Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the death of Lourdes Hernandez. Defendant appealed, claiming that inappropriate statements made in the prosecutor's closing argument and a defective jury instruction on reasonable doubt constituted error requiring that his conviction be reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial error in his closing remarks; (2) the jury instruction was an accurate statement of the law, the instruction did not denigrate the Commonwealth's burden of proof, and Defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction; and (3) cumulative error did not warrant a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Mejia" on Justia Law

Healey, convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving children, completed his prison sentences, but remains committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center as a sexually dangerous person. He was initially committed in 1966, under the law then in effect, and was recommitted after he reoffended sexually while on a gradual release program. He unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge under G.L. c. 123A, 9, several times. In 2005, a jury determined that he remained sexually dangerous. Healy filed a petition in the county court, G.L. c. 211, 3, alleging that his conditions of confinement are governed by the 1958 version of the sexually dangerous person law; that he is entitled to be evaluated by psychiatrists rather than psychologists; that he is entitled to hearings before the parole board; that his right to a speedy trial has been abridged; and that he is entitled to proceed jury-waived. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed denial of the petition. Healy was required to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of remedies alternative to G.L. c. 211, 3, and failed to do so. He could have appealed from dismissal of his habeas corpus petition or filed a civil action against the Commissioner of Correction to challenge the terms of his commitment. View "Healey v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner's son was charged with assault and battery on a person over 60 years of age and with resisting arrest. The petitioner is the alleged victim. The son unsuccessfully moved to suppress a recording made by a third party, allegedly in violation of the wiretapping statute, G.L. c. 272, 99. The recording includes statements made by the defendant and the petitioner. The motion was denied. Petitioner sought relief under G.L. c. 211, 3, on the ground that the introduction of the recording into evidence in the defendant's trial would violate her privacy rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Nothing in G.L. c. 211, 3, or rule 2:21 grants a nonparty to a criminal case standing to obtain review of an interlocutory order. The Legislature has expressly provided a civil remedy, including compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees, for any aggrieved person whose oral or wire communications are unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used, or whose privacy is violated by means of an unauthorized interception. G.L. c. 272, 99 Q. The petitioner does not address this remedy or explain why it would not be adequate to vindicate her privacy interests. View "In re Wadja" on Justia Law

This case involved the proper interpretation of a Massachusetts election law that governed the filing of a vacancy, where a candidate nominated for state, city or town office withdraws, dies, or otherwise becomes ineligible prior to an election, G.L.c. 53, section 14(14), and its application to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of a minor political party. The court concluded that this matter was properly before the court where plaintiffs have established an actual controversy; section 14 applied to presidential electors and assumed by extension to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates the electors have pledged to support; although section 14, as written, was not a model of clarity and its meaning not without uncertainty, the court interpreted it in a manner largely consistent with the interpretation proffered by the Secretary; and finally, aligning the court's analysis under art. 9 with that of the equal protection clause, the court perceived no constitutional deficiency in the election law scheme. View "Libertarian Assoc. of Massachusetts & another v. Secretary of the Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging, inter alia, that the city council's vote to remove Charles Turner, an elected Boston city councillor convicted of attempted extortion and other Federal crimes, was void, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. At issue were two certified questions: (1) Did the Charter of the City of Boston, or any other provision of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, authorize the Boston City Council to promulgate Rule 40A of the Rules of the Boston City Council and employ it to remove an incumbent Councillor from office before he was sentenced and removed automatically by operation of M.G.L.c. 279, section 30? and (2) If so, is Rule 40A a civil or a criminal provision of law? The court answered that the city council was authorized to promulgate Rule 40A but did not have the authority to employ the rule to remove Turner from office. In light of this answer, the court need not provide an answer to the second question. View "Turner & others v. City of Boston & others" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief seeking a determination that, by refusing to give her additional break time and a suitable environment during the medical licensing examination in which to express breast milk for her nursing daughter, the NBME violated her right to privacy under arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; (2) the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L.c. 12, sections 11H, 11I; (3) the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, G.L.c. 93, section 102; and (4) the Massachusetts public accommodation discrimination statute, G.L.c. 272, sections 92A, 98. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief requiring the NBME to give her an additional sixty minutes of break time per test day and a private room with a power outlet in order to express her breast milk in privacy. In a counterclaim, the NBME sought a declaration that it was not a State actor and that its gender-neutral accommodation policy did not disparately impact female exam candidates. The court concluded that the NBME did not violate the civil rights act because its conduct did not amount to coercion under that act; plaintiff proffered sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the NBME violated her rights under the equal rights act; in regards to plaintiff's claim under the public accommodation statute, the court rejected the legal arguments advanced by the NBME regarding the application of that statute to these circumstances; and because plaintiff was entitled to statutory relief under the public accommodation statute, the court did not decide her constitutional claim. The court's decision in the context of the equal rights act and public accommodation statute counts, that lactation was a sex-linked classification, recognized that there remained barriers that prevented new mothers from being able to breastfeed or express breast milk. The court took the opportunity to extend protection to lactating mothers in the context of lengthy testing required for medical licensure. View "Currier v. National Board of Medical Examiners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a superior court judge's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging violations of her state civil rights. Plaintiff contended that she had a right, secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, to attend a lecture that was open to the public, held on the campus of Tufts and that defendants violated the act when they excluded her from the lecture. Tufts, through its office of continuing education, presented a publicly advertised lecture on its campus entitled, "Dangers of Feeding Your Pet a Raw Diet." Plaintiff, who was an advocate of raw food diets for animals, sought to attend the lecture. At the time, she had not paid her bill for services rendered to her horse and defendants informed plaintiff that she was ineligible for continuing education services at Tufts. The court concluded that the circumstances of plaintiff's exclusion from the lecture did not amount to an interference with any claimed free speech right, and thus that the allowance of summary judgment on this claim was proper. The court also concluded that the allowance of summary judgment for defendants' on plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence was correct. View "Roman v. Trustees of Turfts College & others." on Justia Law

The court considered three petitions for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3, that related to the OpenCourt pilot project, which broadcasts live by "streaming" over the Internet video and audio recordings of certain proceedings taking place in the Quincy District Court. Each petition challenged one or more orders of a judge in the Quincy District Court concerning the broadcasts and online posting of particular proceedings in two different criminal cases. The court concluded that any order restricting OpenCourt's ability to publish -- by "streaming live" over the Internet, publicly archiving on the Web site or otherwise -- existing audio and video recordings of court room proceedings represented a form of prior restraint on the freedoms of the press and speech protected by the First Amendment and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. Such an order could be upheld only if it was the least restrictive, reasonable measure necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest. In the Barnes case, the court vacated the order of the district court judge requiring the redaction of the minor alleged victim. In the Diorio case, the court concluded that Diorio had not met the heavy burden of justifying an order of prior restraint with respect to the specific proceedings at issue in his petition for relief. The court requested the Supreme Judicial Court's judiciary-media committee submit a set of guidelines of the operation of the OpenCourt project. View "Commonwealth v. Barnes" on Justia Law

After a hearing, a judge of the district court issued a harassment prevention order, under G.L.c. 258E, that directed Robert O'Brien not to, inter alia, abuse or harass Alan Borowski. O'Brien filed a petition to vacate and dismiss the order under G.L.c. 211, section 3, before a single justice of the court, who reserved and reported the case for decision by the full court. O'Brien argued that c. 258E was unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to him because the conduct complained of was protected speech. The court concluded that c. 258E was not unconstitutionally overbroad under the court's interpretation of the statue because it limited the scope of prohibited speech to constitutionally unprotected "true threats" and "fighting words." Because the court vacated the now-expired harassment prevention order on other grounds, the court did not reach the question whether the application of the statute was unconstitutional. View "O'Brien v. Borowski" on Justia Law

This case involved Commonwealth Care, a state-initiated program that provided structured premium assistance for low-income Massachusetts residents. In 2009, the Legislature made certain changes to the eligibility requirements of Commonwealth Care, enacted in a two-part supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 2010. Section 31(a) of the appropriation excluded all aliens who were federally ineligible under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 8 U.S.C. 1601-1646, from participation in Commonwealth Care. Plaintiffs were individuals who either have been terminated from Commonwealth Care or have been denied eligibility solely as a result of their alienage. The court held that section 31(a) could not pass strict scrutiny and that the discrimination against legal immigrants that its limiting language embodied violated their rights to equal protection under the Massachusetts Constitution. View "Finch & others v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. & others" on Justia Law