Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was a telephone call recorded by the police between Defendant and a cooperating witness where the cooperating witness was instructed by law enforcement to elicit information regarding a “designated offense” but instead elicited information about an unrelated crime that was not a designated offense. The Commonwealth did not seek a warrant under the Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute, which requires the Commonwealth to obtain a warrant before it may conduct an “interception,” unless the communication is recorded “in the course of an investigation of a designated offense.” After the telephone call was recorded, Defendant was indicted for murder and several other offenses. A superior court judge suppressed the conversation, concluding that the recording was not made in the course of an investigation of a designated offense. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that where a law enforcement officer, acting in good faith, instructs a cooperating witness to attempt to elicit information regarding a designated offense, regardless of whether the cooperating witness actually follows the officer’s instructions, the recorded conversation is not an interception and therefore does not require a warrant under the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements made to the police, as the statements were made voluntarily; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions for required findings of not guilty, as the evidence presented at trial supported the conviction; (3) the admission of expert rebuttal testimony was proper and did not violate Defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct during closing arguments. View "Commonwealth v. Harris" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were amendments to the Sex Offender Registry Law that the Governor signed into law on July 12, 2013, including amendments that would require the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) to publish on the Internet information contained in the sex offender registry regarding individuals given a level two or three classification. On July 5, 2013, Plaintiffs, as putative representatives of a class of persons presently and prospectively classified as level two sex offenders, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking an injunction barring SORB from publishing registry information on the Internet of the class of level two offenders. The Supreme Judicial Court declared unconstitutional the retroactive application of the amendments to the extent they would require the Internet publication of the registry information of individuals who were finally classified as level two sex offenders on or before July 12, 2013 but noted that SORB was allowed to publish on the Internet the registry information of any individual who was given a final classification as a level two sex offender after July 12, 2013. View "Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the town of Hanover, filed suit against Defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, alleging that Defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings by maintaining the litigation, providing legal counsel, and controlling the plaintiffs’ interests, despite not being named a plaintiff in the suit. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the “anti-SLAPP” statute, asserting that the town’s claims against it were solely based on Defendant’s constitutionally protected right to petition. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that Defendant did not have standing to bring its motion under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant showed that the suit against it was based on protected petitioning activity; (2) the town did not meet its burden of showing that Defendant’s exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s special motion to dismiss should be allowed. View "Town of Hanover v. New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

After a probation revocation hearing, a district court judge found that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation and revoked Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the judge made no separate finding as to good cause for proceeding without a witness with personal knowledge of the evidence presented, as required by Rule 6(b) of the District Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing comported with due process because the hearsay testimony on which the judge relied was substantially reliable and trustworthy; (2) Rule 6(b) of the District Court Rules of Probation Violation Proceedings is not to be construed as requiring more than is constitutionally mandated, and due process does not require, when the hearsay is substantially reliable, separate proof as to good cause; and (3) there was no improper interference by the office of the district attorney with the probation department’s conduct of the hearing that would give rise to a violation of article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Bukin" on Justia Law

Defendant, his brother, his sister-in-law, and his cousin worked together in a tiling business in Oklahoma. All four individuals were hired to install tile in a fast-food restaurant under construction in Clinton. While working on the job, Defendant stabbed and killed the general manager with no apparent provocation or motive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statements Defendant made to the police; (2) the joinder of the firearms charges with the murder charge for trial did not prejudice Defendant; (3) the admission of certain hearsay evidence at trial did not prejudice Defendant; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s first motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing; and (5) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of lack of criminal responsibility based on evidence that Defendant may have been suffering from a spontaneous recurrence of methamphetamine-induced psychosis at the time of the stabbing. View "Commonwealth v. Spray" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress identification evidence and affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the trial judge did not err in (1) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as the police had good reason to conduct a showup identification procedure, and Defendant did not meet his burden of showing that he was subjected to a showup identification procedure that was unnecessarily suggestive; (2) admitting into evidence surveillance videotape recordings; (3) limiting cross-examination of a witness on the issue of bias; (4) deciding not to discharge a juror; and (5) instructing the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Meas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial judge (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) did not deny Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by denying Defendant’s motion for a change of venue; (3) did not err in denying the admission of certain “third-party culprit” evidence and Defendant’s request for a third-party culprit instruction at trial; and (4) did not abuse his discretion in excluding expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false confessions. View "Commonwealth v. Hoose" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, with armed robbery as the predicate felony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction of murder in the first degree, holding (1) any error by the superior court in denying Defendant’s motions to suppress statements made to police as well as certain physical evidence gathered as a result of those statements was harmless; (2) the trial judge properly precluded Defendant from cross-examining a key Commonwealth witness as to prior false accusations she had made; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of armed robbery, the predicate offense for his conviction of murder in the first degree; and (4) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Martin" on Justia Law

After Defendant was indicted on murder charges, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of cell site location information (CSLI) associated with the cellular phone he was using because the CSLI was obtained without a valid search warrant based on probable cause. The superior court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant’s rights under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights were violated because, although the Commonwealth had obtained the CSLI from Defendant’s cellular servicer provider pursuant to a valid court order under the Federal Stored Communications Act (SCA), the Commonwealth’s access to the CSLI constituted a search within the meaning of article 14. The Supreme Court agreed with the motion judge, holding that although the CSLI in this case was a business record of Defendant’s cellular servicer provider, Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and, under the circumstances, the warrant requirement of article 14 applied. Remanded to allow the Commonwealth to present evidence that the affidavit in support of its application for an order under the SCA demonstrated probable cause for the CSLI records. View "Commonwealth v. Augustine " on Justia Law