Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder and several firearms offenses. The appeals court affirmed. Defendant appealed, asserting, among other things, that the prosecutor misstated evidence and unjustifiably demeaned the defense, Defendant, and defense counsel in his closing argument, thereby depriving Defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) the prosecutor's repeated use of the term "street thug," his reference to the "entire defense" as a "sham," and his accusation that defense counsel assisted in the presentation of lies constituted excessive argument, and therefore, these aspects of the prosecutor's closing argument were improper; and (2) Defendant was prejudiced by the improprieties in the prosecutor's closing argument. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2001, Robert Riskind suffered a grand mal seizure while driving home from work, causing him to strike Plaintiff. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident. Riskind's seizure was triggered by an inoperable brain tumor, a condition for which he had been receiving treatment from Dr. Fred Hochberg since its diagnosis. Riskind died in 2002 as a result of the brain tumor. Plaintiff subsequently filed a negligence action against Hochberg. Hochberg moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, he owed Plaintiff neither a duty to control Riskind nor a duty to warn Riskind against driving. A superior court judge granted Hochberg's summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a medical professional, other than a mental health professional, owes no duty to a third person arising from any claimed special relationship between the medical professional and a patient; and (2) Hochberg did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff under ordinary negligence principals. View "Medina v. Hochberg" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of operating while under the influence of alcohol, fifth or subsequent offense, and possession of a class D substance greater than one ounce. Defendant appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a vehicle stop conducted by a Merrimac police officer in the neighboring city of Amesbury. At issue was whether the police officer acted unlawfully by carrying his authority outside his municipal boundaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the stop was authorized under the terms of the mutual aid agreement between the municipalities, and that agreement complied with the requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, 8G. View "Commonwealth v. Bartlett " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder with deliberate premeditation, murder with deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, armed assault with intent to murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in admitting a hearsay statement of a deceased victim; (2) the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence in his closing argument; (3) defense counsel provided effective assistance; (4) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the excessive use of force in self-defense; and (5) the trial judge's omission of an instruction on knowledge of a weapon on the joint venture theory of deliberately premeditated murder did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Britt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in an abusive relationship. Plaintiff and the parties' child moved out of Massachusetts but subsequently obtained an abuse prevention order, issued pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A. Plaintiff later requested that the order be extended by one year. The judge extended the order for six months instead. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the judge abused her discretion by extending the order for six months, rather than a full year, because she improperly considered matters outside the purview of chapter 209A. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed the appeal as moot because the abuse prevention order had expired and Plaintiff did not seek to have it extended further in the trial court; but (2) concluded that the judge abused her discretion by considering Defendant's visitation rights in deciding to extend the order for six months. View "Moreno v. Naranjo" on Justia Law

Six years after his convictions were affirmed and four years after the denial of his motion for a new trial was affirmed, Defendant filed a motion for relief from unlawful sentence, alleging that the trial judge perceived Defendant's trial testimony as perjurious and then improperly considered his testimony in imposing sentence. A different judge denied the motion, as the trial judge had retired. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentences and remanded the matter for resentencing, holding that the trial judge erred by considering Defendant's testimony in imposing sentence, and because sentencing was thus improper, Defendant must be resentenced. View "Commonwealth v. Gomes" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an order of a superior court judge allowing Defendants' motions to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant. A confidential informant (CI) informed Patrick Byrne, a Boston police officer with experience in drug investigations and arrests, that defendant Anthony Gerald was selling heroin and that the CI had purchased heroin from him in the Jamaica Plain section of Boston (the premises) in the past. Under the supervision of law enforcement, the CI thereafter made three controlled purchases from Gerald. Based on information from an affidavit filed by Byrne, a warrant was issued to search the premises. The warrant led to the arrest of Defendants. The superior court allowed Defendants' motions to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Byrne's affidavit established the required nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the premises to be searched. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that evidence connected to the alleged drug offenses would be found at the premises. View "Commonwealth v. Clagon" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree and for unlawful possession of a firearm and of ammunition as an armed career criminal. The Commonwealth sought to introduce at trial Defendant's three recorded statements to police as well as eight recorded telephone calls Defendant made from the house of correction. Following two hearings on Defendant's motions to exclude his statements to police and the recorded calls, the judge ordered that portions of Defendant's statements to police and six of the eight statements in the recorded phone calls be excluded. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's rulings, holding that the judge did not err in excluding the statements at issue. View "Commonwealth v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Landlord and Tenant entered into a twelve-year lease for commercial space. The lease required a separate guaranty agreement to be executed by Guarantor. Tenant stopped making rent payments a couple of years later, and thereafter, Landlord reentered and took possession of the premises, thereby terminating the lease. Landlord subsequently filed suit against Tenant and Guarantor for damages arising from the breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment to Landlord as to liability and awarded damages in the amount of $1,092,653, for which Tenant and Guarantor were jointly liable. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment assessing damages and remanded. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the part of the judgment finding Tenant liable for breach of the lease and assessing damages for the period before termination of the lease in the amount of $37,276 plus prejudgment interest; and (2) vacated the part of the judgment assessing damages for the period following termination of the lease and awarding attorney's fees. View "275 Washington St. Corp. v. Hudson River Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law