The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Energy Facilities Siting Board that approved a proposal by Eversource Energy under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 264, 69J to construct a new electrical transmission line between substations in Sudbury and Hudson, holding that there was no error in the Board's assessment and approval of the project.Eversource sought to construct the new transmission line after it was discovered that the particular area needed additional energy supply to withstand certain contingencies. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that there was no error in the Board's assessment and approval of the project, holding (1) the Board has wide to discretion to balance the reliability, cost and environmental impact of each proposal before it to achieve its statutory mandate; and (2) there was no legal basis for disturbing the Board's careful and reasoned decision in this case. View "Sudbury v. Energy Facilities Siting Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of felony murder but vacated Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and remanded the matter for entry of a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, holding that the conviction of murder in the first degree was invalid.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of joint venture felony-murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the predicate felony. On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that the first-degree murder conviction was invalid because, at the time of the offense, the felony of aggravated kidnapping did not exist, and therefore, Defendant could be convicted only of felony-murder in the second degree. Defendant also raised several allegations of error on appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the interests of justice were best served by reducing the degree of guilt to murder in the second degree; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Commonwealth v. Trotto" on Justia Law

In this proposed class action suit challenging the rules of blackjack at the Encore Boston Harbor Casino the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting the motion to dismiss brought by MGM Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC (MGM), holding that the rules authorized MGM to offer 6:5 payout blackjack.The Encore Boston Harbor Casino was operated by Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, Wynn MA, LLC, and Wynn Resorts, Ltd. (Encore). Plaintiffs, the gamblers challenging the rules of the game, sued Encore and MGM, contending that there were entitled to three dollars for every two dollars bet (3:2) instead of the six dollars for every five dollars bet (6:5) that they received when playing at tables requiring smaller bets. Plaintiffs argued that the Massachusetts Gaming Commission's blackjack rules did not clearly authorize payouts of 6:5 except with games played by dealing rules different from those used at Plaintiffs' tables. The superior court allowed MGM's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs understood the rules and the stakes and that deference was due to the Commission's interpretation of its blackjack rules. View "DeCosmo v. Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, on a theory of felony order, with aggravated rape as the predicate felony, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to prove that the homicide and the aggravated rape were parts of one continuous event; (2) if there was any error in the prosecutor's closing argument, Defendant was not prejudiced by it; (3) there was no error in the judge's Tuey-Rodriguez charge to the jury; (4) the judge's response to a jury question about the permissibility of inferences from a lack of evidence did not violate Defendant's right to due process; and (5) there was no reason to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Witkowski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court allowing Defendant's motion to suppress all of the statements he made after having invoked his right to counsel, holding that the trial judge did not err in granting the motion to suppress.Defendant was arrested on charges of murder in the first degree and possession of a firearm without a license. Although Defendant first agreed to waive his Miranda rights and speak with police in an interrogation room, twenty minutes after the interview began Defendant requested to speak with an attorney. Forty-five minutes later, Defendant again waived his Miranda rights and agreed with speak with the police. Defendant was subsequently interviewed for about one hour. Thereafter, Defendant moved to suppress all of the statements he made after having invoked his right to counsel. The superior court judge allowed the motion to suppress, concluding that it had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant reinitiated the interview and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err. View "Commonwealth v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court dismissing this complaint alleging a violation of the Massachusetts wiretap act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 99, holding that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cognizable cause of action.Defendants - Barstool Sports, Inc. and Kirk Minihane, an agent for Barstool - recorded a telephone conversation with Plaintiff, Somerville mayor Joseph Curatone, under an assumed identity and then published the recording on Barstool's blog. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Minihane violated the act. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The superior court judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Minihane did not secretly record his conversation with Plaintiff the recording at issue did not fall within the statutory definition of an "interception" within the meaning of the wiretap act. View "Curtatone v. Barstool Sports, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that social workers, and their approving supervisors, in the Department of Children and Families who attest to facts in sworn affidavits as part of care and protection proceedings commenced by the Department in the juvenile court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 119, 24 are entitled to absolute immunity in these circumstances.Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a social worker with the Department, alleging that the social worker intentionally misrepresented facts in a sworn affidavit filed in support of a care and protection petition in the juvenile court. Plaintiff further alleged that the social worker's area supervisor (together, with the social worker, Defendants) was liable because she had approved the social worker's actions. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that they were entitled to absolute immunity. A superior court judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendants were entitled to absolute immunity under the circumstances of this case. View "C.M. v. Commissioner of Department of Children & Families" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful distribution of heroin as a subsequent offender and unlawful possession of heroin with intent to distribute as a subsequent offender, holding that the superior court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress and that there was no other error.In his suppression motion, Defendant sought to suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of a motor vehicle. The superior court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion and Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the police had probable cause to search the vehicle, and there was no error in the denial of the motion to suppress; (2) the trial judge erred in allowing the admission of an in-court identification made by a police officer, but the error did not prejudice Defendant; and (3) there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice as to the jury instructions on possession and distribution of narcotics. View "Commonwealth v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the sentencing judge denying Defendant's motion to dismiss revocation proceedings and the finding that Defendant violated conditions of his probation, holding that there was no error.Defendant was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a child and sentenced to two separate periods of incarceration, the latter of which was to be suspended in favor of probation. Upon release from his confinement, Defendant began serving the probation phase of his sentence. One year later, Defendant was found to have violated the conditions of his probation, and his probation was revoked. On appeal, Defendant argued that his probationary term should have terminated prior to the occurrence of the violations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that it was not fundamentally unfair to delay the commencement of Defendant's probationary term until he was released from the treatment center into the community. View "Commonwealth v. Medina" on Justia Law

In this appeal from various orders regarding Defendant's pretrial detention status the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the single justice concluding that no due process violation occurred regarding one case and ruled that the other case was moot, holding that remand was required for a determination as to whether Defendant's continued pretrial confinement violates due process.Defendant had been held in pretrial detention for more than eighteen months on charges arising out of the Chelsea Division and the Lynn Division of the District Court Department. At the time of this opinion, Defendant had been held for over a year beyond his initial trial dates. Defendant was eventually acquitted of the charges in the Chelsea case. In the Lynn case, Defendant's trial was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At issue was whether the prolonged detention violated Defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) in analyzing whether a defendant's pretrial detention violates due process this opinion contains a procedural framework; (2) because Defendant was acquitted in the Chelsea case, that case was moot; and (3) as to the Lynn case, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Mushwaalakbar v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law