Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Stansfield sought a harassment prevention order against Van Liew alleging four incidents of harassment. The alleged harassment concerned a local municipal election and general issues of local public concern. The District Court judge denied the request. Van Liew then filed this action against Stansfield in the district court, asserting claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Stansfield filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 238, 59H. The District Court judge allowed the special motion after a hearing. Van Liew appealed to the Appellate Division of the District Court Department. The Appellate Division vacated the order of dismissal, concluding that Van Liew had presented sufficient evidence to show that Stansfield lacked any reasonable factual support for her petitioning activity. Stansfield filed an appeal in the Appeals Court from the decision and order of the Appellate Division. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Stansfield’s appeal was properly filed in the Appeals Court; and (2) with one possible exception, the speech at issue in this case did not qualify as either “fighting words” or “true threats,” and therefore, no civil harassment prevention order should have issued. View "Van Liew v. Stansfield" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with shoplifting by concealing merchandise and unlawfully carrying a firearm. Defendants moved to suppress the firearm discovered during the inventory search of the vehicle that they used to travel to the department store. The vehicle was lawfully parked in the department store lot, and, after Defendants were arrested for shoplifting, the driver of the vehicle told the police that the registered owner of the vehicle could pick up the vehicle as an alternative to having it towed. The motion judge allowed Defendants’ motion to suppress, concluding that the seizure of the vehicle that preceded the inventory search was not reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that it was unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional to impound the vehicle and conduct an inventory search where the driver offered the police an alternative to impoundment that was lawful and practical under the circumstances. View "Commonwealth v. Oliveira" on Justia Law

Defendant, who is not a citizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine. Defendant was subsequently placed in a removal proceeding. Defendant filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that he received ineffective assistance from his plea counsel when counsel provided erroneous advice that Defendant would not be subject to deportation. The motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Defendant received ineffective assistance of plea counsel and remanded the matter for additional findings relating to the issue of prejudice. On remand, the judge allowed Defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing Defendant’s motion for a new trial; and (2) the affidavits of Defendant and his plea counsel provided a sufficient basis to conclude that, but for counsel’s errors, Defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have decided instead on going to trial. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvain" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted armed robbery and murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder charge. Defendant appealed, challenging the admission into evidence of his videotaped statement to the police and a statement he made while he was left alone during the police interrogation. Specifically, Defendant argued that although he initially waived his Miranda rights, he later invoked his right to remain silent and that the police did not scrupulously honor this invocation. Defendant failed to raise this claim below. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the police’s failure to honor Defendant’s right to terminate questioning created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because the statement was likely to have affected the jury’s verdict. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based on alleged trial errors. The motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying Defendant’s motion for new trial as well as Defendant’s conviction and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial court erroneously admitted certain DNA evidence, but there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective for introducing audiotapes of prior consistent statements made by the Commonwealth’s principal witness for impeachment purposes; (3) there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice created by the admission of a cooperating codefendant’s plea agreement without prior redaction; (4) there was no error in the admission of prior bad act evidence; and (5) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "Commonwealth v. Lally" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a black male of African descent who had a medical degree from the University of the West Indies, was terminated from his employment with Mount Auburn Hospital while completing the first year of his residency. Plaintiff filed a ten-count complaint against the Hospital and three physicians who supervised his work, asserting employment discrimination and breach of contract, among other claims. The Appeals Court reversed as to the discrimination and breach of contract claims. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgments in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for employment discrimination and breach of contract, holding that Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment and that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to hear his claims. View "Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hospital" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and of armed assault with intent to murder. The Supreme Judicial court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated the trial court order denying Defendant’s first motion for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the decedent’s out-of-court statement about who had shot him; (2) the performance of Defendant’s first counsel was ineffective, and it is necessary to vacate the denial of Defendant’s first motion for a new trial and to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance; and (3) any impropriety on the part of the prosecutor did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Celester" on Justia Law

Police officers applied for and obtained a warrant to search Defendant’s iPhone. The warrant authorized a search of Defendant’s iPhone for evidence of communications that would link him and another suspect to a shooting. The search resulted in the discovery and seizure of photographs of Defendant holding a gun. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm without a license and related offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the photographs obtained from the search of his iPhone. The motion judge denied the motion to suppress, concluding that it was appropriate for the police to search the files on Defendant’s phone that contained his photographs. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) because communications relating to and linking Defendant to the crimes under investigation would be found in photograph form on Defendant’s iPhone, a search of the photograph files was reasonable; and (2) the photographs at issue were properly seized as evidence linking Defendant to the crimes under investigation. View "Commonwealth v. Dorelas" on Justia Law

Defendant was on parole when his parole officer and others searched his apartment without a warrant and seized cocaine from his bedroom door. Defendant was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing that the search was unconstitutional under both the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. The motion judge allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment but did violate article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Specifically, the judge concluded that article 14 offers the same protections for parolees as it does for probations and that searches of a parolee’s residence must be supported by both reasonable suspicion and either a search warrant or a traditional exception to the search warrant. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the allowance of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding (1) article 14 does not offer as much protection to parolees as it affords to probationers, and therefore, reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a warrantless search of the parolee’s home; and (2) the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion that a search of Defendant’s home would produce evidence of a parole violation. View "Commonwealth v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by a state police trooper, who was prompted by the receipt of an anonymous 911 call concerning an apparent drunk driver. After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the warrantless stop of his vehicle because the stop was neither supported by reasonable suspicion nor made pursuant to an ongoing emergency. The appeals court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the information bore sufficient indicia of reliability, and therefore, the trooper could rely on the information in establishing reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the information gathered from the anonymous call, corroborated by other information, was sufficiently reliable to warrant a finding that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. View "Commonwealth v. Depiero" on Justia Law