Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2012, voters approved the Commonwealth’s new medical marijuana law. In May 2013, Defendant was charged with possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, distribution of marijuana, and conspiracy to violate the drug laws. The charges arose from a search of Defendant’s property pursuant to a search warrant issued in May 2013. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. The district court allowed Defendant’s motion, concluding that the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant application demonstrated probable cause that Defendant was cultivating marijuana at the property but, in light of the act, failed to establish probable cause that Defendant was not authorized to do so and therefore was committing a crime. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search. View "Commonwealth v. Canning" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, the unlawful possession of a firearm, and the unlawful possession of ammunition. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the murder conviction. Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other claims, that the trial judge erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on duress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) juveniles, along with adults, are generally barred from using a duress defense for intentional murder; (2) Defendant procedurally waived his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial during the jury empanelment, and therefore, his right to a public trial was not violated when the courtroom was closed for a period of sixty to ninety minutes during jury empanelment; and (3) Defendant was not prejudiced by a noncitizen juror deciding his case. View "Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, and armed robbery. The motion judge dismissed the armed robbery conviction as duplicative. Defendant appealed, arguing that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his room in a “sober house” pursuant to a search warrant, alleging that there was no probable cause that he was the perpetrator. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to reduce the verdict of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or to grant a new trial, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as there was probable cause to issue a search warrant; (2) because Defendant was convicted of murder on theories of both premeditation and felony murder and because the Court affirmed on both theories, the conviction of armed robbery was not duplicative and should not have been dismissed; and (3) there was no reason to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Foster" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and possessing a firearm without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial judge (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to police following his arrest, as Defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and his statements were voluntary; and (2) did not deprive Defendant of a defense by declining to instruct the jury on the uncharged offense of accessory after the fact where the judge’s instructions clearly indicated that Defendant could not be convicted of murder if the jury concluded that Defendant’s role was indeed limited to aiding in the shooter’s escape from the police. View "Commonwealth v. Newson" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin and cocaine and of unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment by police officers during the execution of an “anticipatory search warrant,” claiming that the officers had executed the search before the “triggering events” stated in the affidavit had occurred. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting convictions, holding (1) where, as in this case, the Commonwealth applies for an anticipatory search warrant and the judicial authorization to execute the search is conditioned on the occurrence of a specific future event, the search is authorized by the warrant where there is equivalent compliance with that condition precedent; and (2) in this case, there was both equivalent compliance with the warrant’s triggering conditions, and compliance with those conditions provided probable cause to search Defendant’s residence. View "Commonwealth v. Colondres" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a letter he wrote to another detainee while he was detained awaiting trial; (2) the trial court did not err by not instructing, sua sponte, on involuntary manslaughter based on wanton or reckless conduct; and (3) Defendant’s trial court was ineffective in not requesting an instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on wanton or reckless conduct. View "Commonwealth v. Jessup" on Justia Law

Defendant was a participant in a drive-by shooting against a group of young men that killed one member of the group and wounded two others. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined Defendant’s request that it grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting the grand jury of a Commonwealth witness; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting prior bad act evidence; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant’s refusal to have his custodial interrogation recorded; (4) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of 911 calls received by a police dispatcher; (5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning the course of the investigation and the role of the grand jury, but the error did not prejudice Defendant; (6) the prosecutor’s impeachment of a defense witness with her failure to report exculpatory evidence to police was not in error; (7) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct during closing argument; and (8) the trial judge did not err in declining to give a Bowden instruction. View "Commonwealth v. DaSilva" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after fifteen years. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his mandatory life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a mandatory life sentence with eligibility for parole after fifteen years for a juvenile homicide offender convicted of murder in the second degree does not offend the Eighth Amendment or article 26 or other constitutional rights; and (2) Defendant’s challenges to his underlying conviction were without merit. View "Commonwealth v. Okoro" on Justia Law

In 2013, Gregory Diatchenko filed the present action seeking a declaration that, because he was seventeen at the time he committed the offense leading to his conviction of murder in the first degree, his mandatory sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional. Following Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the mandatory imposition of such a sentence was unconstitutional. The Court held that a juvenile homicide offender who receives a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment must be afforded the opportunity for release on parole. Diatchenko and another petitioner, both of whom became immediately eligible for parole pursuant to the Court’s decision in Diatchenko I, contended that, to ensure their opportunity for release through parole was meaningful, they must have access to counsel, access to funds for counsel and for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of the decision on their parole applications. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the petitioners, holding (1) the procedural protections of representation by counsel and the opportunity to obtain expert assistance in connection with that initial parole hearing are necessary for juvenile homicide offenders serving a mandatory life sentence; and (2) such offenders are entitled to limited judicial review of a parole board decision denying initial parole. View "Diatchenko v. District Attorney" on Justia Law

The chief of police of the city of Worcester determined that Appellant was not a “suitable person” under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 140, 131(d) and (f) to hold a license to carry firearms. The chief first suspended Appellant’s license then revoked the license and finally denied Appellant’s application for a new license to carry. Appellant filed a complaint for judicial review of the chief’s decisions. The district court litigation was consolidated and resolved largely in favor of Appellant. The chief sought certiorari review in the superior court, and the superior court granted the chief’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the “suitable person” standard does not violate the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied; (2) the statutory scheme as to the suspension and revocation of licenses and the denial of license applications does not violate procedural due process; (3) the “suitable person” standard is not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant; and (4) the decisions of the chief were supported by substantial evidence. View "Chief of Police v. Holden" on Justia Law