The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court allowing Defendant's second motion for a new trial based on constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, holding that Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the sole issue of trial counsel's performance. Before an evidentiary hearing was held on remand, Defendant's appellate counsel filed a second motion for a new trial on the ground that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The trial court allowed the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to hold that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. View "Commonwealth v. Ng" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, entered after a second trial, of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant; (2) Defendant's claims of error regarding the trial court's evidentiary rulings were unavailing; (3) there was nothing improper in the prosecutor's closing argument; (4) the judge's instruction on accessory after the fact was not improper; (5) Defendant was not denied the right to a fair trial when a codefendant attacked him as the verdicts were being read; and (6) there is no reason to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Robertson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to revoke and revoke his sentence, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the motion judge's denial.Defendant pleaded guilty to firearm offense. While he was serving a suspended sentence, Defendant stipulated to violating the conditions of his probation and was resentenced with additional conditions of probation. Defendant filed a motion to revise and revoke his sentence, which the motion judge denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's stipulation to probation violations and agreement to waive a probation violation hearing were knowing and voluntary; and (2) Defendant's appeal from his sentence of probation is dismissed as untimely. View "Commonwealth v. Santana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for violating an abuse prevention order, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, 7, the statute under which Defendant was convicted, violated separation of powers because it vests the executive branch with the power to enforce judicially-issued abuse prevention orders; (2) the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions prohibited his criminal punishment for violating an abuse prevention order that was issued when he was uncounselled and afforded no right to court-appointed counsel; and (3) alternatively, there were abuses of discretion in several of the trial judge's rulings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) chapter 209A, section 7 is constitutional under separation of powers principles; (2) neither the state nor the federal Constitution is violated where a constitutionally permissible proceeding provides a predicate for a subsequent incarcerate offense; and (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's challenged rulings. View "Commonwealth v. Dufresne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the ruling of the superior court entering declaratory judgment in favor of the city council of Springfield and held that the city council may reorganize the Springfield police department based on the plain language of the relevant statutes and city ordinances.At issue was whether the city council had the authority to reorganize the police department to be headed by a five-person board of police commissioners rather than a single commission under the provisions of the Springfield city charter passed in accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 43, 46-55. After the mayor refused to implement the city council's ordinance restructuring the police department the city council brought this action. The court entered a judgment declaring that the mayor must appoint qualified individuals to serve on the board. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the ordinance was clearly within the scope of the city council's power to reorganize municipal departments; and (2) there was no separation of powers problem in this case. View "City Council of Springfield v. Mayor of Springfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty for the killing of his wife, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the prosecutor did not improperly exercise a peremptory challenge to strike a male juror; (2) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in connection with certain evidentiary decisions; (3) the prosecutor's challenged statements in his closing argument did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) the jury instruction on mental impairment was sufficient; (5) the denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial did not constitute an abuse of discretion; and (6) this Court declines to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws 278, 33E, to order a new trial or a reduction in the verdict. View "Commonwealth v. Huang" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained after surveillance was conducted at Defendant's apartment building via a hidden video camera placed on a nearby public utility pole, holding that although the pole camera surveillance constituted a warrantless search under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, it was nevertheless constitutional.Defendant was indicted on child pornography charges. After the surveillance at issue in this case took place but before the superior court decided Defendant's motion to suppress, Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 Mass. 360 (2020) was decided. In Mora, the Supreme Judicial Court decided that pole camera surveillance could, under certain circumstances, constitute a search requiring a warrant. After the motion to suppress in this case was decided, Defendant brought an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) the pole camera surveillance constituted a search; but (2) probable cause existed to conduct the pole camera surveillance prior to the time the search began. View "Commonwealth v. Comenzo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Defendant was sentenced on the murder conviction to a term of life in State prison, to be served after his sentence for assault and battery. On appeal, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error in the trial proceedings and that there was no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. View "Commonwealth v. Denson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the appropriate standard of proof by which the Department would have to prove that it had made "reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his [or her] parent or guardian" under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 29C is proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The parties in this case jointly petitioned for clarification of the standard by which the Department would have to prove that it has made reasonable efforts. The Department argued that the standard of proof should be fair preponderance of the evidence, and the child at issue and its mother argued for a more demanding clear and convincing evidence standard. The Supreme Judicial Court declared that, at a reasonable efforts hearing, the Department's burden is to prove that it has made reasonable efforts by a preponderance of the evidence. View "In re Care & Protection of Rashida" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court judge denying Defendant's motion to suppress a video recording Defendant published to his social media account that showed an individual seen from the chest down holding what appeared to be a firearm, holding that no search in the constitutional sense occurred.After accepting a friend request from an undercover police officer, Defendant published the video at issue to his social media account. The officer made a recording of the posting, and that recording was used in the criminal proceedings against Defendant. The trial judge concluded that no search had occurred and denied Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in his social media stories. View "Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo" on Justia Law