Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of rape of a child by force and of assault with intent to rape a second child. The Appeals Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of evidence relating to a prior acquittal deprived him of his right to a fair trial and due process. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) there was no error in the admission of the evidence on relevancy grounds; but (2) the collateral estoppel protections necessarily embraced by article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights warranted the exclusion of the acquittal evidence under the circumstances of this case. View "Commonwealth v. Dorazio" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was an ordinance imposing restrictions on the right of sex offenders to reside in the City of Lynn. Plaintiffs, a class of sex offenders subject to the ordinance, challenged the ordinance's constitutionality. A superior court judge invalidated the ordinance under the Home Rule Amendment. Specifically, the judge determined that the ordinance was inconsistent with the Sex Offender Registry Law and the law providing for the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of sexually dangerous persons. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance was inconsistent with the comprehensive statutory scheme governing the oversight of convicted sex offenders and, therefore, was inconsistent and invalid under the home rule provisions. View "Doe v. City of Lynn" on Justia Law

Defendants were indicted on charges of unarmed robbery and assault and battery. Defendants both committed the offenses prior to their eighteenth birthdays. The Governor subsequently signed an “Act expanding juvenile jurisdiction” that extended the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to children who are seventeen years of age at the time of committing an offense. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the Act should be applied retroactively to seventeen-year-old defendants who had criminal charges pending against them as of the Act’s effective date and that a failure to apply the Act retroactively as to such defendants would violate their equal protection rights. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Act does not apply retroactively to a defendant who commits an offense prior to his eighteenth birthday for which a criminal proceeding commenced prior to the effective date of the Act; and (2) prospective application of the Act does not violate the equal protection guarantees provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by article 106 of the Amendments. View "Commonwealth v. Freeman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes based on three incidents that occurred in October 2010 when Defendant accosted three different teenage victims as they walked to school. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress statements that he made to police during a videotaped interview. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the statements at issue were erroneously admitted at trial because the police engaged in impermissibly coercive tactics that rendered Defendant’s statements involuntary under the circumstances of the interrogation, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Monroe" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his cell site location information (CSLI) relating to his cellular telephone. The Commonwealth had obtained Defendant’s CSLI for a fourteen-day period beginning August 24, 2004 pursuant to the Federal Stored Communications Act under an order of the superior court judge. The superior court allowed the motion to suppress, concluding that obtaining Defendant’s CLSI constituted a search. In Augustine I, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that search a search would be permissible only upon a showing of probable cause. The Court vacated the allowance of the motion to suppress and remanded for consideration of whether the affidavit that the Commonwealth had submitted in support of the order demonstrated probable cause. On remand, the superior court again allowed Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, ruling that the affidavit did not meet the probable cause standard required under Augustine I. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth demonstrated probable cause for obtaining Defendant’s CSLI records for the period from August 24 to August 26, 2004. View "Commonwealth v. Augustine" on Justia Law

Boston police officers stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction. The officers ordered the two rear seat passengers to get out of the vehicle and pat frisked each for weapons. Defendant, the front seat passenger, got out of the vehicle and was ordered to return to his seat. When he did so, he moved the gear shift to the “drive” position. Defendant and the driver were then ordered from the vehicle, and Defendant was pat frisked. Finding no weapon, the officers conducted a protective sweep of the vehicle and discovered a loaded firearm under the front passenger seat. Defendant was charged with unlicensed possession of a firearm and related offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. A superior court judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order allowing the motions to suppress, holding that, even if the pat frisks of the rear seat passengers were invalid, sufficient evidence supported the officers’ suspicion that Douglas might be armed and dangerous and that a limited protective sweep of the vehicle was necessary for officer safety. View "Commonwealth v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Defendant fled when two Boston police officers attempted to stop and question him. When the officers apprehended Defendant, a handgun containing ammunition fell from his pants. Defendant was charged with multiple firearms offenses and resisting arrest. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the encounter. A municipal court judge allowed the motion to suppress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion judge’s finding regarding the moment Defendant was seized was not erroneous; (2) the judge’s finding that the facts of this case did not support a conclusion of reasonable suspicion was not clearly erroneous; and (3) the Court was not permitted to make additional findings, and reach a different result, based on its own view of the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants - Tyshaun McGhee and Sidney McGhee - were convicted of three counts of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 50 (the statute), and related charges. Defendants appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts sex trafficking statute. The Supreme Judicial Court largely affirmed, holding (1) the statute is sufficiently clear and definite and thus did not violate Defendants’ rights to due process; (2) the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (3) the phrase “commercial sexual activity” as used in the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (4) the judge did not err in allowing the substantive admission of grand jury testimony from one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses; (5) the judge did not violate Defendants’ right to confrontation by hindering their cross-examination of a certain witness regarding criminal charges pending against her and her history of prostitution; and (6) Tyshaun’s sentences for two counts of deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute were illegal. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. McGhee" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 56, 42, which criminalizes certain false statements about political candidates or questions submitted to voters, after her political action committee published brochures criticizing a candidate for public office. Defendant filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from the criminal complaint on the ground that section 42 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the requested relief, holding (1) section 42 is inconsistent with the fundamental right of free speech enshrined in article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and is, therefore, invalid; and (2) accordingly, the criminal complaint charging Defendant with violating section 42 must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Lucas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and the orders denying his motion for a new trial and discerned no basis to exercise its authority pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) Defendant waived his right to a public trial where his trial counsel was aware that the courtroom was closed to spectators during the jury empanelment process and did not object to the partial closure; (2) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on extreme atrocity or cruelty based on second and third prong malice; and (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s strategic decision to forgo a defense of lack of criminal responsibility. View "Commonwealth v. Lang" on Justia Law