Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff bank (Bank) claimed to be the holder of a mortgage given by Defendant. Bank filed a complaint in equity in the land court under the Massachusetts Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to determine if Defendant was entitled to foreclosure protections under the Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). Defendant conceded she was not entitled to protection under the SCRA but moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Bank lacked standing to bring a servicemember proceeding because it was not the clear holder of her note or mortgage. The land court denied Defendant's motion, determining that Bank had standing based on its right to purchase Defendant's mortgage. The court then authorized Bank to make an entry and to sell the property covered by the mortgage. The Supreme Court vacated the land court's judgment, holding (1) because Defendant was not entitled to appear or be heard at the servicemember proceeding, the land court should not have accepted or entertained Defendant's filings; (2) only mortgagees or those acting on behalf of mortgagees having standing to bring servicemember proceedings; and (3) in the present case, the judge used the incorrect standard in making the determination that Bank had standing. Remanded. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged initially by complaint with murder. After Defendant was arraigned, the judge scheduled a probable cause hearing. However, due to several continuances requested by the prosecutor, the probable cause hearing was not held before the grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with murder in the first degree. Before the indictment was returned, Defendant filed a petition seeking an order that a probable cause hearing be conducted. A single justice denied the requested relief. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal as moot, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 38 is applicable to a defendant who is initially charged by complaint with murder in the first degree and provides the defendant with the right to a probable cause hearing as soon as practicable in the circumstances; (2) the Commonwealth need not conduct the probable cause hearing within a definite time frame, but the Commonwealth must demonstrate good cause to justify any request by the Commonwealth to continue it; and (3) in the instant case, the single justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the relief sought by Defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Perkins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant and a codefendant were each convicted of assault and battery. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the court denied the motion, finding that counsel's performance did not prejudice Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the loss of exculpatory evidence; (3) instructing the jury on multiple defendants; and (4) denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Marinho" on Justia Law

In 2003, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. In 2007, in light of a decision by a Federal court, Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that his right to a public trial was violated when court officers excluded his family from the courtroom during jury selection and his counsel failed to object. After a hearing, the judge determined (1) the exclusion of Defendant's family constituted structural error but that there was no miscarriage of justice because closing the court did not materially impact the case or verdict; and (2) defense counsel's failure to object to the closure was a reasonable tactical decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the judge did not err in finding that defense counsel's tactical decision not to object to the courtroom closure was not manifestly unreasonable when made, and thus, Defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Lavoie" on Justia Law

Following a joint trial, a jury found Defendants, Terrence Brown and Nathan Rivera, guilty of murder in the first degree, armed assault in a dwelling, home invasion, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Rivera was additionally found guilty of armed assault with intent to murder. On appeal, both Defendants principally argued the admission of a statement Brown made to police was prejudicial error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brown's statement to police admitting his involvement in the home invasion was not obtained in violation of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and Commonwealth v. Mavredakis; and (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting a redacted version of Brown's statement and denying Rivera's motions to sever the trials on this basis; and (3) the admission of Brown's redacted statement did not violate Brown's right to a fair trial by impairing his ability to present a defense of withdrawal. View "Commonwealth v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with home invasion and other offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress an audio recording allegedly made by a key witness in violation of state and federal wiretap laws. The witness was receiving witness protection services from the Commonwealth. Defendant then moved for issuance of a summons to secure the witness's attendance at the suppression hearing. A superior court judge ordered that the Commonwealth file the witness's address with the court under seal so that a summons could be served in time for the suppression hearing. The Commonwealth sought relief from this order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, the judge was within his discretion to order this limited disclosure. View "Commonwealth v. Platt" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for armed assault with intent to murder and other offenses. Defendant filed a motion seeking information as to the alleged victim's status as a police informant. Defendant argued that this information was relevant to his state of mind as to the time of the incident. The judge ordered the prosecutor to inquire of the alleged victim whether he was an informant for any law enforcement agency and to report the result to defense counsel. The Commonwealth sought relief from this order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no basis for the judge to order the Commonwealth to ask the alleged victim whether he was a confidential informant, as this information, obtained by counsel after the alleged incident, logically could not demonstrate Defendant's state of mind at the time of the incident. View "Commonwealth v. Jordan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress out-of-course photographic identifications made by four witnesses even though the officers who conducted the identification procedures did not follow the protocol adopted in 2009, where the out-of-court identifications took place in 2007; (2) admitting testimony that two witnesses feared for their lives; and (3) admitting testimony that Defendant sold drugs, as the testimony could not have resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the Court held that Defendant was not entitled to relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Borgos" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in the district court with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license and various civil motor vehicle infractions. The court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant sought leave to appeal from that ruling pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied. Defendant's application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 15 has no application where a trial court judge denies a defendant's motion to dismiss in a criminal case; and (2) nor was Defendant entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws 211, ch. 3, as it was well established that, unless a single justice decides the matter on the merits or reserves and reports it to the full court, neither of which occurred here, a defendant cannot receive review under chapter 3, section 11 from the denial of his motion to dismiss. View "Azubuko v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Chukwuma Azubuko for failure to pay rent. Azubuko, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Commonwealth, two cities, and a town, asserting various constitutional, statutory, and common-law claims and contending that these governmental entities were liable for paying his rent. A district court judge dismissed the third-party claims and later dismissed the underlying complaint when Plaintiff and Azubuko failed to appear. Azubuko subsequently sought mandamus relief. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied Azubuko's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the single justice correctly denied the request for mandamus relief, as Azubuko had another remedy, namely, an appeal from the final judgment of the trial court dismissing his third-party complaint. View "Azubuko v. City of Boston" on Justia Law