Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his cell site location information (CSLI) relating to his cellular telephone. The Commonwealth had obtained Defendant’s CSLI for a fourteen-day period beginning August 24, 2004 pursuant to the Federal Stored Communications Act under an order of the superior court judge. The superior court allowed the motion to suppress, concluding that obtaining Defendant’s CLSI constituted a search. In Augustine I, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that search a search would be permissible only upon a showing of probable cause. The Court vacated the allowance of the motion to suppress and remanded for consideration of whether the affidavit that the Commonwealth had submitted in support of the order demonstrated probable cause. On remand, the superior court again allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, ruling that the affidavit did not meet the probable cause standard required under Augustine I. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth demonstrated probable cause for obtaining Defendant’s CSLI records for the period from August 24 to August 26, 2004. View "Commonwealth v. Augustine" on Justia Law

Boston police officers stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction. The officers ordered the two rear seat passengers to get out of the vehicle and pat frisked each for weapons. Defendant, the front seat passenger, got out of the vehicle and was ordered to return to his seat. When he did so, he moved the gear shift to the “drive” position. Defendant and the driver were then ordered from the vehicle, and Defendant was pat frisked. Finding no weapon, the officers conducted a protective sweep of the vehicle and discovered a loaded firearm under the front passenger seat. Defendant was charged with unlicensed possession of a firearm and related offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. A superior court judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order allowing the motions to suppress, holding that, even if the pat frisks of the rear seat passengers were invalid, sufficient evidence supported the officers’ suspicion that Douglas might be armed and dangerous and that a limited protective sweep of the vehicle was necessary for officer safety. View "Commonwealth v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Defendant fled when two Boston police officers attempted to stop and question him. When the officers apprehended Defendant, a handgun containing ammunition fell from his pants. Defendant was charged with multiple firearms offenses and resisting arrest. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the encounter. A municipal court judge allowed the motion to suppress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion judge’s finding regarding the moment Defendant was seized was not erroneous; (2) the judge’s finding that the facts of this case did not support a conclusion of reasonable suspicion was not clearly erroneous; and (3) the Court was not permitted to make additional findings, and reach a different result, based on its own view of the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants - Tyshaun McGhee and Sidney McGhee - were convicted of three counts of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 50 (the statute), and related charges. Defendants appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts sex trafficking statute. The Supreme Judicial Court largely affirmed, holding (1) the statute is sufficiently clear and definite and thus did not violate Defendants’ rights to due process; (2) the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (3) the phrase “commercial sexual activity” as used in the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (4) the judge did not err in allowing the substantive admission of grand jury testimony from one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses; (5) the judge did not violate Defendants’ right to confrontation by hindering their cross-examination of a certain witness regarding criminal charges pending against her and her history of prostitution; and (6) Tyshaun’s sentences for two counts of deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute were illegal. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. McGhee" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the orders denying his motion for a new trial and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) Defendant waived his right to a public trial where his trial counsel was aware that the courtroom was closed to spectators during the jury empanelment process and did not object to the partial closure; (2) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on extreme atrocity or cruelty based on second and third prong malice; and (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s strategic decision to forgo a defense of lack of criminal responsibility. View "Commonwealth v. Lang" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and the denial of his motions for a new trial and discerned no basis to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object when court officers excluded the public and Defendant’s family from the courtroom during jury empanelment; (2) Defendant waived his right to be present at sidebar discussions during jury empanelment; (3) the trial judge acted within his discretion in deciding not to allow Defendant’s peremptory challenges of three African-American jurors; (4) Defendant’s challenges to the trial judge’s evidentiary rulings were without merit; (5) the prosecutor did not impermissibly bolster the creditability of certain witnesses or commit prejudicial error during closing argument; (6) no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred when the judge instructed the jury; and (7) Defendant’s motion for a new trial was properly denied. View "Commonwealth v. Fritz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in allowing multiple prior consistent statements; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the admission of certain evidence and failing to impeach a witness; (3) there was not improper prosecutorial vouching during closing argument that created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; and (4) the conviction was viable despite the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating witness, and newly discovered evidence did not necessitate a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Lessieur" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial judge’s refusal to grant immunity to two potential defense witnesses did not violate Defendant’s right to a fair trial and due process of law, nor his right to present a complete defense; and (2) the prosecutor did not engage in improper vouching or misstate the evidence in during closing arguments. View "Commonwealth v. Brewer" on Justia Law