Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the smell of unburnt marijuana suffices to establish probable cause search an automobile. The question arose in the wake of the 2008 ballot initiative decriminalizing possession of one ounce or less of marijuana and the holding in Commonwealth v. Cruz that “the odor of burnt marijuana alone cannot reasonably provide suspicion of criminal activity.” In this case, police perceived a strong odor of unburnt marijuana emanating from Defendant’s vehicle and, after seizing a “fat bag” of marijuana from the glove compartment, searched Defendant’s vehicle. The trial judge denied Defendant’s motion to suppress as to the “fat bag” but ordered suppressed the bags of marijuana found in the ensuing search of the back seat of Defendant’s vehicle. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge correctly determined that the odor of unburnt marijuana did not justify the search of the back seat of Defendant’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; but (2) because the judge did not specifically address whether the seizure of the “fat bag” would support probable cause to arrest Defendant, the case must be remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Overmyer" on Justia Law

This case concerned the effect of the 2008 ballot initiative decriminalizing possession of one ounce or less of marijuana on police authority to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles resulting from the odor of unburnt marijuana. Defendant’s vehicle was searched based solely on the odor of unburnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Defendant was subsequently charged with various drug- and firearms-related offenses. A municipal court judge ultimately allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the search. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order allowing the motion to suppress, holding (1) the search of Defendant’s vehicle was not justified as a search incident to arrest; (2) the search was not permissible on the basis that it was to “prevent the defendant from smoking marijuana while driving”; and (3) absent articulable facts supporting a belief that defendant possessed a criminal amount of marijuana under state law, the search was not justified by the need to search for contraband under federal law. View "Commonwealth v. Craan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion and did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights in questioning members of the jury venire concerning the effect of the absence of eyewitness testimony to the murder in the Commonwealth’s case; (2) the prosecutor’s redirect examination of an immunized witness did not invade the province of the jury to determine the witness’s credibility and did not allow the Commonwealth to vouch for the witness’s credibility; and (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by making certain remarks closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Andrade" on Justia Law

Defendant, an attorney, was charged with multiple counts of, inter alia, forgery of a document and uttering a forged instrument. The charges stemmed from allegations that Defendant, through his use of computers, orchestrated a sophisticated scheme to divert to himself funds that were intended to be used to pay off large home mortgage loans. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion to compel Defendant to enter his password into encryption software he placed on various digital media storage devices that were in the custody of the Commonwealth. Following a hearing, a judge denied the Commonwealth’s motion to compel decryption but reported a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court reversed the denial of the Commonwealth’s motion, concluding that Defendant could be compelled to provide his key to seized encrypted digital evidence provided that the compelled decryption would not communicate facts of a testimonial nature to the Commonwealth beyond what Defendant had already admitted to investigators. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a telephone call recorded by the police between Defendant and a cooperating witness where the cooperating witness was instructed by law enforcement to elicit information regarding a “designated offense” but instead elicited information about an unrelated crime that was not a designated offense. The Commonwealth did not seek a warrant under the Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute, which requires the Commonwealth to obtain a warrant before it may conduct an “interception,” unless the communication is recorded “in the course of an investigation of a designated offense.” After the telephone call was recorded, Defendant was indicted for murder and several other offenses. A superior court judge suppressed the conversation, concluding that the recording was not made in the course of an investigation of a designated offense. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that where a law enforcement officer, acting in good faith, instructs a cooperating witness to attempt to elicit information regarding a designated offense, regardless of whether the cooperating witness actually follows the officer’s instructions, the recorded conversation is not an interception and therefore does not require a warrant under the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements made to the police, as the statements were made voluntarily; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for required findings of not guilty, as the evidence presented at trial supported the conviction; (3) the admission of expert rebuttal testimony was proper and did not violate Defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct during closing arguments. View "Commonwealth v. Harris" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were amendments to the Sex Offender Registry Law that the Governor signed into law on July 12, 2013, including amendments that would require the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) to publish on the Internet information contained in the sex offender registry regarding individuals given a level two or three classification. On July 5, 2013, Plaintiffs, as putative representatives of a class of persons presently and prospectively classified as level two sex offenders, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking an injunction barring SORB from publishing registry information on the Internet of the class of level two offenders. The Supreme Judicial Court declared unconstitutional the retroactive application of the amendments to the extent they would require the Internet publication of the registry information of individuals who were finally classified as level two sex offenders on or before July 12, 2013 but noted that SORB was allowed to publish on the Internet the registry information of any individual who was given a final classification as a level two sex offender after July 12, 2013. View "Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the town of Hanover, filed suit against Defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, alleging that Defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings by maintaining the litigation, providing legal counsel, and controlling the plaintiffs’ interests, despite not being named a plaintiff in the suit. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the “anti-SLAPP” statute, asserting that the town’s claims against it were solely based on Defendant’s constitutionally protected right to petition. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that Defendant did not have standing to bring its motion under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant showed that the suit against it was based on protected petitioning activity; (2) the town did not meet its burden of showing that Defendant’s exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s special motion to dismiss should be allowed. View "Town of Hanover v. New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

After a probation revocation hearing, a district court judge found that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation and revoked Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the judge made no separate finding as to good cause for proceeding without a witness with personal knowledge of the evidence presented, as required by Rule 6(b) of the District Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing comported with due process because the hearsay testimony on which the judge relied was substantially reliable and trustworthy; (2) Rule 6(b) of the District Court Rules of Probation Violation Proceedings is not to be construed as requiring more than is constitutionally mandated, and due process does not require, when the hearsay is substantially reliable, separate proof as to good cause; and (3) there was no improper interference by the office of the district attorney with the probation department’s conduct of the hearing that would give rise to a violation of article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Bukin" on Justia Law

Defendant, his brother, his sister-in-law, and his cousin worked together in a tiling business in Oklahoma. All four individuals were hired to install tile in a fast-food restaurant under construction in Clinton. While working on the job, Defendant stabbed and killed the general manager with no apparent provocation or motive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements Defendant made to the police; (2) the joinder of the firearms charges with the murder charge for trial did not prejudice Defendant; (3) the admission of certain hearsay evidence at trial did not prejudice Defendant; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s first motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing; and (5) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of lack of criminal responsibility based on evidence that Defendant may have been suffering from a spontaneous recurrence of methamphetamine-induced psychosis at the time of the stabbing. View "Commonwealth v. Spray" on Justia Law