The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting Defendant's motion to dismiss this wrongful death action, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the duty Defendant owed to the decedent in this case extended to protecting him from injury caused by a third party.Plaintiff was the mother of Keivan Heath, who was shot and killed at a house party by an unidentified shooter. Plaintiff, as the personal representative of the decedent's estate, sued Defendant, the property owner who had rented the house for the party, for wrongful death. The superior court dismissed the action. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the complaint did not plausibly suggest either that Defendant owed a legal duty to the decedent by virtue of his property ownership or that Defendant voluntarily assumed such a duty. View "Heath-Latson v. Styller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Land Court's judgment affirming the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the town of Lynnfield upholding the decision of the building inspector ordering Plaintiff to cease and desist offering his family home for short-term rentals, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the use of his home for short-term rentals constituted a prior nonconforming use that was exempt from the town's zoning bylaw that, as amended, expressly forbade short-term rentals in single-residence zoning districts. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that Plaintiff's use of the property for short-term rentals was not a permissible use under the town's zoning bylaw as it existed prior to its amendment. View "Styller v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Lynnfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board denying Doe's motion to vacate her final classification as a level three sex offender, holding that Doe's premature classification violated due process.In 2012, years before her potential release date from prison, Doe was classified as a level three sex offender. She did not challenge the classification at the time. In 2019, Doe moved to vacate the final classification on the grounds that it was premature. The Board denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the classification violated due process because it served little to no purpose, posed an unnecessary risk of harm and error and was not justified by the Board's limited interest in finality or administrative efficiency. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the superior court judge allowing Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that Defendant enjoyed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent by him that were stored on a cellular telephone belonging to, and possessed by, another person.Defendant and six codefendants were indicted on charges of trafficking in cocaine, conspiracy to violate drug laws, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The charges stemmed from an investigation originating, in part, from evidence acquired during a search of a codefendant's cell phone. The owner of the telephone filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of his phone, including the contents of text messages sent by Defendant. Defendant moved to join the motion. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, arguing that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. The judge ruled that Defendant had standing and allowed him to join the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Defendant could not challenge the reasonableness of the search because he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sent text messages. View "Commonwealth v. Delgado-Rivera" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking bail review but remanded the case for the judge to make required findings pursuant to Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691 (2017), holding that further proceedings were necessary.Petitioner was indicted on numerous charges. A superior court judge initially set cash bail at $100,000. Two years later, Petitioner, who was unable to pay the cash bail, sought review of the bail determination. A judge reduced the cash bail to $30,000 but did so without any findings or explanation. Petitioner later filed this petition seeking bail review, arguing that the cash bail amount of $30,000 was excessive. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case with directions for the judge who made the bail reduction decision to make the required findings for that decision pursuant to Brangan, holding that the judge should have made findings for that decision. View "Boisvert v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner, an inmate, filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with two Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) standard operating procedures (SOPs) implemented earlier that year. Petitioner also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent DOC from enforcing the SOPs during the pendency of this case. The superior court judge denied Petitioner's injunction request as moot and ordered that judgment enter declaring that implementation of the first SOP violates 103 Code Mass. Regs. 481. Petitioner then filed this petition seeking review of the superior court's judgment and orders. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal or by other available means. View "Wright v. Department of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for two counts of murder in the first degree and the denial of his motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that it was manifestly unreasonable for his trial counsel to forgo mental health defenses in favor of a third-party culprit defense. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) trial counsel was not ineffective for urging one defense over the other, and Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's performance; and (2) there was no basis upon which to exercise the Court's extraordinary authority to order a new trial or to reduce the verdicts pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Velez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was charged in six separate complaints with several offenses, including assault and battery on a family or household member. The Commonwealth moved to join the cases, and a district court judge allowed the motion. After Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied he filed this petition, arguing that not reviewing the joinder decision now could lead to irreversible consequences. A single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal or by other available means. View "Morris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this personal injury suit, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial judge allowing Defendants' motion for a mistrial after Plaintiff's counsel purportedly made improper comments during his closing argument, holding that the judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing the motion for a mistrial.The judge in this case chose to reserve decision on Defendants' motion for a mistrial until after the jury rendered their verdict. Only after the jury found for Plaintiff did the judge allow the motion and declare a mistrial. After a second trial, Plaintiff once again prevailed but was awarded significantly lower damages. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that once the verdict had been returned, the motion for a mistrial should have been evaluated under the standard for a motion for a new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) in civil cases, a motion for a mistrial must be decided when made, and after a jury verdict the appropriate method to seek to have a case tried again is by filing a motion for a new trial; and (2) because this requirement applies only prospectively, the judge in this case properly allowed the motion for a mistrial. View "Fitzpatrick v. Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board granting certain vendors' applications for refunds through the general abatement process for the portion of sales tax they had paid to the Commonwealth that was attributable to out-of-state use of software, holding that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 64H, 1 creates a statutory right to apportionment for software transferred for use in multiple states.The vendors in this case sold or licensed software to Hologic, Inc., a medical device company headquartered in Massachusetts. At the time sales taxes were due, the vendors remitted tax payments to the Commonwealth based on the entire value of the transactions. When the vendors were informed that only a portion of the software was to be used in the Commonwealth, they applied for refunds. The Commissioner of Revenue denied the applications for abatement on the grounds that the regulations for apportionment were not followed. The Board granted the requested abatements. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the vendors had a statutory right to apportionment; and (2) the general abatement process was available to the vendors, despite their having paid sales tax in excess of that properly apportioned to sales in the Commonwealth. View "Oracle USA, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law