Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought release from commitment as a sexually dangerous person. After being found indigent, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the judge authorize funds to retain the services of an independent qualified examiner to evaluate Petitioner and to assist in the preparation of his case. The judge approved the motion for funds in the amount of $2,500. Petitioner subsequently retained a licensed psychologist who agreed to conduct an evaluation of Petitioner and to testify at trial at the hourly rate approved by the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS): $190 an hour. After trial, Petitioner moved for the authorization of an additional $2,060 to compensate the psychologist. The trial judge allowed the motion in the amount of $1,500. The appeals court denied Petitioner's appeal, concluding that the judge did not err in limiting the expert's compensation to $4,000, which was "reasonable under the circumstances." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a judge is bound by CPCS's determination of an hourly rate but still retains the authority to determine whether the total amount billed is reasonable; and (2) the judge in this case acted in accordance with these limits in determining the reasonable amount of the expert's fee. View "In re Edwards" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police and his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress and concluding that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant made a knowing, willing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights and that his statements were otherwise voluntarily made; and (2) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a pretrial motion to suppress a witness's identification of Defendant, as Defendant failed to demonstrate a likelihood that a motion to suppress this evidence would have been successful. View "Commonwealth v. Jules" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by the City in 1983 and was discharged from his employment in 2007. At the time of his departure, Plaintiff had accrued fifty days of unused vacation time. Plaintiff was not paid for those vacation days on the day of his termination. Plaintiff filed an action alleging that the City violated the Wage Act when it failed to pay him for his accrued vacation days on the day he was terminated. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's claim, finding that although the manner of the City's payments to Plaintiff violated the express language of the Wage Act, the City nevertheless compensation Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City could not cast its payments to Plaintiff as vacation pay after the fact and that Plaintiff was entitled to recover his vacation pay in addition to costs and attorney's fees. View "Dixon v. City of Malden" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and two counts of illegal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in limiting cross-examination of the Commonwealth's principal witness; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting a police officer's testimony, which, contrary to Defendant's assertion, did not improperly vouch for the principal witness's testimony; (3) the trial judge did not err in declining to sequester the police witnesses who were involved in the investigation and who had conducted interviews of the principal witness; and (4) the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for Commonwealth witnesses or misstate evidence during his closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Ahart" on Justia Law