The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court allowing Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the claims in this case were based on issues that had been litigating and decided in previous litigation between the same parties, holding that this action was precluded.In 2014, Plaintiff, the owner of the closely held corporation at the center of the parties' dispute, filed a complaint alleging that Defendants breached a contract and their fiduciary duties. The superior court judge found against Plaintiffs on his claims and found in favor of Defendants on their counterclaims. In 2017, Plaintiff brought this action alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and asserting derivative claims. The superior court judge allowed Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) issue preclusion applied in this case; and (2) where the interests of the parties fully coincided with that of the closely held corporation, Plaintiff was precluded from asserting his claims by means of a derivative action. View "Mullins v. Corcoran" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with respect to all counts in the complaint with the exception of the public policy claim, holding that Plaintiff's complaint stated a claim for which relief may be granted.Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Children's Hospital Corporation (CHC) under the Domestic Violence and Abuse Leave Act (DVLA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 52E, alleging that it terminated her employment after she disclosed to CHC that her abuser had violated the terms of a harassment prevention order and that Plaintiff had reported the violation to the police. Plaintiff further asserted that her termination contravened the Commonwealth's public policy to protect victims of abusive behavior. The trial court allowed CHC's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff's complaint stated a ground upon which relief could be granted; and (2) a public policy ground for relief was unavailable. View "Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hospital Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the term "service charge" is a defined term in the Tips Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A, that the disputed charge at issue in this case was properly characterized as a "service charge," and that the "safe harbor" provision of the Act did not apply in this case.Plaintiffs, service employees for Concert Blue Hill, LLC and its managerial staff (collectively, Blue Hill), alleged that Blue Hill violated the Act by failing to remit to them charges identified as "service" charges on invoices sent to patrons but previously described in initial documents as "administrative" or "overhead" charges. The superior court granted Blue Hill's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the action. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the plain meaning of the Act required Blue Hill to remit the disputed charge to Plaintiffs. View "Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court answered three reported questions regarding whether the provision in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 29C that the court shall determine reasonable efforts not less than annually permits or requires a juvenile court judge to make a reasonable efforts determination at other times, holding that a party may file a motion for a determination of reasonable efforts at other times.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held that, following judicial certification of reasonable efforts at the emergency custody hearing and the seventy-two hour hearing, there is no requirement that a trial court judge determine that the department has continued to engage in reasonable efforts at any time prior to the statutorily mandated annual review, but the trial judge has the discretion to do so upon the motion of a parent or child. View "In re Care & Protection of Rashida" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendants' convictions for murder in the first degree on a theory of joint venture, holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the judge not to require the Commonwealth to provide a race-neutral reason for its challenge of at least one African-American juror and that sexual orientation is a protected class for purposes of a Batson-Soares challenge.Defendants, Antwan Carter and Daniel Pickney, appealed from their convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges of five prospective jurors - four based on the prospective jurors' race and one based on a juror's sexual orientation. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants made the limited showing necessary to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination with respect to the challenge of one juror, and the judge's decision constituted structural error for which prejudice is presumed; and (2) while sexual orientation is a protected class Defendants did not satisfy their burden of production under the first step of the Batson-Soares inquiry with respect to that particular challenge. View "Commonwealth v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the superior court concluding that the Commonwealth's exercise of its statutory right to demand a jury trial violated Petitioner's substantive due process rights and allowing Petitioner's motion for a bench trial, holding that the judge erred in concluding that Petitioner's substantive due process rights were violated.A jury found Petitioner to be a sexually dangerous person, and Petitioner was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center. Petitioner later filed a motion pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, 9 for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person. A jury trial in 2018 resulted in a mistrial, and the matter was rescheduled for retrial in 2020. The trial, however, was continued indefinitely because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the suspension of jury trials in the state. A superior court judge granted Petitioner's motion to proceed with a bench trial, concluding that it was unconstitutional for the Commonwealth to exercise its right to demand a jury trial. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that continuing commitment after a single mistrial where Petitioner was previously found to be sexually dangerous did not violate Petitioner's due process rights and did not require that Petitioner be given the opportunity to seek release pending trial. View "In re LeSage" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the single justice of the appeals court denying Defendant's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal of his motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant presented a serious flight risk.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. On October 26, 2020, Defendant filed a second motion for a new trial and a motion to stay the execution of his sentence, seeking release due to COVID-19 concerns. The superior court denied the motion to stay, concluding that Defendant did not satisfy any of the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 394 (2020). Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to stay with a single justice in the appeals court. The single justice concluded that Defendant was a flight risk and that COVID-19 concerns did not support a different result because Defendant had already been vaccinated against COVID-19. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice properly denied Defendant's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal of his motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. McDermott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that there was no reason to order a new trial, reduce the verdict, or grant any other relief.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial judge did not erred in allowing a Boston police detective to testify about the contents of a certain record of the United States Customs and Border Protection agency that he saw on a computer screen at Logan Airport, but the error was not prejudicial; (3) the trial judge's instruction to the jury in response to Defendant's closing argument was not prejudicial; and (4) the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not rise to the level of prejudicial error. View "Commonwealth v. Brea" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this case for a new hearing held pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7 and 8, holding that the trial judge erred in allowing an expert witness to testify on direct examination about the basis of his opinion when the facts were neither within the expert's personal knowledge nor otherwise admitted into evidence during the proceeding.The Department of Mental Health filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7 and 8 to recommit P.R. to a mental health facility. The judge held a full hearing on the merits of the petition. During the hearing, P.R.'s psychiatrist testified for the Department. The judge ultimately found that P.R.'s commitment should continue, and the appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding (1) the trial court erred by allowing the psychiatrist to testify about unadmitted medical reports on direct examination, and the error was prejudicial, requiring a new hearing; and (2) the judge did not err by not making a statement of written or oral findings before ordering commitment under sections 7 and 8. View "In re P.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions of Josiah Zachery and Donte Henley of murder in the first degree and Zachery's convictions of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and carrying a firearm without a license, holding that there was no reversible error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Zachery's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an investigatory stop, a warrantless search of his CharlieCard, and a search of his cell phone pursuant to a search warrant; (2) the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Zachery's motion to sever his case from Henley's; (3) the judge did not err in admitting evidence of prior misconduct that connected Henley to an earlier shooting; and (4) there was no other prejudicial error. View "Commonwealth v. Henley" on Justia Law