The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court judge's decision granting in part Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment against Insurer, holding that the standard fire insurance policy set by statute imposes several, rather than joint, rights and obligations on the insureds under the circumstances of this case and that Insurer's redrafting of the statutorily defined policy language was in violation of the statute.Plaintiff owned a home as a tenant in common with Kelly Pastrana, and the two were coinsureds on a homeowners' insurance policy. Pastrana intentionally set fire to the home. Despite Plaintiff's lack of involvement, Insurer denied Plaintiff's claim for coverage, relying on an intentional loss exclusion in the policy barring recovery when any coinsured intentionally causes a loss. The superior court concluded that the intentional loss exclusion in the policy violated the standard policy language mandated under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, 99, Twelfth, and allowed Plaintiff to recover only one-half of the coverage limit. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the policy not comply with the statute; and (2) the policy proceeds in this case were severable, and Plaintiff was entitled to only one-half of the proceeds. View "Aquino v. United Property & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court concluding that Defendant committed a breach of an "anti-raiding" restrictive covenant entered into between between the parties but held that the equitable remedy fashioned by the trial judge, which expanded the restrictive covenant beyond its plain terms, constituted an abuse of discretion.The restrictive covenant in this case prohibited Defendant from soliciting or hiring employees from Plaintiff, his former company, for a defined period of time. Defendant, however, hired employees from his former company in breach of the restrictive covenant. The superior court judge concluded that the restrictive covenant was enforceable and that Defendant had committed a breach of the covenant. The judge issued injunctive relief extending the length of the restrictive covenant for an additional year beyond the date provided for in the contract. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the restrictive covenant was necessary to protect a legitimate business interest; (2) Defendant committed a breach of the anti-raiding provision; but (3) the use of an equitable remedy to extend the restriction beyond the plain terms of the contract was not warranted without a finding that damages would be inadequate. View "Automile Holdings, LLC v. McGovern" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that where Petitioner had remedies in the ordinary appellate process, the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion by denying extraordinary relief.Petitioner, the plaintiff in a civil action, sought review of a superior court judge's order requiring service of process on Defendants by certified mail at Petitioner's own expense and requested a waiver of the Appeals Court's filing fee for his single justice petition. After reviewing Petitioner's affidavit of indigency and other information, a single justice ordered that Petitioner pay a significantly reduced filing fee for his petition. Petitioner then filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition arguing that the reduced amount was still too high. A single justice denied relief without holding a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner had an adequate remedy in the ordinary appellate process. View "Negron v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying without a hearing Plaintiff's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of alternative remedial routes.Plaintiff referenced Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 when seeking relief from an order of the single justice of the Appeals Court denying Plaintiff leave to file a late notice of appeal more than one year after the Department of Industrial Accidents approved a lump sum agreement in Plaintiff's workers' compensation case. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where Plaintiff had an alternative remedy by way of an appeal, the single justice did not err in denying relief. View "Greci v. Travelers Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition for relief in the nature of mandamus, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in denying relief where the record did not demonstrate that alternative avenues of relief were unavailable.Petitioner sought an order requiring the superior court clerk to assemble the record for his appeal in his underlying civil action against Harvard University. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where Petitioner did not avail himself of several practical and legal steps available to prompt action in the trial court, the single justice was well within his discretion in denying relief. View "Myrick v. Superior Court Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and related motions, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.In her petition, Petitioner requested an order requiring the superior court judge to recuse himself in civil litigation between herself and Respondent. Petitioner also filed motions in relation to the civil matter. The single justice denied the petition and all other relief sought in Petitioner's motions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner could have sought interlocutory review of the judge's rulings and, as to the motion to recuse, could have directly appealed from the adverse judgment. View "Trahan v. Pelczar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, and, at arraignment, a judge ordered that Petitioner be committed to the state hospital for a determination whether he was competent to stand trial. After he had been committed Petitioner filed this Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition alleging violations of his due process rights. The single justice denied the petition without holding a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate why he was entitled to review pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "Howell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the single justice dismissing Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 challenging orders issued by the Land Court in connection with a servicemember proceeding under the Massachusetts Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (MSCRA), holding that the single justice properly dismissed the claims and defenses.In addition to his challenge to the orders issued in connection with the MSCRA action Petitioner also asserted affirmative defenses to foreclosure of his property and claims against Respondents under various statutes, common law, and rules of professional conduct. A single justice dismissed the petition, including all requests for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner did not establish a substantial claim that the Land Court violated his substantial rights in connection with the servicemember proceeding; and (2) with respect to the other claims and affirmative defenses, Petitioner failed to demonstrate the absence of adequate alternative remedies. View "Marley v. Bank of New York" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Defendant's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying relief.Defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree and other offenses. The trial judge declared a mistrial because the jury were unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. Defendant moved to dismiss the murder indictment and for a required finding of not guilty, arguing that a retrial was barred by double jeopardy principles because there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition seeking relief from the denial of that motion. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy principles did not bar Defendant's retrial on the murder charge because the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree based on extreme atrocity or cruelty. View "Collazo v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case involving the indictments of Dr. Frank Stirlacci and his office manager, Jessica Miller, for violations of the Controlled Substances Act and for submitting false health care claims to insurance providers, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the superior court's judgment dismissing several of the indictments, holding that there was sufficient evidence to indict Shirlacci on twenty-six counts of improper prescribing and to indict both defendants on twenty of the twenty-two counts of submitting false health care claims.The charges against Defendants included twenty-six counts each of improper prescribing, twenty counts each of uttering a false prescription, and twenty-two charges each of submitting a false health care claim. The trial judge dismissed the indictments for improper prescribing and uttering false prescriptions and dismissed six of the indictments against each defendant for submitting false health care claims. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to indict Stirlacci on all counts of improper prescribing, but Miller's status as a nonpractitioner precluded her indictment on improper prescribing; (2) there was insufficient evidence to indict either defendant for uttering false prescriptions; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to indict both defendants on twenty counts of submitting false health care claims. View "Commonwealth v. Stirlacci" on Justia Law