The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division dismissing as untimely Massachusetts General Hospital's (MGH) petition seeking to have C.R. committed, holding that the activity governed by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12(a) is separate from the three-day involuntary hospitalization period established under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12(b).The day after C.R. was admitted to a psychiatric facility but six days after she was initially brought to the emergency department of MGH by police pursuant to section 12(a), MGH filed its petition for commitment pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7 and 8. The Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court concluded that MGH's petition was untimely because the three-day window under section 12(b) begins running when the patient is initially restrained under section 12(a). The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the three-day period under section 12(b) is necessary to fully evaluate the patient and was not intended by the Legislature to be shortened by the section 12(a) time period; and (2) as applied to C.R., the statute did not violate due process, as the section 12(a) period of confinement was no longer than necessary under the circumstances of this case. View "Massachusetts General Hospital v. C.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court entering judgment in favor of the parole board on Plaintiff's appeal from the denial of his application for parole, holding that the board did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's application.Plaintiff was seventeen years old when he committed murder in the second degree. Plaintiff was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. Plaintiff later applied for parole, but the board denied the application. Plaintiff sought review, alleging that the board abused its discretion by failing properly to analyze the distinctive attributes of youth in making its determination. A superior court judge granted the board's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Plaintiff's cross motion for the same. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the board based its decision on the statutory standard of rehabilitation and compatibility with the welfare of society, and the board adequately considered the distinctive attributes of youth. View "Deal v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that, due to the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, pretrial detainees who have not been charged with an excluded offense are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of release on personal recognizance and a hearing within two business days of filing a motion for reconsideration of bail and release.To decrease exposure to COVID-19 within correctional institutions, Petitioners sought the release to the community of as many pretrial detainees and individuals who have been convicted and are serving a sentence of incarceration as possible. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the risks inherent in the COVID-19 pandemic constitute a changed circumstance within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58, tenth paragraph, and the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 57; (2) any individual who is not being held without bail under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A and who has not been charged with an excluded offense as set forth in Appendix A to this opinion is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of release; and (3) to afford relief to as many incarcerated individuals as possible, the parole board and Department of Corrections are urged to work with the special master to expedite parole hearings and the issuance of parole permits. View "Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of Trial Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and three related charges, holding that there was no reversible error in this case.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting evidence of a document under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay; (3) the judge's failure to provide guidance to the jury regarding how it should weigh the business records constituted error, but the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) even if the judge erred in admitting testimony concerning firearms, the error would not have prejudiced Defendant; (5) the trial judge's jury instruction regarding the firearms testimony did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (6) there was no error in the prosecutor's improper statements made in his closing argument; and (7) there was no basis for reducing sentence on the murder conviction or ordering a new trial under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Andre" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the probate and family court judge's dismissal of Petitioner's third petition for adoption due to lack of jurisdiction, holding that the probate and family court had both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.Petitioner was the biological father of the child at issue and was named as the child's parent on her birth certificate. Petitioner lived outside of the United States with his same-sex partner and the child, where the child was born outside of marriage to a gestational carrier, the child's birth mother, who lived in Massachusetts. Mother signed a surrender form indicating her desire to surrender the child to the care and custody of Father. Thereafter, Father filed three petitions in the probate and family court seeking to establish his status as the child's sole legal parent. Each petition was rejected. Father appealed the denial of his third petition, which was rejected on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the probate and family court had subject matter jurisdiction under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, 1 and personal jurisdiction over the parties in this case. View "In re Adoption of Daphne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of a single justice of the Appeals Court denying Defendant's motion for reconsideration of a stay pending appeal brought after the Governor declared a state of emergency arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that a fundamental change of circumstances required reconsideration of Defendant's motion.On April 29, 2019, a superior court judge revoked Defendant's probation. Defendant later filed with a single justice of the Appeals Court a motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. The single justice denied the motion on February 26, 2020. On March 10, the Governor declared a state of emergency in response to the spread of COVID-19. On March 23, a superior court judge denied Defendant's new motion for stay of execution of the sentence, apparently on the grounds that he did not have the authority to reconsider Defendant's motion to stay the execution of his sentence because a single justice of the appeals court had already denied the request. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judge's denial of Defendant's motion for reconsideration of a stay pending appeal, holding that it was error for the judge not to reconsider Defendant's motion to stay execution of sentence in light of the rapidly evolving situation arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. View "Christie v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the order issued by the Springfield District Court that required the attorney in charge of the Springfield office of the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants and subsequent appointments of CPCS staff attorneys in the Springfield public defender division (PDD) office pursuant to that order were invalid.Due to a high volume of cases, the First Justice of the Springfield District Court that CPCS staff attorneys in the Springfield PDD office could not handle any more duty days in that court. In response, the First Justice issued the order at issue. The district court subsequently appointed PDD staff attorneys as defense counsel under the order. CPCS filed an emergency petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking to vacate the order and the appointments. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the petition, holding that the order and the appointments were invalid because they improperly infringed on CPCS's statutory authority to control assignments and to limit caseloads for its staff attorneys. View "Carrasquillo v. Hampden County District Courts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court judge's allowance of Defendant's motion to dismiss three indictments against him for statutory rape and three indictments for forcible rape of a minor for three crimes he allegedly committed against a student in the 1980s, holding that the Commonwealth's evidence established probable cause for only two separate incidents rather than three.At issue in this case were certain provisions of a statute that sets a twenty-seven year statute of limitations on sex crimes against children, a requirement of corroborating evidence if the crimes are charged after the limitation period has expired, and a tolling provision. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the tolling provision in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 277, 63 does not apply to the requirement that child rape charges brought more than twenty-seven years after the commission of the alleged crime be supported by corroborating evidence; (2) the evidentiary requirement of section 63 requires the Commonwealth to present the corroborating evidence to the grand jury; (3) the Commonwealth presented sufficient corroborating evidence to the grand jury in the instant case; and (4) the Commonwealth's evidence established probable cause for only two alleged incidents. View "Commonwealth v. Buono" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the Housing Court for Landlord on its summary process complaint and affirmed the denial of relief on Tenants' counterclaims, holding that Landlord's summary process complaint must be dismissed because the summons and complaint were served within fourteen days of Tenants' receipt of the notice to quit.Landlord brought this summary process action against Tenants seeking to recover possession of the premises at issue and damages for unpaid rent. Tenants filed several counterclaims. The judge ordered judgment for Tenants on two counterclaims and awarded nominal damages. The parties later filed cross appeals. The Appeals Court dismissed Tenants' appeal on timeliness grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review and held (1) Tenants' appeal was timely; (2) because the summary process proceeding was commenced before the fourteen-day deadline had come and gone, judgment must enter for Tenants; and (3) the judge did not err in denying relief on Tenants' counterclaims. View "Youghal, LLC v. Entwistle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm while in the commission of a felony under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 18B, holding that the judgment of conviction was not erroneous.On appeal, Defendant argued that his section 18B conviction must be vacated because the Commonwealth failed to indict him for and convict him of an appropriate root felony. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that Defendant's two convictions of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon may serve as the root felony for Defendant's section 18B conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Thomas" on Justia Law