The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court denying Appellants' petitions for relief in the county court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 from the order of the municipal court that Appellants be detained on the ground of dangerousness, holding that there was no error. Appellants were charged with unlicensed firearm possession pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10(a) and held before trial on the ground of dangerousness. On appeal, Appellants argued that including unlicensed firearm possession as a predicate offense violates substantive and procedural due process and that there was insufficient evidence of their dangerousness. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) unlicensed possession of a firearm is a constitutional predicate offense under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A(1); and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the determinations that Appellants should be held on the ground of dangerousness. View "Vega v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme cruelty and felony murder, holding that there was no error warranting a new trial, nor was there any reason to exercise the Court's extraordinary authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme cruelty and felony murder; (2) although portions of the prosecutor's opening statement and examination of one witness were improper, the errors did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (3) Defendant's challenges to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings were unavailing. View "Commonwealth v. Sun" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, holding that there was no error warranting a new trial, nor was there any reason to exercise the Court's extraordinary authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's murder conviction; (2) the prosecution's introduction of character and prior bad act evidence did not sufficiently influence the grand jury's decision to indict to require dismissal of the indictments; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's instruction on eyewitness identification; (4) the prosecutor's questions to the venire did not result in a biased jury; and (5) while several of the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument were improper, the improprieties did not warrant a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Insureds in this insurance dispute over attorney's fees, holding that attorney's fees under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A are not awarded as "damages because of 'bodily injury' and are not 'costs taxed against the insured.'"At issue was whether Insureds' insurance policy, which covered "sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury,'"included Insureds' liability for attorney's fees under chapter 93A, section 9(4) in an action for breach of warranty resulting in bodily injury. After paying the substantive damages on the claim, Insurer brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether it was also responsible for attorney's fees. The superior court concluded that the policy did cover attorney's fees. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Insureds' policy did not cover the award of attorney's fees under chapter 93A. View "Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Poirier" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the scope of the litigation privilege, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the protection afforded by the litigation privilege applies even where the statements in question are fraudulent misrepresentations and that the litigation privilege extends to actions taken during the course of litigation.Plaintiffs were creditors of William von Thaden, who was married to Kimberly von Thaden until their divorce. Defendant represented Kimberly in the divorce proceedings. Before they filed the instant complaint against William and Kimberly Plaintiffs had asserted several claims against William related to contract disputes. William subsequently declared bankruptcy. Plaintiffs then commenced this action against Defendant, seeking to hold him liable for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations he made to the court during the divorce trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of this complaint, holding that the litigation privilege applied under the circumstances of this case. View "Bassichis v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the opinion of a panel of the appeals court affirming the probation violation hearing judge's ruling that Probationer had violated the terms of his probation by committing new crimes, revoking his probation, and sentencing him to a term of incarceration, holding that Probationer's inability to question his accuser violated his right to present a defense.The hearing justice revoked Probationer's probation on the basis of hearsay statements by the complainant, his former fiancee, who alleged that Probationer had repeatedly raped her over a period of four months when they were living together. On appeal, Probationer argued that his constitutional due process rights were violated because the complainant did not appear at the hearing to testify or to be cross-examined. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that precluding Probationer from calling the accuser as a witness at the hearing violated Probationer's due process right to present a defense. View "Commonwealth v. Costa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the superior court judge granting partial summary judgment and separate and final judgment for Plaintiffs in this familial dispute over assets left by Lubov Stempniewicz, the mother and grandmother to the parties to this action, holding that the judgment is reversed with respect to count eight of Plaintiffs' complaint.Plaintiffs initiated this action against their uncle to determine the validity of the Living Trust of Lubov Stempniewicz. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that their uncle acted without authority in creating the trust, and therefore the trust was void ab initio. The superior court agreed and granted judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding that summary judgment was proper as to all counts except count eight, alleging "constructive trust." View "Barbetti v. Stempniewicz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of a judge of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm discovered during what Defendant alleged was an unlawful patfrisk, holding that the motion to suppress was properly granted.The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the grant of Defendant's motion to suppress, arguing that the officers' suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous was reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) the motion judge properly found that Defendant's behavior did not create reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous; and (2) Defendant's reactions to the traffic stop did not justify the subsequent patfrisk. View "Commonwealth v. Garner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress and affirmed the dismissal of her other claims, holding that the alleged facts, taken as true, plausibly supported claims for negligent and reckless infliction of emotional distress.At issue in this case was daguerreotypes made in 1850 by the Harvard University professor Louis Agassiz of Renty Taylor and his daughter, Delia, who were enslaved on a South Carolina plantation. Plaintiff, the alleged descendent of the Taylors, brought this action against Harvard, seeking relief for emotional distress and other injuries and restitution of the daguerreotypes to her. The superior court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal in part, holding that the facts alleged plausibly supported a claim of reckless infliction of emotional distress. View "Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the county court for entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General's summary and the Secretary's one-statement statements regarding a legislative amendment were in compliance with the requirements of article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by article 74 of the Amendments.At issue in this case was a legislative amendment that would impose a tax on a portion of annual incomes of $1 million, to be used, subject to appropriation by the legislature, for education and transportation purposes. In preparing to submit the amendment to voters the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth prepared informational materials to be distributed across the Commonwealth. Plaintiffs argued that some of the materials were constitutionally and statutorily defective. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) the Attorney General's summary was in compliance with the requirements of article 48, as amended by article 74; and (2) the Attorney General and Secretary's one-sentence statements describing the effects of a "yes" vote and a "no" vote are in compliance with the requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, 53. View "Anderson v. Attorney General" on Justia Law