Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Commonwealth’s theory at trial was that Defendant, who was in the midst of a contentious divorce from the victim, had engaged in a murder-for-hire scheme with Steven Stewart, who stabbed the victim, and their mutual friend, Richard Grebauski, the alleged middleman. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting a number of out-of-court statements introduced through Stewart’s testimony under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Defendant said he wanted his son killed and admitting testimony concerning a lumber theft by Stewart and Grebauski, but the errors did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the trial judge erred in deciding not to admit testimony concerning purportedly exculpatory statements made by Grebauski, but the error did not result in prejudice to Defendant; and (4) there was no prejudicial error in certain remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Carriere" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Carolyn Faulk and Stanley Howard, commenced an action against Faulk’s former employer, CVS Caremark Corporation, and two of her former supervisors (collectively, Respondents), alleging that Respondents wrongfully terminated Faulk’s employment and discriminated against her on the basis of age and gender. The complaint further alleged that Howard had provided financial support to Faulk after her employment was terminated and that Howard sought damages from CVS on that basis. The trial court dismissed Howard’s claims for lack of standing and ultimately dismissed the entire complaint. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 challenging the trial court’s denial of Faulk’s request for counsel and the dismissal of Howard’s claims. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ claim regarding Faulk’s request for the appointed of counsel was moot; and (2) Howard had an adequate alternative remedy to challenge the dismissal of his claims by way of direct appeal. View "Faulk v. CVS Caremark Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, kidnapping, and related crimes. In his third motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a court room closure during jury empanelment. The motion judge denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant sought reconsideration of the denial of his motion, arguing that prejudice under the second prong of the standard regarding ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Commonwealth v. Saferian must be presumed due to the structural nature of the right to a public trial. The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that where a defendant has procedurally waived a Sixth Amendment public trial claim by not raising it at trial and later raises the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on his conviction, the defendant is required to show prejudice from trial counsel’s deficient performance, and the presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply to a preserved claim of structural error does not apply. View "Commonwealth v. LaChance" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for a required finding of not guilty because the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant was at the scene of the crime during the period when the victim was robbed and killed; (2) the trial judge did not err in allowing the admission of expert testimony concerning the potential absence of blood on the victim’s killer; and (3) an error in the prosecutor’s closing argument did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Evans" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made during two police interviews and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and declined to exercise its power to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as Defendant’s statements were made voluntarily and after an effective waiver of Defendant’s Miranda rights, and there was no evidence the police coerced Defendant; and (2) counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim in Defendant’s motion for a new trial that Defendant’s right to prompt arraignment had been violated. View "Commonwealth v. Vincent" on Justia Law

Mark Sheehan, a nonimmunized witness in a criminal trial, refused to answer questions posed by the prosecutor concerning his use of illegal drugs by invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ruled that the invocation of the privilege was not valid because Sheehan had not shown that the Commonwealth had the intention of pursuing such a prosecution. The judge then found Sheehan in summary criminal contempt and imposed a sentence of ninety days’ incarceration. Sheehan intervened in the criminal proceeding and appealed the judgment of contempt. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of contempt, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Sheehan validly invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, and Sheehan’s compelled responses to such questioning did not constitute a waiver of the privilege. View "Commonwealth v. LeClair" on Justia Law

Steven Glovsky sought to solicit signatures for his nomination to the second district seat on the Governor’s Council on the sidewalk immediately outside the entrance to a supermarket owned by Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. Despite believing he had a right under article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to solicit signatures on the property, Glovsky left the property after a store manager informed him Roche Bros. prohibited this activity. Glovsky filed suit, requesting relief under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for a violation of his rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” The superior court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the portion of the judgment dismissing Glovsky’s request for declaratory relief under article 9 and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding (1) Glovsky adequately alleged a right to solicit nominating signatures outside the supermarket, but (2) Roche Bros. did not violate this right by threats, intimidation or coercion. Remanded for entry of a judgment dismissing the request for declaratory relief as moot. View "Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, asserting several allegations of error. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting portions of Defendant’s statement to the police, as police officers intruded into Defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent after Defendant exercised his right to cut off police questioning; (2) the prosecutor impermissibly used portions of Defendant’s postinvocation statement in his closing argument, and the prosecutor’s extensive use of propensity-based argument in his closing was improper; (3) the judge erred in instructing the jury on mental impairment; and (4) pursuant to the Court’s review of the entire case under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, the erroneous admission of Defendant’s postinvocation statement, combined with the other errors, required reversal. View "Commonwealth v. Howard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery and assault and battery. On appeal, Defendant challenged the trial court’s admission of expert opinion that the DNA profile generated from a known saliva sample of Defendant matched a DNA profile obtained from a swab taken from eyeglasses that were left at the scene of the robbery. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) an expert opinion regarding the results of DNA testing is not admissible unless the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the reliability of the underlying data produced by the DNA testing; and (2) in this case, the analysts who generated the DNA profiles did not testify at trial, and the expert witness who offered the opinion of a match had no affiliation with the laboratory that tested the crime scene sample, and therefore, Defendant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity for such cross-examination. Remanded for a new trial.View "Commonwealth v. Tassone " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were granted relief an action filed against Marion Haddad and the Holy Annunciation Monastery Church of the Golden Hills. Plaintiffs sought to satisfy the judgment, which represented the proceeds from a sale of property. The court ordered Holy Annunciation and Haddad to hold the proceeds of the sale in escrow, but Haddad deposited $40,000 of the proceeds in her retirement account with the State Board of Retirement. When Plaintiffs received no payment for the judgment, they brought this case in part to name the Board as trustee for the $40,000. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Haddad’s retirement account was exempt from attachment and that the Commonwealth was immune from suit. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Haddad did not have rights in the $40,000 she deposited with the Board, and therefore, those funds were not statutorily prohibited from being subject to attachment; and (2) the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiffs from summoning the Board as trustee with respect to those funds.View "Randall v. Haddad" on Justia Law