Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A juvenile was found delinquent on firearm charges and guilty on a youthful offender indictment for one of the offenses. At the trial, the juvenile was nineteen years old, and the Commonwealth called his mother to testify about events that occurred when he was seventeen. The juvenile argued that the parent-child witness disqualification statute, which prohibits testimony by a parent against their minor child, should have precluded his mother's testimony even though he was no longer a minor at the time of trial. He also claimed that the trial judge made several errors in admitting other evidence and that his sentence was unlawful and unconstitutional.The juvenile was charged in a delinquency complaint with possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device, and improper storage of a firearm. He was subsequently indicted as a youthful offender for the large capacity feeding device charge. The juvenile filed a motion to prevent the Commonwealth from calling his mother as a witness, invoking the parent-child witness disqualification statute. The motion judge denied the motion, reasoning that the statute applied only to testimony against a minor child, and the juvenile was no longer a minor.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and agreed with the trial judge's interpretation that the statutory prohibition of testimony by a parent against their minor child does not apply once the child has reached the age of eighteen. The court found no prejudicial error in the admission of other evidence, although it concluded that the judge should not have admitted a detective's testimony that a firearm depicted in still images was "identical" to the firearm admitted in evidence, nor two hearsay statements. Regarding the juvenile's sentence, the court agreed that the judge erred in not issuing written findings explaining the sentence but concluded that this error did not prejudice the juvenile. The court affirmed the juvenile's delinquency and youthful offender adjudications and declined to vacate his sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Rajiv R." on Justia Law

A Cambridge police officer observed a black Mazda sedan with an unilluminated rear license plate and initiated a traffic stop. The driver, Natnael Zemene, and two passengers were removed from the vehicle for an inventory search, which revealed a bottle of tequila and a box of ammunition. During a subsequent pat frisk, a firearm was found under Zemene's foot. Zemene admitted ownership of the firearm and was arrested.Zemene was charged with possession of ammunition without a license, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and two civil motor vehicle infractions. He was found guilty of carrying a firearm without a license but not guilty of the other charges. The trial judge denied his motion for a required finding of not guilty and sentenced him to eighteen months in a house of correction. Zemene's post-trial motions were denied, and his sentence was stayed pending appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. Zemene argued that retrial on the charge of carrying a firearm without a license would violate the double jeopardy clause. The court held that the relevant legal change occurred with its decision in Commonwealth v. Guardado, not the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen. Therefore, the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial. The court affirmed the single justice's denial of Zemene's petition for relief. View "Zemene v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The defendant, a New Hampshire resident, was arrested in Massachusetts on November 8, 2021, for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol following a collision. During a search of his vehicle, a handgun and ammunition were found. The defendant did not have a Massachusetts nonresident firearm license and was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). He moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the nonresident licensing scheme violated his Second Amendment rights, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen.The District Court judge allowed the motion to dismiss, concluding that the nonresident licensing scheme was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. The judge found that the scheme violated the Second Amendment by imposing discretionary licensing requirements on nonresidents. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Commonwealth's prior nonresident firearm licensing scheme, which allowed the State police colonel discretion to issue or deny licenses, violated the Second Amendment under the Bruen decision. The court noted that such discretionary "may issue" regimes are presumptively invalid and not supported by historical tradition. The court also found that the impermissible portions of the statute could not be severed from the remainder, rendering the entire scheme unconstitutional. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the charge against the defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Donnell" on Justia Law

The defendant, a New Hampshire resident, was involved in a vehicle accident in Massachusetts and was found in possession of an unlicensed firearm. He was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme violated his Second Amendment rights in light of the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen. The motion judge allowed the motion to dismiss, and the Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court first determined that the defendant lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme because he had not applied for and been denied a license under that scheme. The court then considered the merits of a facial challenge to the scheme.The court held that the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme is consistent with the Second Amendment. The scheme's purpose is to restrict access to firearms by demonstrably dangerous persons, which is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court also found that the scheme's "shall issue" licensing regime, which requires nonresidents to meet specific criteria to obtain a license, is analogous to historical regulations such as surety and going armed laws.Additionally, the court held that the scheme does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights to travel and to equal protection. The differences in the treatment of resident and nonresident license applicants, such as license duration and processing times, are rationally related to the legitimate state interest of ensuring public safety.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the motion judge's order allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss, upholding the constitutionality of the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme. View "Commonwealth v. Marquis" on Justia Law

The defendant, a police captain in the West Springfield police department, was found guilty of obtaining an unwarranted privilege with fraudulent intent by using over $1,000 from the police department's evidence room to pay his home mortgage. The defendant was sentenced to a one-year term of probation. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the statutes under which he was convicted were unconstitutionally vague and that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with fraudulent intent or that the unwarranted privilege had a fair market value of over $1,000 in any twelve-month period.The Superior Court denied the defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. After a jury-waived trial, the trial judge found the defendant guilty and denied his motion for a required finding of not guilty. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statutes in question were not unconstitutionally vague. The court found that the terms "unwarranted privilege" and "fraudulent intent" provided sufficient notice of prohibited conduct to a person of reasonable intelligence. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant acted with fraudulent intent, as he had secreted money from the evidence room to pay his mortgage and made false statements to investigators. Additionally, the court determined that the fair market value of the unwarranted privilege exceeded $1,000, based on the face value of the money taken from the evidence room. View "Commonwealth v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

In 2018, the victim ended a five-year relationship with the defendant, who continued to send her text messages and occasionally parked near her home despite her efforts to avoid him. Two years later, the defendant sent the victim two text messages expressing anger and hurt. The next day, after an encounter at a fundraiser, the defendant sent another text message threatening to punch the victim.The defendant was convicted of violating the threatening to commit a crime statute in the New Bedford Division of the District Court Department. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, but the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and found that the jury was not instructed to find that the defendant acted with the required mens rea, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Counterman v. Colorado. The Court held that the conviction violated the First Amendment because the jury was not instructed to find that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communication would be viewed as threatening violence. The Court also concluded that the threatening to commit a crime statute is not facially overbroad when construed to require proof of recklessness. The Court vacated the defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing the Commonwealth to retry the defendant with proper jury instructions. View "Commonwealth v. Cruz" on Justia Law

An undercover police officer, without a warrant, used his cell phone to make audio-visual recordings while purchasing drugs from the defendant. These recordings captured both the audio of their conversations and video footage of the defendant. The defendant was subsequently charged with multiple counts of drug distribution and moved to suppress the recordings, arguing they were unlawful interceptions under the wiretap act.The Superior Court judge partially granted the motion, suppressing the audio but allowing the video footage to be used as evidence if shown silently. Both parties sought interlocutory appeal. The Appeals Court ruled that both the audio and video components must be suppressed under the wiretap act. The Commonwealth then sought further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the wiretap act's suppression remedy extends to both the audio and video components of the recordings. The court reasoned that the video footage, even without audio, contains information about the identity of the parties and the existence of the communication, which falls under the statute's definition of "contents." Therefore, the entire recording must be suppressed to align with the legislative intent of protecting privacy and deterring unauthorized surveillance.The court affirmed the suppression of the audio and reversed the decision allowing the video footage, ordering that both components be suppressed. View "Commonwealth v. Du" on Justia Law

A clerk-magistrate decided to allow public access to show cause hearings for individuals accused of being clients of a prostitution ring but denied media requests for the underlying complaint applications before the hearings. The accused individuals, referred to as John Does, intervened to oppose the public access decision and sought to keep the hearings private. The media outlets filed a petition in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County to challenge the clerk-magistrate's decision to withhold the complaint applications.The single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to the clerk-magistrate for written findings on specific questions related to the public interest and privacy concerns. After reviewing the clerk-magistrate's responses, the single justice denied the petition, concluding that the clerk-magistrate did not commit an error of law or abuse her discretion in allowing public access to the hearings and denying access to the complaint applications.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the clerk-magistrate acted within her discretion. The court found that the public interest in transparency and accountability outweighed the privacy interests of the accused, especially given the significant public attention and the potential for favoritism if the hearings were held privately. The court also agreed that denying access to the complaint applications was appropriate to prevent the dissemination of potentially erroneous or extraneous information before the accused had an opportunity to respond at the hearings.The court further directed the Trial Court to provide notice to the accused when a request for public access to a show cause hearing is made and to offer the accused an opportunity to respond before deciding on the request. View "Trustees of Boston University v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Cambridge Division of the District Court Department" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of sexual offenses against two minor girls, Kathy and Denise, who lived with him at the time of the alleged abuse. Kathy testified that the defendant touched her inappropriately on multiple occasions, including an incident where he allegedly penetrated her. Denise testified that the defendant sexually abused her in various ways, including touching and penetrating her. The defendant sought to introduce evidence of Denise's prior allegations of sexual abuse by a third party, arguing that the similarities between those allegations and her allegations against him suggested fabrication.The Superior Court judge excluded evidence of Denise's prior allegations under the rape shield statute, which generally bars evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct. The judge also prohibited cross-examination on this topic, reasoning that the evidence did not fall within any exceptions to the statute and that the policy of protecting victims, especially children, favored exclusion. The jury convicted the defendant on several charges, but acquitted him on others. The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, and the defendant sought further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of Denise's prior allegations of sexual abuse. The court found that the rape shield statute did apply to the evidence in question but concluded that the exclusion violated the defendant's constitutional rights to confront witnesses and present a complete defense. The court determined that the similarities between Denise's allegations against the defendant and her prior allegations were significant enough to warrant cross-examination. The court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, emphasizing that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the centrality of Denise's testimony to the prosecution's case. View "Commonwealth v. Jacques" on Justia Law

F.A. has been involuntarily committed to state mental health facilities since 1999 after being found not guilty of a sexual offense due to mental illness. In 2020, a District Court judge renewed F.A.'s commitment and imposed a restriction confining F.A. to the buildings and grounds of the facility. F.A. challenged the constitutionality of this restriction.Previously, the Worcester Division of the District Court Department had renewed F.A.'s commitment annually and imposed similar restrictions since 2013. In 2020, F.A. opposed the Commonwealth's motion for the restriction, but the judge granted it after an evidentiary hearing. The judge did not require the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the restriction was necessary. In 2021, a different judge imposed the same restriction without an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division of the District Court affirmed the 2020 restriction but vacated the 2021 restriction due to the lack of a hearing. F.A. appealed the 2020 decision, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and found that the 2020 order violated F.A.'s substantive and procedural due process rights. The court held that a restriction under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (e) must be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest and be the least restrictive means available. The judge failed to make such findings and did not consider less restrictive alternatives. Additionally, the court found that the judge used an incorrect standard of proof and did not provide timely, specific findings to support the restriction. Consequently, the court vacated the 2020 order. View "In the Matter of F.A." on Justia Law