The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of probation entered in separate superior court cases stemming from the same adjudication, holding that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.After a hearing, the hearing justice found that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation in two cases and removed three and a half years suspension on each sentence in those cases. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation. View "Carver v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the Commissioner of Correction in this appeal from the denial of medical parole, holding that the Commissioner's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was made without the benefit of a standardized risk assessment required by Title 501 Code Mass. Regs. 17.02.Appellant, a sixty-six-year-old man serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole in connection with his first-degree murder conviction, petitioned for medical parole under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 119A arguing that he was permanently incapacitated and unlikely to return to violating the law if released. The Commissioner denied the request, determining that there was not a "significant and material" change in Plaintiff's circumstances. Plaintiff then commenced this action pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 4. A superior court denied the motion, finding that the Commissioner's decision was reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner's decision to deny Plaintiff medical parole was erroneous because a risk assessment was not conducted on him. View "McCauley v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution, Norfolk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the single justice of the appeals court reversing the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and vacated the injunction, holding that the single justice abused her discretion in enjoining Defendants from enforcing their December 2021 amended COVID-19 vaccination policy.Plaintiffs - the Boston Firefighters Union, the Boston Police Superior Officers Federation, and others - filed a complaint challenging Defendants' unilateral amendment of the COVID-19 vaccination policy for all city of Boston employees, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The superior court denied Plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief, but a single justice of the appeals court reversed and ordered the entry of a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the single justice abused her discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction because the potential harm to the city resulting from the spread of COVID-19 clearly outweighed the economic harm to employees. View "Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, Internat'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the articulable facts combined to establish reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed armed robbery.At issue was whether information known to other investigating officers may be imputed to the officer who initiated the stop under the collective knowledge doctrine. The superior court judge denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a stop, concluding that the officer who conducted an investigatory stop on Defendant had adequate reasonable suspicion to do so. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, with or without the imputed knowledge, the officer who stopped Defendant had reasonable suspicion to do so. View "Commonwealth v. Privette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 5 seeking relief in the nature of mandamus, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.Petitioner brought this action against the executive director of the Board of Registration in Medicine, acting in his official capacity, and timely served his complaint upon the Board. Petitioner, however, did not also serve the office of the Attorney General, as required under Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3). The superior court denied the petition. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a request for entry of default. The superior court denied the request for failure to certify compliance with Rule 9A of the Superior Court. Petitioner then brought the instant petition requesting that the superior court clerk be compelled to enter a default against the Board. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, because the Board was an agency of the Commonwealth, the office of the Attorney General must be served in order to perfect service of process under Rule 4(d)(3). View "Padmanabhan v. Executive Director of the Bd. of Registration in Medicine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge allowing the State police's motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiff's request for back pay under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 59 (the Perry Law), holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to back pay or other relief under the terms of the Perry Law.Perry Law mandates back pay for a State employee who has been indicted on criminal charges due to job-related misconduct and, consequently, suspended from his position without pay if the charges are subsequently terminated without a finding or verdict of guilty. At issue was whether Plaintiff, who had been suspended from his position without pay pursuant to article 6.2 of the State police rules and regulations, was entitled to back pay under the Perry Law. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) when the colonel of the State police opted to suspend Plaintiff, he had discretion to choose whether to invoke the Perry Law or to proceed under article 6.2, which is unique to the State police; and (2) because the colonel decided to suspend Plaintiff in accordance with article 6.2 Plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the Perry Law. View "Perez v. Dep't of State Police" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the term "physical abuse" as used in an "abuse and molestation" policy exclusion the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Insurer on its action for declaratory relief, holding that the abuse and molestation exclusion did not exempt coverage under the circumstances of this case.The homeowners' insurance policy at issue precluded coverage under a policy exclusion exempting coverage for "[b]odily injury...arising out of sexual molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse." Insured initiated an unprovoked attack on Leonard Miville by punching and kicking him repeatedly. When Insurer denied coverage Miville commenced an action against Insured. Insurer brought this action seeking a judgment declaring that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Insured for the personal injury claims. The judge granted summary judgment for Insurer. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a reasonable insured would not expect the abuse and molestation exclusion to preclude coverage for the incident. View "Dorchester Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miville" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the scope of rights conveyed by a set of burial certificates, as sold by a church to its parishioners, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the burial certificates' unambiguous language permitted the court to disinter and relocate the cremated remains buried on the church's former property despite objections of the decedents' families.After the church in this case was compelled and close and sell its property, it contacted the families of the at least forty-nine deceased individuals interred in the churchyard and requested their consent for relocation and reinterment of the cremains. Family members representing the cremains of twelve individuals did not consent, and the church brought this complaint seeking a declaration that newly-amended church regulations authorized it to relocate the remains. The family court entered judgment in favor of the church. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that this is the type of situation where relocation of the remains is proper. View "Church of Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that when an otherwise qualifying entity sells an urban redevelopment project during the forty-year tax window set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121A, 18C, the tax concession extends to the capital gain from the sale.The tax exemption at issue provides an incentive for private entities to invest in constructing, operating, and maintaining urban redevelopment projects in deteriorated areas. At issue was whether the sale of an urban redevelopment project during the forty-year tax-exempt window is "on account of" the project, thus extending the tax concession to the capital gain from the sale. In this case, the Commission of Revenue issued notice of assessment to Appellants related to their capital gains from the sales of certain ch. 121A projects. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the capital gain from the sale of the ch. 121A project fell within the tax concession. View "Reagan v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order finding Probationer in violation of his probation, revoking his probation and imposing the remainder of his suspended sentence, holding that the evidence was sufficient to for the superior court judge to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Probationer had violated a term of his probation by committing a new offense.On appeal, Probationer argued that the judge erroneously relied upon an unreliable, in-court identification by a witness who had made no prior, out-of-court identification. Specifically, Probationer asked the Supreme Judicial Court to extend the rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 214 (2014), excluding such identifications in criminal trials without a showing of good reason to probation violation hearings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to extend Crayton to probation violation hearings; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the holding that Probationer had violated a term of his probation by committing a new offense. View "Commonwealth v. Jarrett" on Justia Law