second degree may be entered in lieu of a new trial on the murder indictment. The court affirmed defendant's other convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Bell" on Justia Law