Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The sole issue in this appeal was whether an uncontroverted affidavit attesting to the statutory form "Affidavit of Sale under Power of Sale in Mortgage" was sufficient to show compliance with the power of sale for the purpose of establishing the right of possession by motion for summary judgment in a summary process action. A judge in the housing court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, and the defendant, Oliver Hendricks, appealed. Hendricks asserted error in the grant of summary judgment to Fannie Mae, where the statutory form failed to set forth "fully and particularly" the acts taken to exercise the power of sale in Hendricks's mortgage, as required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 15. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) because the statutory form that Fannie Mae offered in support of its motion for summary judgment was sufficient within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, 8, it made out a prima facie case of compliance with chapter 244, 14; and (2) because there was no genuine issue of material fact to be decided, Fannie Mae was entitled to summary judgment. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

In 2000 Go-Best wired $5 million to an account entitled "Morris M. Goldings client account" at Citizens Bank, based on representations made by Morris M. Goldings, who was then a Massachusetts attorney. Goldings later admitted that the representations were false and that he had used the money to pay other debts. Go-Best filed suit against Citizens Bank, bringing claims of misrepresentation, conversion, aiding and abetting a fraud, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a conversion, and negligence. Citizens Bank had no knowledge of Goldings's scheme to defraud Go-Best but failed to notify the Board of Bar Overseers of dishonored checks issued on the client account more than six months before Go-Best wired funds into that account. The trial court dismissed, but a divided Appeals Court reversed in part, vacating dismissal of claims of negligence and of aiding and abetting. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reinstated dismissal. Without actual knowledge, the bank's duty to notify the board of dishonored checks from trust accounts arose only from its contractual duty, not from any duty in tort, so the bank could not be liable to Go-Best for any negligence in fulfilling that duty. View "Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of MA" on Justia Law

A judge preliminarily enjoined Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) from proceeding to evict plaintiff, Eaton, from her home, following a foreclosure sale by Green Tree Servicing, as mortgagee. The judge ruled that Eaton likely would succeed on her claim that for a valid foreclosure sale to occur, both the mortgage and the underlying note must be held by the foreclosing party; Green Tree stipulated that it held only Eaton's mortgage. The supreme court vacated the injunction, announcing a new statutory interpretation to apply to foreclosures under the power of sale where statutory notice is provided after the date of this decision. A foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage must comply with all applicable statutory provisions, particularly G.L. c. 183, 21, and G.L. c. 244, 14, which authorize a "mortgagee" to foreclose by sale pursuant to a power of sale in the mortgage, and require the "mortgagee" to provide notice and take other steps. The term "mortgagee" is not free from ambiguity, according to the court, but refers to the person or entity then holding the mortgage and also either holding the mortgage note or acting on behalf of the note holder. View "Eaton v. Fed. Nat'l Mort. Ass'n" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the enactment of St. 2010, c. 258, on August 7, 2010, which prohibited institutional lenders and certain financial institutions who owned foreclosed properties from evicting residential tenants without just cause. At issue was whether the act required dismissal of a no-cause summary process case that was already pending when the act went into effect, or whether the application of the act to such a case was impermissibly retroactive. The court held that the provision of the act that prevented eviction without just cause was properly applied to protect all residential tenants on foreclosed properties who, on or after August 7, 2010, had yet to vacate or be removed from the premises by an eviction, even where the owner purchased the property before the act's effective date, and initiated a summary process action before that date. Because the tenant, in this case, was still residing on the property on August 7, 2010, and the owner was seeking to evict him without just cause, the court held that the Housing Court judge properly applied the act to dismiss the pending claim for possession. View "Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Nunez" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff, Bank of New York (BNY), asserted that it acquired title to the home of defendant pursuant to foreclosure proceedings. At issue was whether the Housing Court had jurisdiction to decide the validity of a challenge to a title, raised by a former homeowner as a defense to a summary process eviction action by a party acquiring the property pursuant to a foreclosure sale. The court vacated the allowance of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings because the court concluded that the Housing Court had jurisdiction to consider the validity of plaintiff's title as a defense to a summary process action after a foreclosure sale pursuant to G.L.c. 239, section 1. View "Bank of New York v. Bailey" on Justia Law