Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior court against Plaintiffs and directed the court to enter a judgment declaring the "public comment policy" of the town of Southborough unconstitutional,holding that the town's public comment policy violated rights protected by articles nineteen and sixteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.At issue was the policy of the board of selectmen of Southborough that outlines the public comment portion of its meetings where town residents may address the board ("public comment policy"). Plaintiffs argued, among other claims, that the policy violated their constitutionally-protected right under article nineteen "to assemble, speak in a peaceable manner, and petition...town leaders for redress." The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court's decision rejecting the argument that the town's public comment policy was unconstitutional, in violation of articles nineteen and sixteen, holding that the town's civil restraints on the content of speech at a public comment session in a public meeting were forbidden under both articles nineteen and sixteen. View "Barron v. Kolenda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court judge denying Defendant's motion to enforce a plea bargain, holding that the plea offer did not violate Defendant's rights to due process.Defendant was indicted along with two codefendants on two counts of murder in the first degree. Defendant was offered a "package deal" plea bargain under which he would have been able to plead guilty to manslaughter if his codefendant also agreed to the same plea. Defendant's codefendant refused the terms of the agreement. Defendant and his codefendant were tried and convicted of all charges. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his convictions and to accept pleas to manslaughter, as the Commonwealth had originally offered, arguing that the condition attached to the plea offer violated his right to decide whether to accept the plea or go to trial. A superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to enforce the plea bargain. View "Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the county court for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition filed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E challenging the decision of the superior court judge granting Defendant's motion for postconviction relief and reducing his conviction, holding that the petition was untimely.Defendant served forty-four years in prison for his conviction of murder in the first degree. In 2020, Defendant filed a postconviction motion to reduce the verdict from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree on the grounds that the Commonwealth's 1978 package plea offer violated his right to due process. The motion judge granted the motion and, in 2021, reduced the verdict to murder in the second degree. The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal but did not file the gatekeeper petition until five and one-half months later, exceeding the thirty-day time limit set out in Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 36 n.10 (2000). After a remand, the single justice allowed the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition, holding that, with respect to filing deadlines, the Commonwealth is subject to the limitations established in Mains. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the motion judge allowing Defendant's motion for a new trial after the trial court convicted him of murder in the first degree, holding that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that counsel's assistance was constitutionally ineffective.During the proceedings, counsel was informed of a proffer indicating that someone other than Defendant had gone to the victim's home on the evening of the killing and carrying the same caliber firearm as was used in the killing. In his motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the exculpatory evidence provided by the Commonwealth. The motion judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) use of the proffer evidence could have raised a reasonable doubt as to whether Defendant murdered the victim; and (2) therefore, the motion judge's denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial was an abuse of discretion. View "Commonwealth v. Tavares" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was convicted of several crimes, including armed assault with intent to murder. The firearm leading to the charges was recovered during a motor vehicle search that led to charges in a separate case against a different individual, Danilo Depina, who successfully moved to suppress the firearm on the basis that it had been illegally seized. Petitioner later filed the underlying petition, which the county court treated as a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, arguing that he had stand to petition the district attorney's office that had prosecuted Petitioner to produce evidence related to the firearm. A single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court appealed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the appeal. View "Pina v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court judge denying Juvenile's motion to suppress evidence of a seized firearm on the grounds that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her, holding that the juvenile court did not err.As a result of a report about kids displaying a firearm outside a housing complex four police officers were dispatched to the complex. One officer noticed Juvenile walking along the street who kept adjusting the waistband of her pants. The officers stopped her, conducted a patfrisk, and discovered a loaded firearm in Juvenile's waistband. After her motion to suppress was denied Juvenile entered a conditional guilty plea to four firearms-related offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Juvenile was carrying an illegal firearm in her waistband, and therefore, the stop and pat frisk of Juvenile comported with constitutional requirements. View "Commonwealth v. Karen K." on Justia Law

In this case where Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Massachusetts Constitution protects a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide, thereby immunizing the practice from criminal prosecution, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the proposed right, as defined by Plaintiffs, was not supported in the relevant provisions of the Constitution.Plaintiffs were a licensed physician who wished to provide physician-assisted suicide and a retired physician who had been diagnosed with an incurable cancer. Plaintiffs brought a civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that terminally ill patients with six months or less to live have a constitutional right to receive a prescription for lethal medication in order to bring about death in a manner and time of their choosing. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not protect physician-assisted suicide; and (2) the law of manslaughter prohibits physician-assisted suicide without offending constitutional protections. View "Kligler v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner was charged with assault and battery on a family or household member, malicious destruction of property, and intimidation of a witness. After Petitioner unsuccessfully filed several motions to dismiss he filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 arguing that the complaint had not been signed by the correct police officer and proceeding to trial on the basis of a nonconforming criminal complaint would violate his due process rights. The previously unsigned complaint was subsequently signed and sworn in open court. Thereafter, the single justice denied Petitioner's Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no reason Petitioner could not obtain his desired relief in a direct appeal. View "Schajnovitz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the trial denying Defendant's motion to vacate global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of his probation, holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish how the imposition of GPS monitoring would further its interest in enforcing the court-ordered exclusion zone surrounding the victim's home.Defendant was convicted on two indictments charging him with rape and sentenced to a term of incarceration followed by probation. As a condition of probation, the judge ordered Defendant to submit to GPS monitoring pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47. Defendant moved to vacate the condition of GPS monitoring on the ground that it constituted an unreasonable search. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of establishing the constitutionality of the warrantless search. View "Commonwealth v. Roderick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that Defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and that remand to the superior court was required for Defendant to receive a new trial.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and firearm offenses. During the trial, defense counsel disclosed confidential information to the Commonwealth regarding the location of "key incriminating evidence." Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because he had not given his counsel his informed consent to disclose the information. The superior court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding (1) because defense counsel did not present Defendant with any other option than disclosing the existence of the incriminating evidence Defendant's purported consent to the disclosure was neither adequately informed nor voluntary; and (2) because trial counsel mistakenly believed he had a duty to disclose the incriminating evidence and did not obtain Defendant's prior consent to making that disclosure, an actual conflict of interest existed rendering the representation constitutionally ineffective. View "Commonwealth v. Tate" on Justia Law