The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the denial of Defendant's Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a) motion seeking to vacate his remaining sentences after he was paroled from his life sentence for murder and remanded the matter to the superior court for a hearing, holding that the motion judge failed to consider the specific circumstances and unique characteristics of Defendant as a juvenile.In 1996, Defendant, who was seventeen, committed crimes that resulted in his guilty plea to murder in the second degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and illegal possession of a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and two sentences of five to seven years' imprisonment for the assaults to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the life sentence. After Defendant was paroled from his life sentence he moved to vacate the remaining sentences and for resentencing under Rule 30(a). The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to consider whether Defendant's sentences comported with article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, holding (1) 120 Code Mass. Regs. 200.08 distinguishes parole for life sentences from other sentences and is therefore invalid; and (2) because Defendant already served the aggregate minimum of his sentences, he was immediately entitled to a parole hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Sharma" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the counts of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, holding that a conservator acting pursuant to judicial approval is a quasi judicial officer and is entitled to absolute immunity for conduct that is authorized or approved by the probate court.Plaintiff, acting as guardian and next of friend for his mother, filed a complaint against defendant, the mother's permanent conservator, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice, conversion, and fraud. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The judge allowed the motion as to the malpractice and fraud counts but denied the motion as to the remaining counts. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order allowing the motion to dismiss in its entirety, holding that Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant acted outside the authorized scope of her duties as conservator, and therefore, the superior court judge erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the remaining counts of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. View "Hornibrook v. Richard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court denying this action in the nature of mandamus as well as certiorari review of the decision of the city of Salem to reject Mederi, Inc.'s application to enter into a host community (HCA) agreement, holding that there was no error.When Mederi applied for an HCA with the city to open a retail marijuana establishment in Salem it was one of eight applications vying for four available spots. The city of Salem denied Merderi's application. Merderi then filed a complaint seeking relief in the nature of mandamus as well as certiorari review of the city's decision, claiming that by rejecting it as an HCA partner, the city effectively precluded Mederi from being considered for a license to sell marijuana. A superior court judge dismissed the mandamus claim and granted judgment on the pleadings on the remaining certiorari claim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the city made a rational choice to reject Mederi's application in favor of other prospective retail marijuana establishments; and (2) the city's application process was not contrary to law. View "Mederi, Inc. v. Salem" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying the Commonwealth's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking review of, and relief from, the judge's discovery orders in a criminal case, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Defendant pleaded guilty to several drug crimes. Defendant later filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the grounds that chemist Sonja Farak analyzed the drugs at issue while she was employed at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute. The judge issued rulings related to the district attorney's obligations to review the facts related to Farak's performance and to disclose any exculpatory information to Defendant. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) produced thousands of pages of documents. The district attorney proposed to turn over all of the documents to Defendant without first reviewing them herself. The judge rejected this "open file" discovery approach, the Commonwealth filed the petition at issue. The single justice denied the petition on the merits. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Commonwealth was not entitled to review as of right pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 in these circumstances. View "Commonwealth v. Simmons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court reversing the determination of the Massachusetts Office of Medicaid's board of hearings that Plaintiff's home was a countable asset, making her ineligible for Medicaid long-term care benefits, holding that the superior court did not err.While they were both still living, Plaintiff and her husband created an irrevocable trust, the corpus of which included their home. The terms of the trust granted Plaintiff, during her lifetime, a limited power of appointment to appoint all or any portion of the trust principal to a nonprofit or charitable organization over which she had no controlling interest. MassHealth denied Plaintiff's application for long-term care benefits, determining that the home was a countable asset because Plaintiff purportedly could use her limited power of appointment to appoint portions of the home's equity, which was included as part of the trust principal, to the nursing home where Plaintiff lived as payment for her care. The superior court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the plain terms of the trust neither intended for nor permitted Plaintiff to exercise her limited power of appointment for her benefit, as contemplated by MassHealth. View "Fournier v. Secretary of Executive Office of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, 20, Fourth - which applies to the testimony of a parent of minor child against the other in criminal, delinquency, and youthful offender proceedings where the victim is not a family member and does not reside in the household - does not disqualify parents from being called as witnesses for the defense to testify at an evidentiary hearing for a motion to suppress.Juvenile was indicted as a youthful offender on the charge of carrying a firearm without a license. Before trial, Juvenile moved to suppress certain statements he made to the police and sought to call his mother to testify at the evidentiary hearing. The Commonwealth sought to prohibit the juvenile's mother from testifying based on section 20, Fourth. The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) section 20, Fourth prevents the prosecution from calling the child's parents to testify for the Commonwealth in youthful offender proceedings where the victim is not a family member and does not reside in the household; but (2) section 20, Fourth allows the child to call his or her parents as witnesses for the defense and then the Commonwealth to cross-examine them. View "Commonwealth v. Vigiani" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board classifying Plaintiff as a level three sex offender, holding that the sex offender registration law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178C-178Q, is not unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Plaintiff's challenges to the constitutionality of provisions in the sex offender registration law requiring a person convicted of kidnapping a child to register as a sex offender, as applied to his case, were unavailing; (2) there was no error in the admission of hearsay evidence at Plaintiff's classification hearing or in the denial of Plaintiff's motion for expert funds; and (3) the Board's decision to classify Plaintiff as a level three sex offender was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. View "Doe, SORB No. 339940 v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court requiring Leroy Randolph to submit a saliva sample for DNA testing to establish whether DNA found on a murder weapon belonged to him, holding that there was no error.In 1986, Richard Randolph was convicted of murder in the first degree for the killing of Brian Golden. In 2020, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, 7, Richard sought a DNA sample from Leroy to determine whether Leroy's DNA was present on the knife. After the motion was allowed Leroy filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Richard demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that testing would not "lack any probative value"; and (2) the motion judge properly found that Richard established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that analysis of Leroy's DNA would provide evidence material to the identification of a perpetrator of the crime. View "Randolph v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for trafficking of persons for sexual servitude and unlawful possession of marijuana, holding that the superior court judge did not err denying Defendant's motion to suppress and that there were no errors necessitating a new trial.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from sex cell phones; (2) the judge did not commit reversible error in allowing the Commonwealth's motion in limine seeking to introduce certain text messages as statements by a coventurer, andthe judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction was error but did not prejudice Defendant; (3) the judge did not abuse her discretion in permitting the introduction of prior bad acts; and (4) there was no other prejudicial error in the proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Lowery" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of assault and battery and strangulation, holding that admitting the victim's statements did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.The victim did not testify at trial. Instead, a recording of the victim's 911 call and the responding officers' recounting of the victim's statements were admitted. The Appeals Court reversed Defendant's convictions on the grounds that his confrontation rights were violated. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) because most of the admitted statements were not made with the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial testimony they were non testimonial and did not violate Defendant's confrontation rights; and (2) to the extent that the victim's statements were testimonial, the only such statement was duplicative of other evidence, and its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Rand" on Justia Law