Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Benjamin Tariri was charged with multiple counts of embezzlement and larceny, allegedly misappropriating nearly $2 million from clients while working as an attorney. He was arrested at Logan International Airport attempting to board a one-way flight to Iran, where he had recently spent six months. Tariri had longstanding ties to the United States but also significant connections to Iran. After his arraignment in the Boston Municipal Court, he was released on cash bail and required to submit to GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone restricting his movements to certain areas, primarily to mitigate his risk of flight.Following indictment and arraignment in the Superior Court, the bail and GPS conditions were maintained, with the inclusion zone expanded to cover additional areas. Tariri moved to modify or vacate the GPS condition, arguing that it hindered his ability to work and prevented him from visiting his wife and child in East Boston. The motion judge expanded the inclusion zone to address employment concerns but otherwise denied further relief. Tariri then filed a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court, which a single justice denied, finding no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s order.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the single justice’s denial for clear error of law or abuse of discretion. The court held that GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone, imposed as a condition of pretrial release, was a reasonable and constitutional search under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, given the particularized risk of flight and the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring Tariri’s appearance in court. The judgment of the single justice was affirmed. View "Tariri v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with twenty-one felony counts stemming from a fifteen-minute crime spree in February 2019, during which he attempted to break into homes, engaged in a physical altercation, stopped vehicles at gunpoint, and was ultimately apprehended by police. He was arraigned in May 2019 and held on high bail. Over the next several years, the case was delayed by issues including the Commonwealth’s slow production of mandatory discovery, changes in defense counsel, and the defendant’s own motions and requests. The COVID-19 pandemic led to statewide orders suspending jury trials for extended periods, further delaying proceedings.The case was heard in the Hampden Superior Court, where the defendant filed multiple motions to dismiss, arguing that the delay violated both the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure (rule 36) and his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Superior Court judge excluded various periods from the speedy trial calculation, including time attributable to COVID-19 orders, delays caused by defense motions, and periods when the defendant changed counsel or requested continuances. The defendant was ultimately convicted on most counts after a bench trial, and he appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that delays resulting from its COVID-19 orders do not weigh against the Commonwealth in evaluating constitutional speedy trial claims. The Court further found that, after excluding periods attributable to the pandemic, defense motions, and other justified delays, the remaining delay did not violate rule 36 or the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment or Article 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Larace" on Justia Law

A member of the Lowell police department’s gang unit created an undercover Snapchat account using a “nonwhite” username and bitmoji, aiming to monitor gang activity by befriending users connected to other officers’ undercover accounts. The officer became “friends” with a user believed to be the defendant, though he did not know the user’s identity or race at the time. The defendant posted a video of himself discharging a firearm from a car, which led police to identify and locate him. A search of the defendant’s vehicle uncovered a firearm matching the one in the video and shell casings consistent with those found at the scene. The defendant did not possess a license to carry a firearm.The Lowell Division of the District Court Department charged the defendant with multiple firearms offenses. The defendant sought discovery on a selective enforcement claim, and the court ordered the production of relevant police records and policies. The records showed that all suspects charged from Snapchat investigations with identifiable race were nonwhite. The defendant moved to suppress evidence, arguing racial motivation in the investigation, but a District Court judge denied the motion, finding no reasonable inference of racial motivation. The defendant also moved to dismiss the firearms charges, claiming the resident firearm licensing scheme violated the Second Amendment. Another District Court judge denied this motion, finding the problematic provision severable. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving his right to appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the defendant had raised a reasonable inference of selective enforcement under the Commonwealth v. Long framework and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, requiring the Commonwealth to rebut the inference with a race-neutral reason. The court also held that the Commonwealth’s resident firearm licensing scheme was not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a lawyer, was accused of delivering sixty-one orange strips containing Suboxone, a controlled substance, to an inmate at a county house of correction. The delivery was disguised as legal paperwork following instructions from another inmate. The strips were confiscated by officers who suspected they were Suboxone. Forensic testing was performed by analyst Dunlap, who concluded the strips contained Suboxone. Dunlap documented her procedures and results in her notes, but was no longer employed at the crime lab at the time of trial. Instead, LaBelle, a supervisor who had not participated in or observed the testing, reviewed Dunlap’s work and testified as a substitute expert, relaying Dunlap’s notes and offering her own opinion based on the case file.A jury in the Massachusetts Superior Court found the defendant guilty of unlawfully delivering a class B controlled substance to a prisoner. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that LaBelle’s opinion was independent. After the United States Supreme Court decided Smith v. Arizona, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Appeals Court’s judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Smith. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then transferred the case for review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the admission of LaBelle’s testimony violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Court found that LaBelle’s opinion was not independent, as it depended on the truth of Dunlap’s testimonial hearsay statements regarding the procedures and results of the testing. The Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and vacated the conviction, remanding for a new trial. The Court also held that its new rule applies prospectively to cases not yet final. View "Commonwealth v. Gordon" on Justia Law

An individual pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses committed against two girls, aged thirteen and fourteen, when he was eighteen years old. The offenses included several instances of rape and indecent assault. The individual had a history of psychological diagnoses, including autism spectrum disorder. After his conviction, the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) initially classified him as a level three sex offender, which would require the highest level of public notification. The individual challenged this classification, leading to a de novo hearing before a SORB hearing examiner.At the hearing, the examiner found by clear and convincing evidence that the individual posed a moderate risk of reoffense and a moderate degree of danger, resulting in a reclassification to level two. The examiner considered several statutory and regulatory factors, including the number of victims, the nature and location of the offenses, and the individual’s psychological profile. The examiner also considered the fact that the individual committed multiple offenses, including repeated offenses against one victim, as relevant to the degree of dangerousness. The examiner determined that Internet publication of the individual’s registration information would serve a public safety interest. The individual sought judicial review in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which affirmed the SORB’s decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the SORB hearing examiner did not err in considering the individual’s multiple offenses as relevant to dangerousness under regulatory factor thirty-seven, even though such consideration is limited under factor two, which addresses risk of reoffense. The court also declined to find the application of factor thirty-seven unconstitutional due to a lack of empirical evidence, given the statutory mandate to consider the number of offenses. The court affirmed the classification as a level two offender and the requirement for Internet dissemination of registration information. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

A former Massachusetts State Police trooper retired in March 2018 after a 21-year career. While assigned to overtime patrol programs funded by federal grants, he falsely reported working over 700 overtime hours in 2015 and 2016, receiving more than $50,000 in unearned pay. He attempted to conceal his conduct by submitting falsified motor vehicle citations. In July 2018, he pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of embezzlement from an agency receiving federal funds, was sentenced to three months in prison, one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution.Following his conviction, the State Board of Retirement suspended his pension and held a hearing. The hearing officer recommended, and the board adopted, a finding that under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), the plaintiff and his beneficiaries were not entitled to any retirement benefits due to his conviction for an offense involving violation of laws applicable to his office. The board ordered the return of his accumulated contributions, less certain deductions. The plaintiff sought judicial review in the Massachusetts District Court, raising constitutional challenges under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, arguing the forfeiture was an excessive fine and cruel or unusual punishment. The District Court judge entered judgment for the retirement board.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the pension forfeiture constituted a fine under Article 26 but was not excessive, adopting the United States Supreme Court’s multifactor analysis for excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that, even assuming Article 26’s cruel or unusual punishment provision applied to fines, the forfeiture was not cruel or unusual. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment and the retirement board’s decision. View "Raftery v. State Board of Retirement" on Justia Law

In 2020, a police officer applied for a criminal complaint in the District Court, alleging that the defendant possessed a loaded firearm while intoxicated. A clerk-magistrate denied the application, finding no probable cause that the defendant had a firearm under his control inside a motor vehicle. No review of this decision was sought. Over two years later, the same officer filed a new application for the same offense with the same facts, and a different clerk-magistrate found probable cause and issued the complaint.The defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the issuance of the complaint was barred by collateral estoppel and that the delay violated his due process rights. A single justice of the county court reserved and reported the petition to the full court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the principles of collateral estoppel did not bar the issuance of the complaint because the initial denial was not a final judgment. The court noted that a District Court determination of no probable cause is not conclusive and does not bar a subsequent indictment for the same offense. The court also found no due process violation, as the defendant did not have a constitutionally protected interest in the finality of a show cause determination, and the delay did not cause severe prejudice to the defendant's ability to mount a defense. The court remanded the case to the county court for entry of a judgment denying the defendant's petition for extraordinary relief. View "Cabrera v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case involves the admissibility of location data obtained from a GPS device imposed on the defendant as a condition of pretrial release. The defendant was involved in a domestic violence incident on December 26, 2019, where he threatened his ex-wife, C.P., and discharged a firearm. He was later apprehended in July 2020 and released on bail with conditions, including GPS monitoring. In August 2020, following a shooting incident, police retrieved the defendant's GPS data to determine his proximity to the crime scene.The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the GPS evidence, and he entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.The Supreme Judicial Court addressed two main issues: whether the initial imposition of GPS monitoring was an unreasonable search under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and whether the subsequent retrieval and review of the defendant's GPS data constituted an unreasonable search.The court held that the initial imposition of GPS monitoring was a search but was reasonable under Article 14 due to the legitimate governmental interests in protecting the alleged victims and ensuring compliance with the conditions of pretrial release. The court found that the defendant's privacy expectations were outweighed by these interests.Regarding the retrieval and review of the GPS data, the court concluded that it did not constitute a search under Article 14. The defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the specific location data retrieved, as it was limited in scope and duration, and the defendant was aware that his movements could be monitored for compliance with pretrial conditions.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's order denying the motion to suppress. View "Commonwealth v. Govan" on Justia Law

A child was temporarily removed from her parents' care shortly after birth and placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) due to concerns about domestic violence. DCF sought to vaccinate her according to an age-based immunization schedule, but her parents, practicing Rastafarians, objected on religious grounds. A Juvenile Court judge allowed DCF to facilitate vaccinations for the child. The parents sought to stop future vaccinations, arguing that vaccinating their child over their religious objections violated their constitutional rights.The Juvenile Court judge found that the parents' religious beliefs were outweighed by the child's best interests and allowed DCF to vaccinate the child. The parents petitioned the Appeals Court for interlocutory relief, which was denied. The parents then appealed to the Appeals Court panel, and the child sought direct appellate review in the Supreme Judicial Court, which was granted.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the order allowing the child to be vaccinated violated the parents' constitutional rights. The court concluded that the parents' sincerely held religious beliefs were substantially burdened by DCF's vaccination efforts. The court applied the State constitutional protections afforded to parents exercising their free exercise rights and determined that DCF failed to demonstrate that exempting the child from vaccinations would substantially hinder the fulfillment of DCF's interests in promoting child health. The court noted the Commonwealth's allowance of religious exemptions from vaccination requirements for parents who have not lost custody and DCF's inconsistent exercise of its authority to order vaccinations for children in its care. The order allowing the joint motion by DCF and the child to facilitate the vaccination of the child was reversed. View "Care and Protection of Eve" on Justia Law

Two detectives from the Lowell police department, while investigating a home invasion in Lowell, Massachusetts, crossed into Nashua, New Hampshire, to speak with the defendant. During the conversation, one detective suspected the defendant was deleting data from his cell phone and seized it without a warrant. The detectives then brought the phone back to Massachusetts and obtained a warrant to search it.In the Superior Court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the cell phone, arguing that the seizure was unlawful. The motion judge allowed the motion, finding that the Lowell detectives had no authority to seize the phone in New Hampshire. The Commonwealth sought an interlocutory appeal, which was allowed by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. The case was then transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the Lowell detective did not have extraterritorial authority to seize the cell phone in New Hampshire. The court found that no statutory or common law authority permitted the warrantless seizure in these circumstances. The court also rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, as this theory was not sufficiently supported by the record. The court held that suppression of the evidence was the appropriate remedy to deter police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity. The order allowing the motion to suppress was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. McCarthy" on Justia Law