Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Eugene McCain filed an initiative petition that sought to amend Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K to authorize the Gaming Commission to award one additional license for a slot machine parlor. The Attorney General certified the petition. Plaintiffs, ten registered voters and residents of Suffolk County, brought an action against the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth, contending that the petition violated tw restrictions set forth in Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, which sets forth certain standards for initiative petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding that the petition did not violate Article 48’s restrictions and was therefore properly certified by the Attorney General. View "Bogertman v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and abuse of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age. The Appeals Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor made an improper closing argument that created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s argument. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the cumulative effect of various improper statements in the prosecutor’s argument created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Dirgo" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was pursued and stopped for traveling at a "speed greater than is reasonable," G. L. c. 90, 17.1 While the vehicle was still in motion, the defendant got out, looked uncertainly toward the officers, and grabbed the side of his waist area. The officers gave chase. When the defendant was apprehended, he was carrying a firearm. Before defendant’s trial for firearms offenses, a Boston judge allowed his motion to suppress the evidence. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Although operating at a "speed greater than is reasonable" provides a basis for a valid stop, an officer's suspicion that a violation has occurred must be supported by articulable facts sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person in the officer's position in forming that conclusion. The testifying officer provided nothing on the subject of speed beyond his conclusion that it was greater than reasonable. He did not estimate the vehicle's speed; compare its speed to other vehicles; provide any measurement from a radar gun or other device; or testify that the vehicle was traveling faster than the posted speed limit. Nor was there evidence regarding traffic on the road, its use at the time by pedestrians or others, or other safety considerations. The Commonwealth failed to prove that the stop was lawful. View "Commonwealth v. Teixeira-Furtado" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried for first degree murder, home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated assault and battery (by means of a dangerous weapon), carrying an unlicensed firearm and trafficking in cocaine. The jury deadlocked on nine of the charges and found defendant not guilty on the tenth (cocaine). The trial judge declared a mistrial. Defendant was retried, and in the middle of jury deliberations in the second trial, an issue regarding a juror's compliance with the judge's instruction not to consult outside research came up. After an inquiry, the judge dismissed one juror and found that the others were not affected by exposure to the extraneous information. The jury continued to deliberate, and a week later found defendant guilty on four indictments charging first-degree murder, home invasion and armed robbery. The issues raised before the Supreme Court in this case centered on five questions reported by a Superior Court judge to the Appeals Court concerning the effect of an amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1428 (2015) (rule 3.5 [c]), regarding an attorney's ability to communicate, postverdict, with jurors who deliberated on, or were discharged from, the attorney's client's case. The Supreme Court held that Rule 3.5 (c) generally applied to attorneys in their representation of litigants in trials on and after July 1, 2015, but an attorney representing a party in a case that was tried to a jury and concluded before that date may contact jurors on that case pursuant to rule 3.5 (c) if the case was pending on appeal as of July 1, 2015, or the appeal period had not run as of that date. "If an attorney is entitled to initiate contact with jurors who were discharged prior to July 1, 2015, because the case at issue is pending on appeal or the appeal period has not yet run, the attorney is treated the same as an attorney contacting jurors discharged after July 1, 2015; the attorney is not required to seek prior court approval, but is required to adhere to the notice requirements set out in this opinion." View "Massachusetts v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant's six-month-old daughter, Jahanna, was rushed to the emergency room, unconscious and unresponsive. She was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. Brain scans showed retinal hemorrhages, subdural hematoma, and brain swelling, symptoms called "the triad" associated with shaken baby syndrome. Defendant, Jahanna's sole caretaker when she became unconscious, claimed that Jahanna accidentally fell from the couch where she was sitting and landed on the wooden floor. After Jahanna's physicians concluded that her injuries could not have been caused by an accidental fall from the couch, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a child causing substantial bodily injury (head injury), G. L. c. 265, 13J(b), and assault and battery on a child causing bodily injury (fractured vertebrae), G. L. c. 265, 13J(a), but was found not guilty on allegations concerning a fractured tibia and fractured ribs. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, noting the debate surrounding shaken baby syndrome and that the defense attorney did not retain a medical expert to offer opinion testimony or to assist him in cross-examining the Commonwealth's medical experts. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because, by not providing the jury with the other side of the debate, his attorney "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." View "Commonwealth v. Millien" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants Branden Mattier and Domunique Grice were convicted on indictments charging one count each of conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted larceny. Mattier was also convicted on an indictment charging one count of identity fraud. The convictions arose from Defendants’ attempt to defraud The One Fund Boston by claiming that a long-deceased aunt had been injured in the 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Mattier’s identity fraud conviction failed as a matter of law, but Defendants’ remaining convictions were based on sufficient legally obtained evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of Mattier’s warrantless arrest for the identity fraud and attempted larceny charges; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to strike for cause jurors who donated to One Fund; and (4) the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments did not require reversal. View "Commonwealth v. Mattier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on thirty indictments, ten each charging armed robbery while masked, home invasion, and kidnapping. The Appeals Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding eyewitness identification in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriguez. Defendant, however, neither requested the instruction nor objected to its admission. In the alternative, Defendant claimed that counsel’s failure to request a Rodriguez instruction was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) in the absence of a request, Defendant may not attribute the omission of a Rodriguez eyewitness identification instruction to judicial error and, consequently, Defendant was not entitled to review on that ground; and (2) counsel’s failure to request a Rodriguez instruction in this case was error, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Navarro" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in fourteen grams or more of cocaine. Defendant sought further review, arguing that the search of his genital area during a patfrisk for weapons was an unlawful strip search, and therefore, the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that the search met the criteria for a strip search and did not satisfy the probable cause requirement articulated in Commonwealth v. Morales. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Amado" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, based on the predicate felony of aggravated rape, and aggravated rape. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction of murder of the first degree and ordered dismissal of the aggravated rape conviction as duplicative, holding (1) there was no error in the denial of Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress two statements Defendant made to police; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony from the victim’s daughter; (4) there was no error in the admission into evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts; (5) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to reduce the verdicts; and (7) the conviction on the indictment alleging aggravated rape is duplicative of the conviction of felony-murder and must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Mazariego" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, based on the predicate felony of aggravated rape, and aggravated rape. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction of murder of the first degree and ordered dismissal of the aggravated rape conviction as duplicative, holding (1) there was no error in the denial of Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress two statements Defendant made to police; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony from the victim’s daughter; (4) there was no error in the admission into evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts; (5) the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments; (6) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to reduce the verdicts; and (7) the conviction on the indictment alleging aggravated rape is duplicative of the conviction of felony-murder and must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Mazariego" on Justia Law