The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss this suit alleging sexual abuse by leadership of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield that Plaintiff allegedly endured as a child in the 1960s, holding that common-law charitable immunity did not insulate Defendants from certain counts in the complaint.Defendants moved to dismiss this complaint on the grounds of common-law charitable immunity and the doctrine of church autonomy. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants' arguments pertaining to common-law charitable immunity fell within the doctrine of present execution and were properly before the Court; and (2) common-law charitable immunity insulated Defendant from the count alleging negligent hiring and supervision but did not protect Defendant from the counts alleging sexual assault against Plaintiff. View "Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that delivery drivers that delivered takeout food and various prepackaged goods from local restaurants, convenience stores, and delicatessens to Grubhub, Inc. do not fall within a residual category of workers who are exempt from arbitration pursuant to section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).Plaintiffs, former delivery drivers for Grubhub, brought this putative class action against Grubhub, alleging violations of the Wage Act, the Tips Act, and the Minimum Wage Act and that Grubhub unlawfully retaliated against drivers who complained about their wages. Grubhub filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement each Plaintiff had entered into. Because Plaintiffs transported and delivered some prepackaged food items manufactured outside Massachusetts, the judge found that Plaintiffs fell within the definition of "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" who were exempt from arbitration under section 1 of the FAA. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs were not transportation workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce, as required by the residual clause of section 1. View "Archer v. Grubhub, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Plaintiff's emergency complaint for relief in the nature of mandamus, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying Plaintiff's request for mandamus relief.In her complaint, Plaintiff requested that the single justice compel the Secretary of Housing and Economic Development to award her certain benefits under the Emergency Rental Assistance Program and to help her locate a home with suitable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The single justice denied the request without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that mandamus relief was not appropriate in this case. View "Linardon v. Secretary of Housing and Economic Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) superseding order of conditions allowing the City of Boston's bridge project to proceed superseded the decision of the Conservation Commission of Quincy to deny Boston's application to build the bridge in question.Boston petitioned the Commission for permission to build a bridge to Long Island because the bridge would have an impact on wetlands in Quincy. The Commission denied the application pursuant to the State Wetlands Protection Act and Quincy's local wetlands ordinance. Boston subsequently sought a superseding order of conditions from the DEP pursuant to the Act. The DEP issued the order. The superior court concluded that the project would be governed by the DEP's superseding order of conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DEP's superseding order of conditions preempted the Commission's denial of Boston's application. View "City of Boston v. Conservation Commission of Quincy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part the Housing Court judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as trustee of the Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E, Mortgage Backed Certificate, Series 2005-E (HSBC), in this summary process action, holding that one of Defendants' counterclaims was not barred.Defendants purchased their home with proceeds from two loans secured by a mortgage on the property. The primary loan was at issue on appeal. After Defendants defaulted on their monthly payments HSBC, the assignee of the home mortgage loan, held a foreclosure sale and sold Defendants' home to the highest bidder. When Defendants refused to vacate the property HSBC initiated the present summary process action. Defendants brought counterclaims under section 15(b)(2) of the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act (PHLPA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of HSBC. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants were entitled to assert a counterclaim under PHLPA to limited monetary damages; and (2) Defendants' counterclaim under chapter 93A was barred. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris" on Justia Law

In this case involving licenses to operate a retail marijuana dispensary the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Land Court judge ordering the issuance of a special permit to Plaintiff and the issuance of a second injunction, holding that the second injunction exceeded the permissible scope of the judge's authority.After denying Plaintiff's application for a special permit license to operate a recreational marijuana establishment in the City of Taunton the City granted a special permit to a different applicant. Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the denial of its special permit application. The Land Court judge found the City's denial of Plaintiff's special permit application was arbitrary and capricious and enjoined the City from conducting previously-scheduled licensing proceedings to consider applications from nonparties seeking licenses to operate medical marijuana dispensaries and from issuing any of the four licenses to the pending applicants. A single justice vacated the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment concerning the city council's licensing hearings and otherwise affirmed, holding that the injunction exceeded the scope of the judge's authority but that the judge did not err in determining that the City's denial was arbitrary and legally untenable. View "Bask, Inc. v. Municipal Council of Taunton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial; (2) in no instance did the admission of polygraph evidence constitute reversible error; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter; and (4) this Court discerns no reason to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Gamboa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict to manslaughter or to order a new trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the exclusion of Defendant's recorded interview statements with police as inadmissible hearsay did not violate his constitutional rights; (2) the trial judge erred in instructing counsel that attorney-conducted voir dire is limited to questions solely related to apparent bias and does not include the opportunity to elicit information that may help counsel exercise a peremptory challenge, but the error was harmless; (3) the admission of relationship-related text messages between Defendant and a former romantic partner was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) the Commonwealth's cross-examination of Defendant did not result in reversible error. View "Commonwealth v. Steeves" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the housing appeals committee had jurisdiction over the projects at issue in this case and the power to remove or modify conditions that made such projects significantly more uneconomic.Under the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40B, 20-23, qualifying developers of low or moderate income housing have access to a comprehensive streamline permitting process and expedited appeal before HAC. The Act further authorizes HAC to strike or modify any conditions on a comprehensive permit application that would make it "uneconomic" to proceed with a project. At issue was whether the HAC has the power to reject conditions where a project has received a funding commitment from a public subsidizing agency and the developer receives a comprehensive permit subject to conditions but the rate of return for the original proposal is found to be uneconomic and HAC determines that the imposed conditions make the project "significantly more uneconomic" and therefore rejects them. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that HAC is authorized to eliminate conditions that effectively prevent such projects by rendering them significantly more uneconomic. View "Zoning Board of Appeals of Milton v. HD/MW Randolph Avenue, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting partial summary judgment and entering declarations in the two underlying cases that certain waterways regulations were an improper delegation of the Department of Environmental Protection's public trust responsibilities, holding that there was no error.Consistent with its public trust responsibilities, the Department set certain specifications for buildings within one hundred feet of protected tidelands and promulgated regulations purporting to allow the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs to override the Department's specifications by approving substitute specifications as part of a municipal harbor plan. At issue was whether the Department had the authority to delegate this override authority to the Secretary. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the delegation was ultra vires and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Armstrong v. Secretary of Energy & Environmental Affairs" on Justia Law