Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from his convictions of murder in the second degree and related firearms charges. Defendant was convicted on retrial; the jury at his trial was unable to agree on a unanimous verdict. On appeal, defendant contended, among other things, that State and Federal double jeopardy protections precluded the judge at the second trial from instructing the jury on accessory liability where no such instruction was provided to the first jury. The court concluded that the instruction given at the second trial was appropriate, because it would have been supported by the evidence introduced at the first trial, and, in the circumstances of this case, did not invite the jury to convict on a theory of the crime abandoned or foreclosed by the Commonwealth at the first trial. The court discerned no other error that would warrant relief and affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Phim" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted pursuant to the parental kidnapping statute, G.L.c. 265, section 26A, after his five-year-old nonmarital son, G.G., disappeared while in defendant's care. Relying on Commonwealth v. McCarthy, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment (McCarthy motion) where defendant argued that the Commonwealth could not prove, as it must under the parental kidnapping statute, that he acted "without lawful authority" in allegedly taking G.G. To the extent the Commonwealth relied on G.L.c. 209C, section 10(b), to satisfy this element of the crime, defendant argued that the operation of that statute in these circumstances gave rise to an unconstitutional violation of his right to equal protection because it discriminated against him on the basis of gender. Because the indictment could properly rest on the application of another, gender-neutral statute, G.L.c. 209C, section 10(c), and because, in these circumstances, defendant could not raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to G.L.c. 209C, section 10(b), in a McCarthy motion, the court reversed the order allowing the motion to dismiss the indictment. View "Commonwealth v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, murder in the second degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of deliberately premeditated murder and of armed assault with intent to murder. Defendant also challenged two jury instructions and claimed improper direct examination and closing argument by the trial prosecutor. The court affirmed defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and declined to exercise its power to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. The court affirmed the conviction of murder in the second degree. Because the court concluded that the omission of a jury instruction regarding defendant's knowledge that a codefendant was armed created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, the court reversed defendant's conviction of armed assault with intent to murder. Finally, the court affirmed defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm. View "Commonwealth v. Bolling" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an attorney, submitted an affidavit of resignation pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, section 15, and his resignation was thereafter accepted as a disciplinary sanction. At issue was whether an attorney, whose resignation from the practice of law was accepted as a disciplinary sanction, could now work, either for pay or on a volunteer basis, as a mediator. The court concluded that, although mediation did not in all circumstances constitute the practice of law, an attorney who had resigned from the practice of law while the subject of disciplinary investigation, or who had been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, could be prohibited from serving as a mediator when to do so would be perceived by the public as an extension of the attorney's practice of law, or when the conduct of the mediation was so closely related to the practice of law as to constitute legal work. View "In the Matter of Bott" on Justia Law

This case concerned the mechanics of NSTAR's, an electric distribution company, attempt to shift the recovery of one of it supply-related costs, supply-related bad debt costs, from its distribution rates to its supply rates. NSTAR filed a petition, through which it sought to begin recovery of its supply-related bad debt costs through its supply rates rather than, as before, through its distribution rates. Not withstanding that contention, the department conditioned its approval of NSTAR's petition on a corresponding reduction in NSTAR's distribution rates. The court concluded that the department had failed to provide an adequate statement of its reasons for imposing the condition. Specifically, the court was unable to determine whether this aspect of the department's order rested on a determination that NSTAR did not follow the correct procedural path in removing supply-related bad debt costs from its distribution rates, or rather on a determination that NSTAR did not in fact remove such costs from its distribution rates at all. The court concluded further that certain of the department's factual determinations were not adequately supported by subsidiary findings and that an aspect of the department's analysis was legally erroneous. Accordingly, the department's order was to be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "NSTAR Electric Co. vs. Dept. of Public Utilities" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned six indictments charging defendant with rape of a child under the age of sixteen by force. At defendant's first trial, the trial judge entered a required finding of not guilty on one of the indictments. The jury returned guilty verdicts on the remaining indictments. However, almost a year later, the judge allowed defendant's motion for a new trial. The case proceeded to a new trial on the remaining five indictments and defendant was subsequently convicted of all charges. On appeal, defendant argued that he was convicted of crimes for which he was not indicted; error in the admission of first complaint testimony; error by the judge's restriction of cross-examination of one of the victims and refusal to grant a mistrial; and error in the admission of bad act evidence. The court transferred the case on its own motion and subsequently affirmed the convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Roby" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with committing an assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age causing substantial bodily injury and wantonly and recklessly permitting an assault and battery on a child that caused substantial bodily injury. At defense counsel's request and with the Commonwealth's agreement, the judge instructed the jury that they could consider whether defendant recklessly endangered her child. The jury acquitted defendant of the offenses charged in the indictments but found her guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless endangerment. Defendant filed a motion to vacate the conviction, claiming that the crime of reckless endangerment of a child was not a lesser included offense and the jury instruction to the contrary that her counsel had requested should not have been given. The court concluded that, although erroneously charged, the lesser included offense instruction created no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court also held that the judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing admission of the expert testimony at issue. View "Commonwealth v. Roderiques" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's suit against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) where plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident with a bus operated by a MBTA employee. Effective November 1, 2009, the amendments to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L.c. 258, sections 1-14, and the MBTA's enabling statute, G.L.c. 161A (collectively, 2009 amendments), made the MBTA a "public employer" covered by the Tort Claims Act, G.L.C. 258, section 1. At issue was whether the 2009 amendments applied retroactively, allowing the MBTA the protections of public employer status against a plaintiff whose claims accrued prior to November 1, 2009. The court concluded that the 2009 amendments did not so apply. Accordingly, plaintiff was not precluded from recovering prejudgment interest and costs of postjudgment interest against the MBTA that accrued prior to November 1, 2009. View "Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of 23 out of 32 charges stemming from his participation in a string of robberies. On appeal, defendant argued that he was unduly prejudiced by the joinder of the charged offenses in a single trial, and that inculpatory evidence that was discovered in a search of his bags violated his rights under the U.S. Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and therefore should not have been admitted. The court concluded that the charges were joined properly for a single trial, but that the challenged evidence should have been suppressed. Accordingly, the convictions that relied on that evidence must be reversed. View "Commonwealth v. Magri" on Justia Law