Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During a daytime traffic stop in Lawrence, Massachusetts, a police officer encountered a sixteen-year-old juvenile who had been reported missing by the Department of Children and Families. The juvenile was seated in a vehicle with an infant and three adults, one of whom was known by the officer to be affiliated with a street gang. The officer ordered the juvenile out of the car without asking any questions and immediately conducted a patfrisk, discovering a handgun on the juvenile’s person. The juvenile was subsequently charged with multiple firearms offenses and indicted as a youthful offender on one count.The Essex County Juvenile Court reviewed the juvenile’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the exit order and patfrisk, arguing violation of constitutional rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the judge granted the motion to suppress, finding the officer's actions unjustified under the circumstances. The Commonwealth sought interlocutory review, and a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk allowed the appeal. The Appeals Court reversed the suppression order, concluding the officer’s actions were reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Judicial Court then granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the officer’s exit order was justified under the community caretaking doctrine, as the officer was acting to ensure the safety and well-being of a missing juvenile. However, due to inconsistencies in the Juvenile Court judge’s findings regarding the credibility of the officer’s testimony about key facts supporting the patfrisk, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the suppression order. The case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for clarification of factual findings and reconsideration of the legal conclusions in light of those findings and the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Demos D." on Justia Law

The defendant killed his former high school girlfriend by strangling and cutting her throat after their relationship ended. In the months leading up to the crime, he exhibited signs of emotional distress and had several altercations with the victim and others. On the day of the killing, he took calculated steps to conceal his involvement, including moving the victim’s body, cleaning evidence, and misleading police about their interactions. During trial, the defendant admitted to the killing but argued he was not criminally responsible due to mental illness, presenting expert testimony regarding his psychological state.In the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, along with assault and battery charges. He was sentenced to life without parole. After his conviction, he filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from searches of his home and vehicle, arguing lack of probable cause, which the court denied. Later, he moved for a new trial, citing newly discovered evidence of developing schizophrenia after the crime. After an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding the new evidence did not cast real doubt on the justice of the conviction.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the consolidated appeals from the convictions and denial of the new trial motion. The court held that the lower court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the new trial or in its evidentiary rulings. It also found the denial of the suppression motion proper, concluding the warrants were supported by probable cause. The court affirmed all convictions and the denial of the new trial motion. However, it held that the sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional for defendants under twenty-one and remanded for resentencing to life with parole eligibility after fifteen years. View "Commonwealth v. Fujita" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty in 2012 to multiple sex offenses involving his minor children. He was sentenced to ten years in state prison followed by ten years of probation, with mandatory global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of probation under Massachusetts law. The statute required GPS monitoring for the entirety of his probation, but at the time of sentencing, no specific exclusion zones were established. After serving his prison sentence and two years of probation with GPS monitoring, the defendant sought relief from the GPS monitoring condition, arguing that it was unreasonable and unconstitutional, particularly due to its ten-year duration.After the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Feliz, which required individualized judicial findings regarding the reasonableness of GPS monitoring as a probation condition, the defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court for such an individualized assessment. The Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had shown continued GPS monitoring was reasonable, based in part on the defendant’s classification as a level three sex offender and the victims’ statements about ongoing harm. However, the judge did not make findings regarding the reasonableness of the specific ten-year duration of GPS monitoring.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. The Court held that a judge must consider the duration of GPS monitoring in evaluating its reasonableness under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The holding clarified that a judge may only impose GPS monitoring for a duration found to be reasonable, even if that period is less than the statutory term of probation. Because the Superior Court judge did not evaluate the ten-year duration, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the defendant’s motion and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Benjamin Tariri was charged with multiple counts of embezzlement and larceny, allegedly misappropriating nearly $2 million from clients while working as an attorney. He was arrested at Logan International Airport attempting to board a one-way flight to Iran, where he had recently spent six months. Tariri had longstanding ties to the United States but also significant connections to Iran. After his arraignment in the Boston Municipal Court, he was released on cash bail and required to submit to GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone restricting his movements to certain areas, primarily to mitigate his risk of flight.Following indictment and arraignment in the Superior Court, the bail and GPS conditions were maintained, with the inclusion zone expanded to cover additional areas. Tariri moved to modify or vacate the GPS condition, arguing that it hindered his ability to work and prevented him from visiting his wife and child in East Boston. The motion judge expanded the inclusion zone to address employment concerns but otherwise denied further relief. Tariri then filed a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court, which a single justice denied, finding no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s order.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the single justice’s denial for clear error of law or abuse of discretion. The court held that GPS monitoring with an inclusion zone, imposed as a condition of pretrial release, was a reasonable and constitutional search under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, given the particularized risk of flight and the legitimate governmental interest in ensuring Tariri’s appearance in court. The judgment of the single justice was affirmed. View "Tariri v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with twenty-one felony counts stemming from a fifteen-minute crime spree in February 2019, during which he attempted to break into homes, engaged in a physical altercation, stopped vehicles at gunpoint, and was ultimately apprehended by police. He was arraigned in May 2019 and held on high bail. Over the next several years, the case was delayed by issues including the Commonwealth’s slow production of mandatory discovery, changes in defense counsel, and the defendant’s own motions and requests. The COVID-19 pandemic led to statewide orders suspending jury trials for extended periods, further delaying proceedings.The case was heard in the Hampden Superior Court, where the defendant filed multiple motions to dismiss, arguing that the delay violated both the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure (rule 36) and his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Superior Court judge excluded various periods from the speedy trial calculation, including time attributable to COVID-19 orders, delays caused by defense motions, and periods when the defendant changed counsel or requested continuances. The defendant was ultimately convicted on most counts after a bench trial, and he appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that delays resulting from its COVID-19 orders do not weigh against the Commonwealth in evaluating constitutional speedy trial claims. The Court further found that, after excluding periods attributable to the pandemic, defense motions, and other justified delays, the remaining delay did not violate rule 36 or the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment or Article 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Larace" on Justia Law

A member of the Lowell police department’s gang unit created an undercover Snapchat account using a “nonwhite” username and bitmoji, aiming to monitor gang activity by befriending users connected to other officers’ undercover accounts. The officer became “friends” with a user believed to be the defendant, though he did not know the user’s identity or race at the time. The defendant posted a video of himself discharging a firearm from a car, which led police to identify and locate him. A search of the defendant’s vehicle uncovered a firearm matching the one in the video and shell casings consistent with those found at the scene. The defendant did not possess a license to carry a firearm.The Lowell Division of the District Court Department charged the defendant with multiple firearms offenses. The defendant sought discovery on a selective enforcement claim, and the court ordered the production of relevant police records and policies. The records showed that all suspects charged from Snapchat investigations with identifiable race were nonwhite. The defendant moved to suppress evidence, arguing racial motivation in the investigation, but a District Court judge denied the motion, finding no reasonable inference of racial motivation. The defendant also moved to dismiss the firearms charges, claiming the resident firearm licensing scheme violated the Second Amendment. Another District Court judge denied this motion, finding the problematic provision severable. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving his right to appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the defendant had raised a reasonable inference of selective enforcement under the Commonwealth v. Long framework and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, requiring the Commonwealth to rebut the inference with a race-neutral reason. The court also held that the Commonwealth’s resident firearm licensing scheme was not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a lawyer, was accused of delivering sixty-one orange strips containing Suboxone, a controlled substance, to an inmate at a county house of correction. The delivery was disguised as legal paperwork following instructions from another inmate. The strips were confiscated by officers who suspected they were Suboxone. Forensic testing was performed by analyst Dunlap, who concluded the strips contained Suboxone. Dunlap documented her procedures and results in her notes, but was no longer employed at the crime lab at the time of trial. Instead, LaBelle, a supervisor who had not participated in or observed the testing, reviewed Dunlap’s work and testified as a substitute expert, relaying Dunlap’s notes and offering her own opinion based on the case file.A jury in the Massachusetts Superior Court found the defendant guilty of unlawfully delivering a class B controlled substance to a prisoner. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that LaBelle’s opinion was independent. After the United States Supreme Court decided Smith v. Arizona, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Appeals Court’s judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Smith. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then transferred the case for review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the admission of LaBelle’s testimony violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Court found that LaBelle’s opinion was not independent, as it depended on the truth of Dunlap’s testimonial hearsay statements regarding the procedures and results of the testing. The Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and vacated the conviction, remanding for a new trial. The Court also held that its new rule applies prospectively to cases not yet final. View "Commonwealth v. Gordon" on Justia Law

An individual pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses committed against two girls, aged thirteen and fourteen, when he was eighteen years old. The offenses included several instances of rape and indecent assault. The individual had a history of psychological diagnoses, including autism spectrum disorder. After his conviction, the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) initially classified him as a level three sex offender, which would require the highest level of public notification. The individual challenged this classification, leading to a de novo hearing before a SORB hearing examiner.At the hearing, the examiner found by clear and convincing evidence that the individual posed a moderate risk of reoffense and a moderate degree of danger, resulting in a reclassification to level two. The examiner considered several statutory and regulatory factors, including the number of victims, the nature and location of the offenses, and the individual’s psychological profile. The examiner also considered the fact that the individual committed multiple offenses, including repeated offenses against one victim, as relevant to the degree of dangerousness. The examiner determined that Internet publication of the individual’s registration information would serve a public safety interest. The individual sought judicial review in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which affirmed the SORB’s decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the SORB hearing examiner did not err in considering the individual’s multiple offenses as relevant to dangerousness under regulatory factor thirty-seven, even though such consideration is limited under factor two, which addresses risk of reoffense. The court also declined to find the application of factor thirty-seven unconstitutional due to a lack of empirical evidence, given the statutory mandate to consider the number of offenses. The court affirmed the classification as a level two offender and the requirement for Internet dissemination of registration information. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

A former Massachusetts State Police trooper retired in March 2018 after a 21-year career. While assigned to overtime patrol programs funded by federal grants, he falsely reported working over 700 overtime hours in 2015 and 2016, receiving more than $50,000 in unearned pay. He attempted to conceal his conduct by submitting falsified motor vehicle citations. In July 2018, he pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of embezzlement from an agency receiving federal funds, was sentenced to three months in prison, one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution.Following his conviction, the State Board of Retirement suspended his pension and held a hearing. The hearing officer recommended, and the board adopted, a finding that under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), the plaintiff and his beneficiaries were not entitled to any retirement benefits due to his conviction for an offense involving violation of laws applicable to his office. The board ordered the return of his accumulated contributions, less certain deductions. The plaintiff sought judicial review in the Massachusetts District Court, raising constitutional challenges under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, arguing the forfeiture was an excessive fine and cruel or unusual punishment. The District Court judge entered judgment for the retirement board.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the pension forfeiture constituted a fine under Article 26 but was not excessive, adopting the United States Supreme Court’s multifactor analysis for excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that, even assuming Article 26’s cruel or unusual punishment provision applied to fines, the forfeiture was not cruel or unusual. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment and the retirement board’s decision. View "Raftery v. State Board of Retirement" on Justia Law

In 2020, a police officer applied for a criminal complaint in the District Court, alleging that the defendant possessed a loaded firearm while intoxicated. A clerk-magistrate denied the application, finding no probable cause that the defendant had a firearm under his control inside a motor vehicle. No review of this decision was sought. Over two years later, the same officer filed a new application for the same offense with the same facts, and a different clerk-magistrate found probable cause and issued the complaint.The defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the issuance of the complaint was barred by collateral estoppel and that the delay violated his due process rights. A single justice of the county court reserved and reported the petition to the full court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the principles of collateral estoppel did not bar the issuance of the complaint because the initial denial was not a final judgment. The court noted that a District Court determination of no probable cause is not conclusive and does not bar a subsequent indictment for the same offense. The court also found no due process violation, as the defendant did not have a constitutionally protected interest in the finality of a show cause determination, and the delay did not cause severe prejudice to the defendant's ability to mount a defense. The court remanded the case to the county court for entry of a judgment denying the defendant's petition for extraordinary relief. View "Cabrera v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law