The Supreme Judicial Court held that there is no common-law duty for insurers to cover costs incurred by an insured to prevent imminent covered loss when the plain, unambiguous terms of the insurance policy speak directly to the question of mitigation and reimbursement and do not provide coverage and the costs are otherwise excluded by other policy provisions.Insured sought recovery from Insurer for various costs it incurred after a wastewater treatment system at its manufacturing facility malfunctioned, claiming coverage under its pollution liability policy. In dispute were costs incurred that were not cleanup costs or costs necessary to avoid imminent endangerment to public health or welfare but necessary to avoid a business interruption. The district court held that the costs at issue were not recoverable and that there was no basis to impose a common-law duty that was inconsistent with the policy's coverages and exclusions. View "Ken's Foods, Inc. v. Steadfast Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case involving Salvatore F. DiMasi's attempt to register as a lobbyist with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 3, 45 (m) ("the disqualification provision") limits automatic disqualification to individuals who have been convicted of a felony set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 3, 55 or 268A.In 2011, DiMasi was convicted of seven federal felonies arising from his sale of political favors while serving as Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. In 2019, after he was released from prison, DiMasi filed his application to register as a lobbyist. The Secretary denied the application, citing the disqualification provision. The Secretary determined that, even though DiMasi was convicted of federal offenses, his application for registration as a lobbyist must be rejected because the conduct underlying his convictions would have violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 3 or 268A. Thereafter, DiMasi brought this lawsuit. The Supreme Judicial Court held in favor of DiMasi, holding that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 3, 45(m) does not afford the Secretary discretion to consider what other offenses might require automatic disqualification even if the underlying criminal conduct could support a felony conviction pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 3, 55 or 268A. View "DiMasi v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court judge denying Juvenile's motion to suppress evidence of a seized firearm on the grounds that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her, holding that the juvenile court did not err.As a result of a report about kids displaying a firearm outside a housing complex four police officers were dispatched to the complex. One officer noticed Juvenile walking along the street who kept adjusting the waistband of her pants. The officers stopped her, conducted a patfrisk, and discovered a loaded firearm in Juvenile's waistband. After her motion to suppress was denied Juvenile entered a conditional guilty plea to four firearms-related offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Juvenile was carrying an illegal firearm in her waistband, and therefore, the stop and pat frisk of Juvenile comported with constitutional requirements. View "Commonwealth v. Karen K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Seller in this case stemming from the economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically at issue was, in light of the disruptions caused by COVID-19 pandemic, whether the doctrines of impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose temporarily excused the purchaser of a cleaning services franchise and the purchaser's co-owners from their obligation to pay the outstanding portion of the purchase price of the franchise. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the property seller. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the record did not support a rational finding that the pandemic cause date continued payment of the franchise purchase price to be impracticable or frustrated the principal purpose of the contract; and (2) the parties intended that the obligation to pay would not be conditioned on the franchise's financial performance beyond the first six months following the sale. View "Le Fort Enterprises, Inc. v. Lantern 18, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of kidnapping, rape of a child with force, and threatening to commit a crime. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Petitioner later filed three motions for a new trial, all of which were denied. Petitioner then filed the instant petition arguing that the appeals court erred in affirming the denial of his third new trial motion. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion. View "Dumas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the Appeals Court single justice affirming the Housing Court's use and occupancy order at issue in this case, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.After the foreclosure of Petitioner's residence, the Federal National Mortgage Association successfully initiated a summary process action against him. Petitioner appealed. A Housing Court judge ordered Petitioner to pay monthly use and occupancy payments of $1,000. Petitioner appealed. Petitioner then filed this petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 211, 3 requesting that the Supreme Court vacate the use and occupancy order or reduce it. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief. View "Branch v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the appellate tax board permitting an abatement requested by a nondomiciliary seller, holding that 830 Code Mass. Regs. 64H.1.7 did not by its plain terms permit the Commissioner of Revenue to apply the Court's new rule, which replaced a bright-line rule, to the tax period at issue in this case.The bright-line rule was adhered to by the United States Supreme Court as it pertained to the constitutional limits of a State's authority to impose an obligation on a nondomiciliary seller to collect and remit a sales or use tax when a consumer purchases goods or services for use or consumption in the state. In 2018, the Court concluded that the rule's requirement that the nondomiciliary seller have a "physical presence" was no longer required. Here, the Commissioner argued that the pre-2018 regulation at issue in this case incorporated the Court's new rule retroactively. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the appellate tax board's decision, holding (1) the regulation incorporated the bright-line rule set forth in pre-2018 jurisprudence and did not permit the Commissioner to apply the new rule to this case; and (2) the existence of what the Commissioner described as "electrons" in the Commonwealth did not satisfy the applicable physical presence test. View "U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of a single justice of the court vacating the superior court's order that Defendant could depose the licensed social worker who saw the complaining witness, Jonathan, after Jonathan told his parents that Defendant, his technology teacher, had touched him inappropriately, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the motion judge to order that the social worker be subjected to a limited deposition.Defendant was indicted on charges arising from Jonathan's allegations during an interview with the Sexual Assault Intervention Network. Defendant filed a motion to examine the treatment records of the social worker who treated Jonathan, but the records had been destroyed. In response, a judge ordered that Defendant would have the opportunity to depose the social worker. Jonathan filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking to block the deposition. A single justice vacated the order that the social worker could be deposed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the single justice's order and denied Jonathan's petition for extraordinary relief, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the motion judge to order that the social worker be subjected to a limited deposition. View "In re an Impounded Case" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the verdict of the trial court awarding Plaintiffs $100,000 for property damage and $3.4 million in emotional distress damages and entering an injunction forbidding operation of the golf course next to which Plaintiffs' home was located in a manner that allowed golf balls on Plaintiffs' property, holding that the trial judge erred.Plaintiffs lived in a subdivision on the side of a golf course operated by Defendant. In 2018, Plaintiffs sued Defendant in trespass for equitable relief and money damages, alleging that several hundred golf balls had hit the property since 2017, breaking eight windows and damaging the house's siding and a railing on the deck. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the trial judge erred when he did not interpret the documents creating the covenants and restrictions as a whole and in light of attendant circumstances; and (2) because the jury were not properly instructed about the documents, the verdict must be reversed, the injunction lifted, and the case remanded. View "Tenczar v. Indian Pond Country Club, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case where Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Massachusetts Constitution protects a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide, thereby immunizing the practice from criminal prosecution, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the proposed right, as defined by Plaintiffs, was not supported in the relevant provisions of the Constitution.Plaintiffs were a licensed physician who wished to provide physician-assisted suicide and a retired physician who had been diagnosed with an incurable cancer. Plaintiffs brought a civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that terminally ill patients with six months or less to live have a constitutional right to receive a prescription for lethal medication in order to bring about death in a manner and time of their choosing. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not protect physician-assisted suicide; and (2) the law of manslaughter prohibits physician-assisted suicide without offending constitutional protections. View "Kligler v. Attorney General" on Justia Law