Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were granted relief an action filed against Marion Haddad and the Holy Annunciation Monastery Church of the Golden Hills. Plaintiffs sought to satisfy the judgment, which represented the proceeds from a sale of property. The court ordered Holy Annunciation and Haddad to hold the proceeds of the sale in escrow, but Haddad deposited $40,000 of the proceeds in her retirement account with the State Board of Retirement. When Plaintiffs received no payment for the judgment, they brought this case in part to name the Board as trustee for the $40,000. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Haddad’s retirement account was exempt from attachment and that the Commonwealth was immune from suit. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Haddad did not have rights in the $40,000 she deposited with the Board, and therefore, those funds were not statutorily prohibited from being subject to attachment; and (2) the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiffs from summoning the Board as trustee with respect to those funds.View "Randall v. Haddad" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a new vehicle from Dealer that was subject to Manufacturer’s limited warranty. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against Manufacturer and Dealer (together, Defendants), alleging that the vehicle was defective and that Defendants failed to repair or remedy the defects under the warranty. Dealer demanded that Manufacturer reimburse Dealer for the attorney’s fees it incurred in defending against Plaintiff’s claims and indemnification for and liability incurred. Plaintiffs claims against Defendants were disposed of through summary judgment and voluntary dismissal. The judge also found that Dealer was not entitled to indemnificationt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff’s allegations alleged the fault or negligence of both Manufacturer and Dealer, Manufacturer did not have a duty to defend under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B, 8(a).View "Ferreira v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a crime and sentenced to a period of imprisonment followed by community parole supervision for life (CPSL). While serving his CPSL sentence, Petitioner tested positive for opiates. During the CPSL revocation proceedings that followed, Petitioner was confined pursuant to parole board regulations pursuant to parole board regulations. While Petitioner was confined, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the superior court alleging that Petitioner was a sexually dangerous person (SDP). The parole board found a CPSL violation, and Petitioner’s confinement continued as a sanction for the CPSL violation. Petitioner was civilly committed pending the outcome of the SDP petition. While temporarily committed, Petitioner filed this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration that his due process rights were violated in the CPSL revocation proceeding and that his CPSL sentence was unconstitutional under separation of powers principles. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Petitioner’s CPSL sentence and his incarceration were unlawful, and therefore, Petitioner was not a “prisoner” for purposes of the SDP statute when the Commonwealth filed its SDP petition.View "Gangi v. Mass. Parole Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant was classified as a level two sex offender and was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant later pleaded guilty to failing to provide notice of a change of address. The district court sentenced him to six months of supervised probation and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct his sentence, claiming that the sentence was unconstitutional. Specifically, Defendant argued that CPSL violated the separation of powers doctrine by improperly delegating to the parole board the exercise of the judicial power to impose sentences. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Defendant and vacated his sentence, holding that CPSL violates article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by granting to the parole board, an entity of the executive branch, a quintessential judicial power, the power to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to additional terms of imprisonment.View "Commonwealth v. Cole" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, probation, and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his CPSL sentence was unconstitutional. Pursuant to the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding today in Commonwealth v. Cole, which held that CPSL violates separation of powers principles by delegating to the parole board, an agency of the executive branch, the distinctly judicial power to impose sentences, the Court vacated Defendant’s CPSL sentence and remanded for resentencing.View "Commonwealth v. Parrillo " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was granted a temporary abuse prevention order against Defendant and later sought to have the abuse prevention order extended for one year. The district court extended certain portions of the abuse prevention order for three months. Plaintiff appealed. While the appeals were pending, the underlying orders were succeeded by other orders, to which Plaintiff did not object. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeals as moot. However, the Court exercised its discretion to comment on some of the issues presented in this opinion.View "Singh v. Capuano" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of committing assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse and prevention order and of violating an abuse preventing order. The Appeals Court affirmed. Defendant filed an application for further appellate review, contending that the two offenses for which he was convicted were duplicative, and therefore, his convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) violation of an abuse prevention order is not a lesser included offense of assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse preventing order, and therefore, conviction of both offenses does not violate double jeopardy principles; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction of assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse prevention order.View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested in connection with the shooting death of Jonathan Nieves. While awaiting his initial appearance in the district court and after being held for approximately nine hours in the police station, Defendant was interrogated by police. Defendant moved to suppress the inculpatory statements he made during the interrogation, arguing that the statements were inadmissible under Commonwealth v. Rosario because they were made more than six hours after arrest and before being brought to court for arraignment. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining the Commonwealth’s request to revisit the Roasrio rule, as the rule “continues to serve as an important and practical protection of the constitutional and common-law rights of persons arrested for violations of the criminal laws.”View "Commonwealth v. Powell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were retired public employees who received a retirement allowances from the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System (MTRS) and the Plymouth County Retirement System pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32. Plaintiffs filed an action against the Town of Middleborough, arguing that the board of selectmen did not have the authority to raise the health maintenance organization (HMO) premium contribution percentage for retired public employees from ten percent to twenty percent. The trial judge allowed Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32B, 16, the town’s board of selectmen has the authority to establish the percentage of the total monthly premium for HMO coverage that is to be paid by the town’s retired employees. View "Twomey v. Town of Middleborough" on Justia Law

Defendants and Plaintiff executed a purchase and sale agreement under which Defendants agreed to sell real property to Plaintiff. Later, Defendants’ attorney (“Attorney”) falsely told Plaintiffs that Defendants had received a higher offer for the property and to calculate its liquidated damages. Later, due to Attorney’s withholding of information before the closing, the parties were unable to close the sale. Plaintiff filed suit for specific performance. The superior court judge concluded that Defendants anticipatorily repudiated the agreement and that Attorney’s attempt to “scuttle the deal” at closing constituted an actual breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As a result, the court allowed Plaintiff to choose either compensatory damages, as provided by the agreement, or specific performance. Plaintiff elected to receive compensatory damages. Defendants appealed, contending that they did not commit an actual breach, and therefore, monetary damages were not available. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err finding of an actual breach by Defendants, and therefore, the judge’s decision offering Plaintiff a choice of remedy was proper.View "K.G.M. Custom Homes, Inc. v. Prosky" on Justia Law