Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of posing or exhibiting a child in a state of sexual conduct. The case was tried under the "live performance" prong of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 29A(b). The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty because the state sufficiently proved the victim's conduct satisfied the statutory definition of a "live performance"; and (2) expert testimony was not required to aid the jury in understanding how the alleged "live performance" occurred. View "Commonwealth v. Bundy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, armed burglary, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of felony-murder and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and vacated Defendant's armed burglary conviction, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective; (3) the prosecutor's closing argument did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; but (4) Defendant's conviction for armed burglary was duplicative of his conviction for felony-murder. View "Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were individuals who entered into contracts with Defendants for the provision of janitorial services to third-party customers. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action, alleging that Defendants violated the Massachusetts Wage Act. Defendants moved to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration according to the terms of the arbitration clause contained in the parties' franchise agreements. The superior court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as set forth in Feeny v. Dell Inc. (Feeney I). After the United States Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, Defendants sought appellate review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court reversed the order invalidating the arbitration in light of its interpretation of Conception and its impact on Feeney I, as set forth in Feeney II, holding (1) Massachusetts public policy in favor of class proceedings in certain contexts may no longer serve, in and of itself, as grounds to invalidate a class waiver in an arbitration agreement; and (2) in this case, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate they lacked a practical means to pursue their claims on an individual basis. View "Machado v. System4 LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action against Defendant, alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Dell successfully moved to compel arbitration according to an arbitration agreement signed by the parties. An arbitrator concluded that the parties waived class action relief by signing the agreement. In Feeney I, the Supreme Court invalidated the class waiver provision in the arbitration agreement. In this subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement was properly invalidated where (1) Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court after Feeney I, precluded the invalidation of class waiver provisions in arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, such as the one at issue here, and therefore, Concepcion undid the principal rationale for the Court's decision in Feeney I; (2) a court is not foreclosed from invalidating an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver where a plaintiff can demonstrate he effectively cannot pursue a claim against the defendant in individual arbitration according to the terms of his agreement, thus rendering his or her claim nonremediable; and (3) Plaintiffs demonstrated that they could not pursue their statutory claim under the individual claim arbitration process required by the arbitration agreement. View "Feeney v. Dell Inc." on Justia Law

Marie Evans died at fifty-four years old from small cell lung cancer caused by smoking cigarettes. Marie's son, Willie Evans, filed this action against Lorillard Tobacco Company (Defendant), the designer and manufacturer of Newport brand cigarettes. A jury (1) found Defendant caused Marie's wrongful death based on various theories of liability; (2) found Marie also to be negligent, and apportioned a percentage of the comparative negligence to her; (3) awarded damages to Plaintiff for the loss of Marie's companionship and awarded damages to Marie's estate for her conscious pain and suffering; and (4) awarded punitive damages. The judge also found Lorillard violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 2. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the jury was not adequately instructed regarding the claim of wrongful death based on the theories of negligent design and marketing, and therefore, the jury's finding that Marie's wrongful death was caused by Lorillard's negligence and the award of punitive damages must be vacated; and (2) the judge erred in finding Lorillard committed unfair acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce, and therefore, Plaintiff's claim under chapter 93A must be vacated. Remanded. View "Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of indecent assault and battery in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13H and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a child in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 63. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the indecent assault and battery conviction, holding that the trial judge erred by limiting Defendant's ability to impeach the victim's credibility through eliciting from a police statement the victim's earlier inconsistent statements, and the error was prejudicial; and (2) reversed Defendant's conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a child that rested on Defendant's delivery of alcohol to his daughter, holding that the Legislature did not intend chapter 138, section 34 to prohibit a parent's delivery of alcohol to his minor children. View "Commonwealth v. Parent" on Justia Law

Jamie Melendez pleaded guilty to four counts of statutory rape of a child. As the result of Melendez's crimes, the victim gave birth to Melendez's biological child. The superior court ordered Melendez to acknowledge paternity, to financially support the child as conditions of his probation, and to abide by any orders of the probate and family court. The victim moved the superior court to revise the conditions of Melendez's probation, contending that his conditions of probation unlawfully bound her to an ongoing relationship with Melendez. The superior court denied the victim's motion, and a single justice of the Supreme Court denied the victim's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The Supreme Court affirmed, where Melendez's sentence did not require the victim to be involved with Melendez in any way. View "H.T. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and related firearm and ammunition offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the joinder of the indictment charging assault and battery with the indictments charging murder in the first degree was proper and not unfairly prejudicial; (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by asking members of the venire if they would be able fairly to evaluate the evidence notwithstanding the absence of physical evidence such as DNA or fingerprints linking Defendant to the crimes; (3) under the circumstances, the prosecutor did not improperly use the judge's voir dire questions to argue in closing that the jury should ignore the absence of scientific evidence; and (4) the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress a box of ammunition seized from the kitchen of the apartment where he lived. View "Commonwealth v. Gray" on Justia Law

John Rousseau and Michael Dreslinski (Defendants) were each convicted of four counts of arson, breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony, malicious destruction of property, and malicious injury to a railroad. On appeal, both Defendants argued that a warrant secured by the State police for the purpose of attaching a global positioning system (GPS) device to Dreslinski's vehicle, and then tracking its location over a thirty-one-day period, was not supported by probable cause and was overly broad. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendants' convictions but remanded Rousseau's case for modification of his probationary terms, holding (1) both Defendants had standing to challenge the GPS warrant; (2) probable cause supported the warrant; (3) the evidence was sufficient to prove Rousseau participated in the charged offenses; (4) the conditions of Rousseau's probation violated his constitutional right to access the courts by effectively denying him access to research and legal materials otherwise available to prison inmates; and (5) the trial judge did not commit prejudicial error in instructing the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Rousseau" on Justia Law

Defendant turned himself in after killing his wife and stepson. Defendant made a long statement to police in his native Portuguese. An officer fluent in both Portuguese and English contemporaneously translated the statement. Following the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress the statement, the statement was introduced into evidence at Defendant's trial. A jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of murder in the first degree based on the theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress, as (i) Defendant understood all of his Miranda rights before he made his statement to police, and (ii) Defendant both voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily made his statement to police; (2) certain out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the state of mind exception to the rule against hearsay; (3) any misuse by the prosecutor of the out-of-court statements did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) the judge did not err in denying Defendant's request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. View "Commonwealth v. Bins" on Justia Law