Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

B.V.G., a young woman with intellectual disabilities, has been in the sole custody of her father for many years. He was named her temporary guardian when B.V.G. reached age 18. Her maternal grandfather sought to intervene in B.V.G.'s father's permanent guardianship proceedings, asserting that his relationship with B.V.G. has been restricted by her father, that B.V.G. has indicated expressly her desire to communicate with him and has sought contact with him via social media, and that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s best interests. Concluding that the grandfather lacked standing because he was not an "interested person" within the meaning of G.L. 190B, 5-306(c), a judge denied the motion. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, on different grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, first holding that the grandfather had standing. The statute is intended to provide a means by which an individual interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person can advocate on behalf of that person and the Massachusetts implementation of the Uniform Probate Code encourages a broad right of advocacy in favor of an incapacitated person's protected interest in a limited guardianship. Once a judge has concluded that a proposed intervener is an "interested person," nothing more is required to establish that person's entitlement to intervene. View "Guardianship of B.V.G." on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint against Harvard University alleging employment discrimination. The superior court granted Harvard’s motion to dismiss the complaint and denied Appellant’s subsequent attempts to reinstate the case. Appellant appealed and, while his appeal was pending, filed a motion to stay the appeal so that he could file a new complaint and seek additional discovery in the underlying action. A single justice of the Appeals Court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying Appellant’s request for relief. View "Myrick v. Harvard University" on Justia Law

Victoria was born in Mexico in 1997 and later moved to Texas. The Office of Refugee Resettlement designated Victoria as an unaccompanied refugee minor and assigned her for placement in Massachusetts. Three weeks after Victoria’s arrival in Massachusetts, the Department of Children and Families filed a petition for custody of Victoria in the Probate and Family Court. The probate and family court judge concluded that Massachusetts lacked child custody jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act but that jurisdiction was proper where Massachusetts was an “appropriate court” under federal law governing custody and resettlement of unaccompanied refugee minors. The judge stayed further custody proceedings pending resolution of questions regarding jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Massachusetts has jurisdiction over the custody proceeding under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209B, 2(a)(2) because (1) no other state has home state jurisdiction, and (2) it is in the best interest of Victoria that a Massachusetts court assume jurisdiction of the custody proceeding. View "In re Custody of Victoria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action alleging various constitutional violations with respect to the presidential ballot. Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of indigence pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 261, 27B requesting a waiver of normal court fees and litigation costs. In his affidavit, Plaintiff claimed indigence on the ground that he received public assistance in the form of veterans’ benefits. The judge concluded that Plaintiff was not indigent because he had the ability to pay the normal and extra fees and costs. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff, who received federal veterans’ benefits and a Massachusetts property tax abatement that were not dependent on his economic circumstances, was considered indigent under Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 261, 27A and therefore entitled to a waiver despite having ample financial resources to pay court fees and costs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judge’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request for a waiver of normal and extra court fees and litigation costs, holding that the statute was not intended to provide for a waiver under the circumstances of this case. View "Reade v. Sec’y of Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, acting on behalf of his minor son, commenced this negligence action against the City of Somerville. The City filed a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), claiming that Plaintiff failed to meet the statutorily-required presentment requirements. The superior court denied the motion. The City appealed, arguing that its interlocutory appeal was proper under the doctrine of present execution. The Appeals Court dismissed the City’s appeal, concluding that the doctrine of present execution did not apply. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the City’s appeal was not moot; (2) the appeal was proper under the doctrine of present execution; and (3) the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint should have been allowed because presentment in this case was deficient. View "Rodriguez v. City of Somerville" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin and cocaine and of unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment by police officers during the execution of an “anticipatory search warrant,” claiming that the officers had executed the search before the “triggering events” stated in the affidavit had occurred. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting convictions, holding (1) where, as in this case, the Commonwealth applies for an anticipatory search warrant and the judicial authorization to execute the search is conditioned on the occurrence of a specific future event, the search is authorized by the warrant where there is equivalent compliance with that condition precedent; and (2) in this case, there was both equivalent compliance with the warrant’s triggering conditions, and compliance with those conditions provided probable cause to search Defendant’s residence. View "Commonwealth v. Colondres" on Justia Law

After the parties in this case separated, a California court entered a judgment establishing monthly child and spousal support payments payable by Father to Mother. Father subsequently moved to Massachusetts, and the California support order was registered in the probate and family court. Thereafter, the child support division of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue initiated contempt proceedings against Father. A probate and family court judge issued multiple orders that sought to enforce the California support order. The orders incorporated the parties’ stipulated agreements regarding issues that had not been included in the order of the California court. Several years later, the probate and family court found Father in contempt for having failed to make certain payments. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) to the extent the probate and family court orders modified the California support order, they were void, as the stipulated agreements did not extend the jurisdiction of the probate and family court to modify the California support order; and (2) the probate and family court had authority to hold Father in contempt for failing to comply with the probate and family court’s orders that sought to enforce the California support order. View "Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law