Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a hearing, a judge of the district court issued a harassment prevention order, under G.L.c. 258E, that directed Robert O'Brien not to, inter alia, abuse or harass Alan Borowski. O'Brien filed a petition to vacate and dismiss the order under G.L.c. 211, section 3, before a single justice of the court, who reserved and reported the case for decision by the full court. O'Brien argued that c. 258E was unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to him because the conduct complained of was protected speech. The court concluded that c. 258E was not unconstitutionally overbroad under the court's interpretation of the statue because it limited the scope of prohibited speech to constitutionally unprotected "true threats" and "fighting words." Because the court vacated the now-expired harassment prevention order on other grounds, the court did not reach the question whether the application of the statute was unconstitutional. View "O'Brien v. Borowski" on Justia Law

This case involved Commonwealth Care, a state-initiated program that provided structured premium assistance for low-income Massachusetts residents. In 2009, the Legislature made certain changes to the eligibility requirements of Commonwealth Care, enacted in a two-part supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 2010. Section 31(a) of the appropriation excluded all aliens who were federally ineligible under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 8 U.S.C. 1601-1646, from participation in Commonwealth Care. Plaintiffs were individuals who either have been terminated from Commonwealth Care or have been denied eligibility solely as a result of their alienage. The court held that section 31(a) could not pass strict scrutiny and that the discrimination against legal immigrants that its limiting language embodied violated their rights to equal protection under the Massachusetts Constitution. View "Finch & others v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. & others" on Justia Law

This case was before the court pursuant to an order entered by the United States Supreme Court granting defendant's petition for certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the court for further consideration in light of McDonald v. Chicago. At issue was whether McDonald required the court to dismiss the three indictments charging defendant under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), with possession of a firearm and ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for (and was denied) a FID card to possess a firearm and ammunition, defendant could not challenge his convictions under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), as unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Accordingly, there was no reason to alter the court's judgment. View "Commonwealth v. Loadholt" on Justia Law

Ralph C. Sullivan was stopped and issued a citation assessing a one hundred dollar penalty for a moving violation, failure to stay within a marked lane, in violation of G.L.c. 89, section 4A. On appeal, defendant claimed that the twenty-five and fifty dollar filing fees, he was required to pay in order to have his case heard, violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Defendant also argued that, because the statue providing for payment of the twenty-five dollar filing fee was enacted after he had requested a clerk-magistrate's hearing, the imposition of the filing fee was an ex post facto application of that statute. The court held that the filing fees did not violate Sullivan's equal protection rights and that the application of the statute requiring the twenty-five dollar filing fee did not violate the ex post facto clause. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Sullivan's motion seeking the return of these filing fees. View "Police Dept. of Salem v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

This case was brought pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, section 14, and G.L.c. 231A, where the court was asked to decide whether the the imposition of $275 in filing fees to obtain judicial review of a final decision of a municipal parking clerk regarding a parking citation offended the Massachusetts Constitution. Plaintiffs each appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court that the statutory scheme that imposed such fees for review of a municipal parking clerk's adjudication of the citation, following an in-person administrative hearings, was consonant with the principles of due process, equal protection, and separation of powers. The court held that the statutory scheme did not violate substantive or procedural due process; did not violate the equal protection clause; and afforded the opportunity for judicial review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, violation of G.L. c. 93A, 11, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with contractual and business relations and defendants filed counterclaims. At issue, among others, was whether actions taken by an employer against a former employee could violate G.L. c. 151B, 4(4), and (4A), sections of the antidiscrimination law that respectively prohibited retaliation and interference with a protected right. The court held that an employer or other person could be liable to a former employee under these sections for retaliatory or interfering conduct that occurred after the employment relationship had terminated. The court also affirmed in part and reversed in part the remaining issues in case.