Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued its Insurer, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory relief, after the Insurer refused to defend or indemnify Plaintiff in connection with an environmental dispute. A superior court allowed Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Insurer’s duty to defend. Plaintiff then amended its complaint to assert a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 11 arising out of the Insurer’s duty to defend. Thereafter, Plaintiff subsequently accepted reimbursement from the Insurer for its expenses in litigating and resolving the environmental matter. Insurer then sought summary judgment on the chapter 93A claim, arguing that its reimbursement of Plaintiff’s expenses precluded a finding that Plaintiff had suffered a loss of money or property, as required to establish a violation of chapter 93A section 11. The trial court denied summary judgment on the chapter 93A claim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) chapter 93A does not require a showing of uncompensated loss or a prior judgment establishing the amount of damages as a prerequisite to recovery; and (2) therefore, neither Plaintiff’s acceptance of full reimbursement of its expenses nor the absence of a judgment establishing contract damages precluded Plaintiff from pursuing a claim under chapter 93A. View "Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an unpaid party who has brought an action for breach of contract against an automobile insurer and thereafter refused the insurer’s tender of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits due and payable, made prior to the entry of judgment, may proceed with the suit and obtain a judgment for those amounts, as well as its costs and attorney’s fees. Plaintiff here provided chiropractic services to a patient, who was injured while driving a vehicle insured by Defendant. Plaintiff sought payment from Defendant for its treatment of the patient, but Defendant determined it was liable for only a portion of Plaintiff’s submitted fees. Plaintiff then filed a complaint seeking, among other things, payment of the disputed amount plus costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 34M. Before trial, Defendant sent Plaintiff a check for the disputed amount, but Plaintiff rejected the offer. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that an insurer’s late tender of PIP benefits, made after a claimant has filed suit and which the claimant denies to accept, does not entitle an insurer to summary judgment. View "Barron Chiropractic & Rehab., P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham Group" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made during two police interviews and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and declined to exercise its power to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as Defendant’s statements were made voluntarily and after an effective waiver of Defendant’s Miranda rights, and there was no evidence the police coerced Defendant; and (2) counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim in Defendant’s motion for a new trial that Defendant’s right to prompt arraignment had been violated. View "Commonwealth v. Vincent" on Justia Law

Mark Sheehan, a nonimmunized witness in a criminal trial, refused to answer questions posed by the prosecutor concerning his use of illegal drugs by invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ruled that the invocation of the privilege was not valid because Sheehan had not shown that the Commonwealth had the intention of pursuing such a prosecution. The judge then found Sheehan in summary criminal contempt and imposed a sentence of ninety days’ incarceration. Sheehan intervened in the criminal proceeding and appealed the judgment of contempt. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of contempt, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Sheehan validly invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, and Sheehan’s compelled responses to such questioning did not constitute a waiver of the privilege. View "Commonwealth v. LeClair" on Justia Law

Steven Glovsky sought to solicit signatures for his nomination to the second district seat on the Governor’s Council on the sidewalk immediately outside the entrance to a supermarket owned by Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. Despite believing he had a right under article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to solicit signatures on the property, Glovsky left the property after a store manager informed him Roche Bros. prohibited this activity. Glovsky filed suit, requesting relief under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for a violation of his rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” The superior court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the portion of the judgment dismissing Glovsky’s request for declaratory relief under article 9 and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding (1) Glovsky adequately alleged a right to solicit nominating signatures outside the supermarket, but (2) Roche Bros. did not violate this right by threats, intimidation or coercion. Remanded for entry of a judgment dismissing the request for declaratory relief as moot. View "Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1980, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner filed several postconviction motions in the trial court. The instant filing was treated by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court as a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition and subsequently denied. Petitioner’s claims stemmed from a hearing and decision on a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition the Commonwealth successfully sought during the course of prosecuting Petitioner for murder. Petitioner now complained that the hearing on the petition was improperly held ex parte. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "Tyree v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, asserting several allegations of error. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting portions of Defendant’s statement to the police, as police officers intruded into Defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent after Defendant exercised his right to cut off police questioning; (2) the prosecutor impermissibly used portions of Defendant’s postinvocation statement in his closing argument, and the prosecutor’s extensive use of propensity-based argument in his closing was improper; (3) the judge erred in instructing the jury on mental impairment; and (4) pursuant to the Court’s review of the entire case under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, the erroneous admission of Defendant’s postinvocation statement, combined with the other errors, required reversal. View "Commonwealth v. Howard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery and assault and battery. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court’s admission of expert opinion that the DNA profile generated from a known saliva sample of Defendant matched a DNA profile obtained from a swab taken from eyeglasses that were left at the scene of the robbery. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) an expert opinion regarding the results of DNA testing is not admissible unless the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the reliability of the underlying data produced by the DNA testing; and (2) in this case, the analysts who generated the DNA profiles did not testify at trial, and the expert witness who offered the opinion of a match had no affiliation with the laboratory that tested the crime scene sample, and therefore, Defendant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity for such cross-examination. Remanded for a new trial.View "Commonwealth v. Tassone " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendant were neighbors. Because of false police reports filed by Defendant, Defendant was granted a harassment prevention order against Plaintiffs, which was later vacated. Defendant also filed several criminal complaints against Plaintiffs, each of which was dismissed. Additionally, Defendant installed several video cameras in his house, which were pointed at Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. The superior court allowed Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to all claims. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs made out a plausible claim for invasion of privacy; and (2) there was no error in the judge’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.View "Polay v. McMahon" on Justia Law

A ten-year-old boy was in a kayak fishing with his father when Defendant, who was piloting a motorboat, struck the kayak, killing the boy and seriously injuring the father. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor homicide by vessel and misleading a police officer. Defendant challenged the validity of both convictions on appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) reversed Defendant’s conviction for misleading a police officer, holding that there was insufficient evidence that Defendant had the specific intent necessary to prove a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, 13B; and (2) affirmed Defendant’s homicide conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant was operating while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, which diminished his capacity to operate the vessel safely. View "Commonwealth v. Morse" on Justia Law