The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court concluding that the insurance policies of three restaurants (Plaintiffs), which suffered reductions in revenues during the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting government restrictions on public gatherings, did not unambiguously cover Plaintiffs' losses, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the scope of their policies. The superior court granted judgment against Plaintiffs, finding that there was no "direct physical loss or damage" resulting from the COVID-19 virus. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed. View "Verveine Corp. v. Strathmore Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this negligence suit, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the motion judge allowing a defendant's motion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 35(a) seeking a court order requiring the injured individual to submit to a neurological examination, holding that neuropsychologists are physicians for the purpose of rule 35.Thomas Ashe suffered injures as a result of an accident allegedly caused by multiple parties, including Shawmut Design & Construction, Inc. Defendant sought to have Ashe examined by its expert, a board-certified clinical neuropsychologist, but Plaintiffs declined to make Ashe available on the grounds that Rule 35, which applies to examinations performed by a "physician," precluded the examination. The motion judge granted Shawmut's motion for an order requiring Ashe to submit to the examination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion by allowing the motion. View "Ashe v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the comprehensive remedial scheme provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., for recovery of damages when an employer violates the federal overtime law, 29 U.S.C. 207, precludes an employee from alternatively pursuing remedies under the wage act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, for the untimely payment of overtime wages due solely pursuant to the FLSA.Plaintiffs, employees of Defendant, brought this action alleging violations of the FLSA for failure to pay overtime wages, violations of the wage act for failure to pay the FLSA overtime wages in a timely manner, and violations of federal and state minimum wage laws. The motion judge allowed summary judgment as to Defendant's liability under the federal overtime law and wage act. After a trial, the trial judge awarded damages. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the trial judge's trebling of damages pursuant to the wage act was error; (2) the jury instructions for the calculation of overtime wages under the FLSA contained a methodological error; and (3) Defendant's remaining claims lacked merit. View "Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the superior court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss insofar as it concerned the charge of murder in the first degree on a joint venture theory, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction.Defendant charged with murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, accessory after the fact to murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a loaded firearm without a license. After four days of deliberations the jury deadlocked, and the trial judge declared a mistrial. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a retrial would violate his right against double jeopardy. After the motion judge denied the motion Defendant filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the cause, holding that there was insufficient evidence that Defendant shared the lethal intent of the shooter required to support a conviction of murder in the first degree on a joint venture theory. View "Baxter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the motion judge granting a continuance sought by the Commonwealth for the express purpose of delaying resolution of the case past the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, holding that, absent certain findings, it was an abuse discretion to allow the continuance.Where the motion judge granted the continuance in this case, it meant the difference between twenty days and twelve months the juvenile spent in the custody of the Department of Youth Services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) continuances for the sole purpose of extending the time of commitment are authorized only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the continued commitment is necessary for the rehabilitation of the juvenile and express findings are made to that effect after an evidentiary hearing; and (2) because no such findings were made in the instant case and the juvenile had already turned eighteen, it was an abuse of discretion to allow the continuance. View "Noah v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the trial judge denying Barbara Howard's motion to dismiss a petition seeking to partition two adjacent parcels of land in Foster that Howard Dunn and Howard owned as joint tenants with a right of survivorship, holding that Howard's motion to dismiss should have been granted.During the partition proceedings, Dunn died. Howard subsequently filed her motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that Dunn's death vested full title in her as the surviving joint tenant. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the partition proceedings and the acceptance of a buyer's offer to purchase the property did not sever the joint tenancy or terminate Howard's right of survivorship; (2) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 241, 26 does not confer standing on the heirs of a joint tenant to continue a partition action; and (3) where a party lacks standing under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 241, 1, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 241, 25 does not permit the land court to retain jurisdiction over the defective suit. View "Battle v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the proper measure of damages for the private right of action for Wage Act violations under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 150 when the employer pays wages after the deadlines provided in the aCt but before the employee files a complaint is treble the amount of the late wages, not trebled interest.When Plaintiff was discharged from her employment with the City of Methuen the City owed her almost $9000 for accrued vacation time. While the Act required the City to pay this amount to Plaintiff on the day of her termination the City did not pay her until three weeks later. One year later, the City paid Plaintiff an amount representing the trebled interest for the three weeks between Plaintiff's termination and the payment of Plaintiff's vacation pay. Plaintiff subsequently brought this lawsuit. The superior court judge concluded that Plaintiff was only entitled to treble interest for the three-week delay in receiving her vacation pay. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding that late-paid wages are "lost wages" for purposes of the Wage Act. View "Reuter v. City of Methuen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that "tower dumps" are not per se unconstitutional and that investigators may use tower dumps so long as they comply with the warrant requirements of article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.The Commonwealth obtained search warrants for seven different "tower dumps," a law enforcement tool that provides investigators with the cell site location information for all devices that connected to specific cell towers during a particular time frame, corresponding to the locations of several crimes. Defendant was ultimately charged with six robberies and a homicide. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the tower dumps as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) investigators may use tower dumps so long as they comply with the warrant requirements of article 14; (2) the second of the two warrants in this case was supported by probable cause and therefore did not offend the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; but (3) the first warrant was not supported by probable cause, and any evidence obtained from it must be suppressed. View "Commonwealth v. Perry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the superior court judge allowing the forfeiture in this case, holding that firearms found to be improperly secured according to the requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 131L are not subject to forfeiture under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 3(b), which regulates the disposal of certain firearms seized during the execution of a search warrant.Police obtained a search warrant to search Defendant's home for a firearm allegedly used in an altercation. During the search, officers found that some of Defendant's more than 240 firearms appeared to be improperly secured. Defendant was subsequently indicted on twenty-seven counts of improperly securing a firearm and convicted on twelve counts. Defendant later moved for the return of all twenty-seven of the seized firearms. A superior court judge ordered the return of the firearms seized during during the execution of the search warrant with the exception of the twelve that had been found to have been improperly secured, which the judge ordered be forfeited and destroyed. The Court of Appeals vacated the order below, holding that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 129D applies only to firearms "deliver[ed] or surrender[ed]," not to those seized during a lawful search. View "Commonwealth v. Fleury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and home invasion, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.On appeal from his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial Defendant asserted a number of allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings, claimed that the Commonwealth failed to comply with its discovery obligations, and contended that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no reversible error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below; and (2) there was no reason for this Court to exercise its authority to grant relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Kostka" on Justia Law